HISTORY OF AURANGZIB

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HISTORY OF AURANGZIB

Mainly based on Persian Sources.

JADUNATH SARKAR, M.A.,

Professor, Patna College.

Vol. I.

Reign of Shah Jahan.

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INTRODUCTION.

The history of Aurangzib is practically the history of India for sixty years. His own reign (1658—1707) covers the second half of the seventeenth century and stands forth as a most important epoch in the annals of our country. Under him the Mughal empire reached its greatest extent, and the largest single State ever known in India from the dawn of history to the rise of the British power was formed. From Ghazni to Chatgaon, from Kashmir to the Karnatak, the continent of India obeyed one sceptre; and beyond this region, in far-off Ladak and Malabar, the suzerainty of the same ruler was proclaimed from the pulpit. Islam made its last onward movement in India in this reign.

The empire thus formed, while unprecedented in size, was also one political unit. Its parts were governed not by the mediation of sub-kings, but directly by the servants of the Crown. Herein Aurangzib's Indian empire was vaster than that of Asoka, or Samudra-gupta or Harshavarman. No provincial governor had as yet set up his own rule and withheld revenue and obedience from the central power. There were rebellions here and there, but no other crowned
head raised itself to defy the Emperor of Delhi even in any province.

But the reign that saw the formation of the greatest Indian empire of pre-British days, witnessed also unmistakable signs of its commencing decline and disruption. Long before Nadir Shah the Persian or Ahmad Shah the Afghan proved the Padishah to be an impotent shadow of royalty and Delhi the mere memory of past greatness, long before the Maratha confederacy hid beneath its super-imposed sway the regular monarchy of the land,—even before Aurangzib closed his eyes, the Mughal empire had turned bankrupt in finance and prestige, the administration had broken down, the Imperial power had confessed its failure to maintain order and hold this vast realm together.

The reign of Aurangzib is also marked by the upspringing of the Maratha nationality out of the ashes of their short-lived kingship, and by the appearance of the Sikh sect in the role of warriors and armed opponents of the ruling power. Thus the supreme factors of Indian politics in the 18th and early 19th centuries owe their origin to Aurangzib's reign and policy. In the Deccan, after kings like Adil Shah and Qutb Shah, Sambhaji and Rajah Ram, had bowed low before the Mughal blast, the people
asserted themselves and drove back the spoiler from the North. To the Marathas, alone among the Indian peoples, belongs the glory of giving the first successful check to the onward advance of the Mughal power and saving their fatherland from foreign encroachment. Their development into conquerors and raiders belongs to the next age.

In the very reign in which the Mughal crescent rounded to fulness and then began to wane visibly, the first glow of a new dawn was distinctly seen in our political sky. The future lords of our country's destiny gained a firm and safe footing on its soil. Madras and Bombay became presidencies of the English East India Company in 1653 and 1687 respectively; Calcutta was founded in 1690. The shelter thus secured to the Europeans formed a dominion within a dominion, and was fortified to defy the greatest onslaughts of the "country powers." The "merchant adventurers" here began their first experiments in Oriental government and legislation,—experiments which were destined in the fulness of time to result in an empire larger than that of the Romans and more populous than that of Charles V., and a civilised and progressive administration to which the world, ancient or modern, affords no parallel.
The end of the seventeenth century reveals the Mughal empire as rotten at the core. The grand edifice which Akbar had built up and Shah Jahan and Aurangzib had extended, still looked fair as before, but it was ready to tumble down like a house of cards at the first touch of the foreign invader's lance. The Treasury was empty. The Imperial army knew itself defeated and recoiled from its foes. The centrifugal forces were asserting themselves successfully, and the empire was ready for disruption. The moral weakness of the empire was even greater than the material: the Government no longer commanded the awe of its subjects; the public servants had lost honesty and efficiency; ministers and princes alike lacked statesmanship and ability; the army broke down as an instrument of force. In letter after letter the aged Aurangzib mourns over the utter incapacity of his officers and sons and chastises them with his sharp pen, but in despair of a remedy. Contemporaries like Bhimsen and Khafi Khan, sadly contrast the misery and degradation of the nobles and the people alike in Aurangzib's closing years with the glory of the empire under his forefathers, and wonder why it was so.

Why was it so? The ruler was free from vice, stupidity, or sloth. His intellectual keenness
INTRODUCTION.

was proverbial, and at the same time he took to the business of governing with all the ardour which men usually display in the pursuit of pleasure. In industry and attention to public affairs he could not be surpassed by any clerk. His patience and perseverance were as remarkable as his love of discipline and order. In private life he was simple and abstemious like a hermit. He faced the privations of a campaign or a forced march as uncomplainingly as the most seasoned private. No terror could daunt his heart, no weakness or pity melt it. Of the wisdom of the ancients which can be gathered from ethical books, he was a master. He had, besides, undergone a long and successful probation in war and diplomacy in his father's lifetime.

And yet the result of fifty years' rule by such a sovereign was failure and chaos! The cause of this political paradox is to be found in Aurangzeb's policy and conduct. Hence his reign is an object of supreme interest to the student of political philosophy no less than to the student of Indian history.

Happily, the materials for a study of it are abundant in Persian, the literary language of Mughal India. First, we have the official annals,—the Padishahnamah (in three sections by three
writers) and the Alamgirnamah—which cover the 41 years lying between the accession of Shah Jahan and the tenth year of Aurangzib’s reign. These works were written by order, on the basis of the State papers preserved in the Imperial archives, such as official correspondence, despatches, newsletters, treaties and revenue returns. They are rich in dates and topographical details of the utmost value and accuracy, but as they were read to the Emperor and revised by him before presentation to the public, they suppress or belittle all incidents likely to throw discredit on his character or government. For the last forty years of Aurangzib’s reign we have the Masir-i-Alamgiri, compiled from the same class of official records, but after his death, and hence free from the fulsome flattery and misrepresentation of the former two histories. Unfortunately, this work is very condensed and lacks the fulness and detail of the regular official annals.

Next come a class of private histories, like those of Masum, Aqil Khan, and Khafi Khan. These were written by officials, but, not having been meant for the Emperor’s eyes, they supply us with many of the facts suppressed in the court annals, though their dates and names are sometimes inaccurate and their descriptions meagre. They, however, contain many personal
traits and graphic touches which the more formal official histories have excluded. Khafi Khan, who has been mainly relied on by European writers, completed his work twenty-six years after the death of Aurangzib. His history is professedly an abridgement of the Court annals for the entire reign of Shah Jahan and the earlier part of that of Aurangzib. But he begins to speak with personal knowledge from about 1688 and often quotes what he had gathered from his father and his friends, who had witnessed earlier scenes. In the same class must be placed the biographical dictionary of the peers of the Mughal empire, the Masir-ul-umara, written in 1780 on the basis of the existing Persian annals, but giving many characteristic anecdotes from tradition and throwing many side-lights on the manners of past generations.

There are even two histories of Aurangzib's reign written by Hindus in the Persian tongue. One is the Nuskha-i-Dilkasha by Bhimsen Burhanpuri, the business man of Aurangzib's general Dalpat Rao Bundela. This author was an active traveller, with a good eye for topographical details, and a careful recorder of all he saw from Mathura to Malabar. His work is of special value for Deccan affairs, because there he was brought up and spent nearly all his life.
He lived near enough to the Imperial Court to learn facts accurately, but was not so closely connected with it as to be a lying flatterer. The other is the Fatuhat-i-Alamgiri of Isar-das Nagar, who long served the Shaikh-ul-Islam and lived at Pattan in Guzerat. This work is of great importance for Rajput affairs.

Besides these general histories of the reign, we have monographs in Persian touching only particular episodes or personages of the time,—such as Niamat Khan Ali's account of the siege of Golkonda, Shihabuddin Talish's diary of the conquest of Kuch Bihar, Assam, and Chatgaon, the memoirs of Iradat Khan and of some other servants of Bahadur Shah I. which start from the closing years of Aurangzib's reign. Of the two Deccani kingdoms of Golkonda and Bijapur we have separate histories, which throw light on the dealings of the Mughal Government with them. On the Maratha side there are chronicles (Bakhars) of Shivaji, Sambhaji, and Rajah Ram written by their officers and others. Mr. Rajwade is said to have hunted out a number of historical letters of the 17th century in Marathi for inclusion in the Aitihasik Lekh Sangraha series.

The Royal Asiatic Society of London has a box of Court bulletins of Aurangzib's time
(Akhbarat-i-Darbar-i-Muala). They are bare skeletons,—dry, extremely brief, and good only for dates. Only a few have been preserved for the first 22 years of the reign, but from the 36th year they are more numerous.

The accounts of Aurangzib's reign now current in India, especially in Urdu, are based on works like the Tarikh-i-Muhammad Shahi, and the Tarikh-i-Farah-Bakhsh, written long after the events and merely reproducing the bazar gossip and popular traditions. Not being based on official records and other contemporary sources of information, their evidence must be rejected wherever they conflict with the earlier and authoritative histories of Aurangzib's reign. These unreliable but picturesque works have inspired Dow's History of Hindostan and Stewart's History of Bengal, and continue to perpetuate many historical heresies in the popular belief of India.

Most fortunately, for several portions of Aurangzib's reign I have been able to secure the very raw materials of history,—a source of information even more valuable than the contemporary official annals described above. These are the LETTERS of the actors in the political drama of the 17th century, of which nearly three thousand are in my possession. In them we see
events as they happened day by day, and not as they were dressed up afterwards by writers with a purpose. In them we see the actual hopes and fears, plans and opinions of those who made Indian history. To this class belong the letters of Aurangzib (forming many different and bulky collections, to be described in the bibliography), of his father, brothers and sisters (in the Faiyaz-ul-qawanin, Lucknow MS.), of Jai Singh (in the Haft Anjuman, Benares MS.), of Aurangzib’s fourth son Prince Akbar (in the Adab-i-Alamgiri, the Zahur-ul-insha, and the Khatut-i-Shivaji), of Shah Abbas II. (in a MS. picked up by me in the Lucknow bazar), the Mughal-Maratha correspondence in the Khatut-i-Shivaji, and the letters of various officials such as Nur-ul-Hassan, Radandaz Khan, and Lutfullah Khan, besides several miscellaneous collections in the libraries of the Asiatic Society of Bengal, the India Office of London, and the Nawab of Rampur. Mr. P. V. Mawji of Bombay has collected some Persian letters addressed to Shivaji and his father, but he has declined to let other scholars use them.

An extremely interesting collection of anecdotes about Aurangzib with many of his sayings and orders on petitions, is the Ahkam-i-Alamgiri, ascribed to Hamiduddin Khan Nimchah, which I have translated as Anecdotes of Aurangzib.
We have a cloud of witnesses,—both professed histories and collections of letters,—for the beginning and the end of Aurangzib's reign; but the intervening period of nearly thirty years (1667—1696) is comparatively dark. I, however, believe that many other historical letters of these decades can still be discovered in India, especially in the United Provinces of Agra and Oudh, if my educated countrymen interest themselves in the quest and make it a point to examine the Persian MSS. in private possession with knowledge and care.

The European travellers, Tavernier, Bernier, and Manucci, who visited India in this reign, have left long accounts of the country. Their works are of undoubted value as throwing light on the condition of the people, the state of trade and industry, and the history of the Christian churches in India. Moreover, the criticism of Indian institutions by foreign observers has a freshness and weight all its own. But of the political history of India, apart from the few events in which they took part or which they personally witnessed, their report merely reproduced the bazar rumours and the stories current among the populace, and cannot be set against the evidence of contemporary histories and letters in Persian. Tavernier and Bernier
touch only the beginning of the reign; the former took most of his facts from Bernier, who, again, was indebted to Manucci for several particulars. The last-named writer's Storia do Mogor covers the whole reign; but he was a run-away lad of poor education when he reached India, and, as is admitted by his able editor, was a credulous listener. He wrote long after most of the events, and from memory; hence we cannot expect accuracy in his narrative. From their position these foreign travellers had no access to the best sources of information; the State archives were closed to them. They visited the makers of Indian history only occasionally and as suppliants for favours; hence they could not derive the oral information which only familiar intercourse with the highest personages in camp and Court could have given them. Finally, their imperfect knowledge of literary Persian prevented them from using the written annals of the time and checking the reports they had received orally. For instance, Manucci's story of how Aurangzib, when travelling slenderly guarded, met with Jai Singh at the head of an army and with great presence of mind hailed him as a friend (Storia, i. 320), is proved by the known dates to have been impossible. The official annals are so detailed that any wrong date in
them clashes with what goes before and after, and can be at once detected. We must accept their dates as against those supplied by the European travellers. Hence, in my narrative, I have not been able to use Bernier and Manucci except to a limited extent, viz., where they supplement the official histories or record the writers' personal experiences.

I cannot place this history before the public without acknowledging the deep debt of gratitude I owe to the late Mr. William Irvine, i.c.s., the author of the Later Mughals. He freely lent me his own Persian MSS., took great pains in securing on my behalf permission from European public libraries to take copies of their MSS., and beat down the rates demanded by photographers in London and Paris for mechanically reproducing (by a process called 'rotary bromide print') Persian MSS. for me. In every difficulty and doubt that I have appealed to him, he has given prompt assistance and advice. A certain Indian Nawab has a rare volume of Persian historical letters. I secured his permission to take a copy of it at my expense, and engaged a scribe. But for more than a year the Nawab's officers under various pretexts refused my man access to the MS. At last, in despair I wrote to Mr. Irvine about the case. He wrote to one
of his friends, high in the Civil Service of the U. P., and this gentleman communicated with the Nawab. The owner of the MS. now had it copied at his own expense, bound the transcript in silk and morocco, and presented it to Mr. Irvine, who lent it to me as soon as he received it!

Mr. Irvine criticised and emended the first five chapters of this history, as carefully and minutely as if it were his own work. His lamented death has robbed me of the pleasure of presenting these volumes to him; but I am happy that I could show him at least a portion of the book, and I have been heartened in my undertaking by the following cordial appreciation from a critic of his standing and ability:

"I like the style—from this first impression,—it being a judicious compromise between the over-crowded stiffness of my Later Mughals and mere popular, journalese writing,—yet without any sacrifice of exactness." And again, "I like very much your attention to genealogy and topography and above all your recourse to all modern sources of information—the Indian Atlas and modern travellers."

Dr. C. R. Wilson, the historian of the Early Annals of the English in Bengal, who encouraged my historical studies and recommended me, unsolicited, to the Bengal Government for aid, is also beyond the reach of my thanks. The Education Department of Bengal, at his instance, very kindly made a grant of £39 5s. for getting copies of the MSS. I needed from the Bodleian,
the British Museum, and the Bibliotheque Nationale of Paris,—the copies to remain in the Imperial Library, Calcutta, as Government property, after I had done with them. The Secretary of State for India has lent me Persian MSS. from the India Office Library on four occasions and the Royal Asiatic Society of London twice, for which priceless help I am deeply indebted to them.

My thanks are due to the authorities of the Khuda Bakhsh Library (Bankipur), the Bodleian, the British Museum, the Cambridge University Library, the Bibliotheque Nationale (Paris), and the Berlin Royal Library, and to H. H. the Nawab of Rampur, Nawab Abdus Salam Khan Bahadur (late Sub-Judge, Oudh), Major Vaman Das Basu, I.M.S. (ret.), and Munshi Shyam Sundar Lal (of Benares), for their enlightened courtesy in allowing me to take copies of certain of their Persian MSS.

Among friends in India who have taken pains for me in securing the permission of owners of MSS. and engaging copyists, I gratefully mention Hafiz Ahmad Ali Khan (Rampur State), Mr. D. N. Mallik (Electrical Engineer) and Mr. Maqbul Alam, B.A., LL.B., (Benares). Nor should I omit the name of my former colleague, Maulvi Abdul Hai, Lecturer, Patna College, to whom I
have gone in every difficulty in interpreting Persian and who gave much of his time to collating the Persian MSS. copied for me.

In the spelling of Eastern words I have followed the Hunterian system, restricting u to express the sound of oo, except in a very small number of cases (such as Jumna, nullah, Calcutta, &c.) I have also in a few instances (like Barhamdeo) refrained from Sanskritising Hindi proper names, in order to avoid too great a departure from the popular pronunciation. All the dates in the Hijera era have been converted to the Christian era according to the Old Style.

Two volumes of my history are now placed before the public. A third is expected to be ready in manuscript a year hence. To complete this long reign of 50 years and give some account of the condition of the people, trade, life and manners, two more volumes at least will be needed. I am now on the threshold of my subject and can see its distant end but dimly.

_July, 1912._

_Jadunath Sarkar._

* Chapters I—IX, XI—XV, XIX, XXIII and XXIV were first printed in the _Modern Review_ and a portion of Ch. XXV in the _Indian Review_; but they have been thoroughly revised and emended before publication in their present form.
The History of Aurangzib.

CHAPTER I.

Boyhood and Education, 1618—1634.

Muhiuddin Muhammad Aurangzib, who ascended the throne of Delhi as Alamgir I., was the sixth child of Shah Jahan and Mumtaz Mahal, the royal couple who lie buried in the famous Taj Mahal. His grandfather, the Emperor Jahangir, after putting down one of Malik Ambar’s attempts to revive the Ahmadnagar kingship, was leisurely making a royal progress from Guzerat to Agra, with Shah Jahan and his family in his train, when at Dohad,* on the way to Ujjain, Aurangzib

* Dohad (22°50 N. 74°20 E., Indian Atlas, Sheet 36 s. w.) is a subdivision of the Panch Mahal District in the Bombay
was born, in the night of 15th Ziqada, 1027 A.H.* (or, according to European calculation, the night preceding Sunday, 24th October, 1618 A.D., Old Style). A few days afterwards when the Imperial Court reached Ujjain, the capital of Malwa, the princely infant's birth was celebrated with befitting splendour.†

Aurangzib cherished an affectionate memory of the place of his birth; we find him in his old age writing to his son Muhammad Azam, "Noble son, the village of Dohad, in the province of Guzerat, is the birth-place of this sinner. Deem it proper to treat its inhabitants with kindness. Conciliate and retain at his post the old man who has been its faujdar for a long time past."‡

Shah Jahan was intensely devoted to his wife Mumtaz Mahal, and never in her life parted from her in weal or woe. Wherever he moved, whether marching on a campaign, visiting different provinces, or, in Jahangir's later years, fleeing from his father's wrath through the wilderness of Telingana to Bengal,—his wife always bore him company. Thus, Aurangzib was

Presidency, and the town stands just south of the Dohad Station on the B. B. & C. I. Railway.

* Tuzuk-i-Jahangiri ed. by Syud Ahmud, p. 250.
† Tuzuk, p. 251.
‡ Ruqat-i-Alamgiri, lithographed ed., No. 31.
born on the return march from the Deccan and Murad Bakhsh* in the fort of Rohtas in South Bihar.

From 1622 till almost the end of his father's reign, Shah Jahan was under a cloud; the infatuated old Emperor, entirely dominated by his selfish and imperious consort Nur Jahan, deprived Shah Jahan of his posts and fiefs, and at last drove him into rebellion in self-defence. But the prince's efforts were in general unsuccessful, and he had to flee by way of Telingana, Orissa and Bengal to Jaunpur and back again to the Deccan by the same wild and terrible route, his wife and children accompanying him. At last he had no help but to submit to his father and give up his young sons, Dara and Aurangzib, as hostages. These two reached Jahangir's Court at Lahore in June 1626,† and remained under the care of Nur Jahan. Shortly afterwards Jahangir died, Shah Jahan ascended the throne, and the two boys were escorted by Asaf Khan to Agra, where a most pathetic scene was acted: their eagerly expectant mother clasped her long lost darlings to her bosom and poured out all her pent up

* Tuzuk, 391.
affection for them* (26 February, 1628). Aurangzib’s daily allowance was now fixed at Rs. 500.

Thus, at the age of ten he came to a settled life; and arrangements were evidently now made for his regular education. Sadullah Khan, who rose to be the best reputed of Shah Jahan’s wazirs, is said† to have been one of his teachers. Another teacher was Mir Muhammad Hashim of Gilan, who after a study of twelve years at Mecca and Medina came to India, learnt medicine under Hakim Ali Gilani, and kept a famous school at Ahmadabad, where he was afterwards made Civil Judge (Sadr). As Aurangzib’s tutor he remained in the Prince’s service till the end of Shah Jahan’s reign.‡ Bernier§ speaks of Mulla Salih as his old teacher, but the Persian histories do not bear this statement out. Of one Mulla Salih Badakhshani|| we read that he was a scholar of Balkh and had his first audience of Shah Jahan on 4th January, 1647, when Aurangzib was already 29 years of age,—too old to go to school.

* Abdul Hamid’s Padishahnamah, I.A. 70, 97, 177.
‡ Padishahnamah, I. B. 345.
§ Bernier’s Travels, ed. by Constable, p. 154.
|| Padishahnamah, ii. 624.
That Aurangzib had a natural keenness of mind and quickly learnt what he read, we can readily believe. His correspondence proves that he had thoroughly mastered the Quran and the Traditional Sayings of Muhammad (Hadis), and was ever ready with apt quotations from them. He spoke and wrote Arabic and Persian like a scholar. Hindustani was his mother tongue, the language used by the Mughal Court in private life. He had some knowledge of Hindi, too, and could talk and recite popular sayings in that language.* He acquired a mastery over Chaghtai Turki, as he had served in Balkh and Qandahar, and the Mughal army contained a large body of men recruited from Central Asia. Under exactly the same circumstances Jai Singh had learnt that foreign tongue.†

Aurangzib wrote Arabic in a vigorous and masterly naskh hand. In this he used to copy the Quran, a deed of piety in Muslim eyes. Two manuscripts of this book he presented to Mecca and Medina, after richly binding and illuminating them.‡ A third copy is preserved at the tomb of Nizam-

† Dilkasha, p. 63.
‡ Masir-i-Alamgiri, 532.
uddin Auliya near Delhi. Others were sold in his lifetime by this puritan Emperor, who deemed it sinful to eat the bread of idleness, and used to ply the trade of copyist and cap-maker in his leisure hours in order to earn his livelihood. Copies of these Qurans are known to exist here and there in India.

“His nastaliq and shikasta styles of writing were also excellent,” says Saqi Mustad Khan, and this we can readily believe, for Aurangzib was the author of a vast number of letters, and made it a point to write orders across all petitions in his own hand.* The princes of the house of Akbar were taught handwriting with great care, as the signatures of Shah Jahan and Dara Shukoh on some Persian MSS. of their libraries, and the autograph remarks of Jahangir in his book of fate (a copy of the Diwan of Hafiz), look remarkably clear and beautiful.†

In his letters and speeches, he frequently quotes verses to point his remarks. But these “familiar quotations” were a part of the mental equipment of every cultured Muhammadan, and do not prove any special taste for poetry. Indeed his historian remarks, “This

* Alamgirnamah, 1092—'94.
† MSS. containing the autographs of these princes are preserved in the Khuda Bakhsh Library, Bankipur.
emperor did not like to hear useless poetry, still less laudatory verses. But he made an exception in favour of poems containing good counsels." The moral precepts of Sadi and Hafiz he had evidently learnt by rote in his youth, and he quoted them to his last day, but he does not seem to have studied these poets in later life. Once he asked for the works of a poet named Mulla Shah. But we may rightly hold that, unlike his grandfather he was not fond of poetry, and unlike Shah Jahan he had no passion for history. "His favourite study was theological works,—Commentaries on the Quran, the Traditions of Muhammad, Canon Law, the works of Imam Muhammad Ghazzali, selections from the letters of Shaikh Sharf Yahia of Munir, and Shaikh Zainuddin Qutb Muhi Shirazi, and other works of that class." We also learn that he

* Masir-i-Alamgiri, 532.

† Asiatic Society of Bengal Pers. MS. F. 27, 5a. He mentions another poet whose pen-name was Fani.

‡ Masir-i-Alamgiri, 531-532. He spent his leisure in the afternoon in investigating theological problems, deliberating on the philosophy of truth, (lit., 'the certain sciences,') reading the books and pamphlets of wisemen and saints. (Alamgirnamah, 1103.) Aurangzib speaks of his having read two books of Ghazzali (A.S.B. Pers. MS. F. 27, 126a and b.)
highly prized the *Nihaiyya* of Mulla Abdullah Tabbakh.* Like many other pious Muslims, and even some ladies of the Mughal royal family, Aurangzib committed the *Quran* to memory.

Such intellectual tastes made him find delight in the society of dervishes, and when he was Viceroy of the Deccan, he took care to visit the holymen of Islam in his province, engaging them in talk, and reverently learning wisdom at their feet.

Painting he never appreciated. Indeed the portraiture of any living being was impossible under an orthodox Islamic king, as an impious imitation of the Creator. Music he banished from his Court, in the outburst of devotion which marked the completion of the tenth year of his reign. Fine Chinaware he liked, and these were presented to him by nobles and traders. But he had none of his father's passion for building. No masterpiece of architecture, no superb or exquisite mosque,† hall, or tomb marks his reign.

* Masir-i-Alamgiri, 391.

† Except one, the Pearl Mosque in the Delhi palace, which was begun on 10 Dec. 1659 and completed in 5 years at a cost of one *lakh* and sixty thousand rupees, (*Alamgir-namah, 468, Masir-i-Alamgiri, 29*). His mosque at Lahore is not the best one in that city.
All that he built took the impress of his utilitarian mind. They were commonplace necessary things, piles of brick and mortar, which quickly decayed. Such were the mosques which marked the scenes of his victories, and the numberless serais which he built along the Imperial highways running to the south and the west.*

One incident of his boyhood made his fame ring throughout India, and showed what stuff he was made of. It was his encounter with a fighting elephant on 28th May, 1633. That morning Shah Jahan, who loved this sport, set two huge elephants, Sudhakar and Surat-sundar by name, to fight a combat on the level bank of the Jumna near the mansion at Agra which he used to occupy before his accession. They ran for some distance and then grappled together just below the balcony of the morning salute in the fort. The Emperor hastened there to see the fight, his eldest three sons riding a few paces before him. Aurangzib, intent on seeing the fight, edged his way very close to the elephants.

* Aurangzib's mosque at Fatihabad or Dharmat, where he defeated Jaswant Singh, was in ruins when I visited it on 19th October, 1909. For the serais he built, see Alamgirnamah, 1084.
The brutes after a while let go their grip and each stepped back a little. Sudhakar's spirit was fully roused. Losing sight of his opponent he turned to vent his wrath on the prince standing by. Trumpeting fiercely, the moving mountain charged Aurangzib. The Prince, then only fourteen years old, calmly stood his ground, kept his horse from turning back, and flung his spear at the elephant's head. All was now confusion and alarm. The crowd swayed this way and that, men stumbling on one another in their eagerness to flee. The nobles and the servants ran about shouting, fireworks were let off to scare away the elephant, but all to no effect. The animal came on and felled Aurangzib's horse with a sweep of his long tusk. But the prince jumped up from the ground, drew his sword, and faced the raging beast. The unequal combat would have soon ended fatally for the heroic boy, but succour was at hand. His brother Shuja forced his way through the crowd and smoke, galloped up to the elephant, and wounded it with his spear. But his horse reared and he was thrown down. Rajah Jai Singh, too, came up, and while managing his shying steed with one hand attacked the elephant with the other from the right side. Shah Jahan
shouted to his own guards to run to the spot.

Just then an unlooked for diversion came to the princes' aid. The other elephant, Surat-sundar, ran up to renew the combat, and Sudhakar, having now no stomach for the fight, or being daunted by the spear-thrusts and fire works discharged at him, fled from the field with his rival thundering at his heels.

The danger thus passed away, and the princes were saved. Shah Jahan clasped Aurangzib to his bosom, praised his courage, gave him the title of *Bahadur* or 'hero,' and covered him with presents. The courtiers cried out that the boy had inherited his father's reckless courage, and told each other how Shah Jahan in his youth had attacked a wild tiger sword in hand before the eyes of Jahangir.*

On this occasion Aurangzib gave a foretaste of his lofty spirit and royal contempt for death, in his speech as reported by Hamiduddin Khan. When his father lovingly chid him for his rash courage, he replied, "If the fight had ended fatally for me it would not have been a matter of shame.

* Abdul Hamid, I.A. 489—495, Khafi Khan, I. 474. In one MS. we have *Madhukar* for *Sudhakar.*
Death drops the curtain even on emperors; it is no dishonour. The shame lay in what my brothers did!”*

Three days afterwards occurred his fifteenth birthday. The Emperor had the boy weighed against gold pieces in full Court and presented him with the amount (5000 mohars,) the elephant Sudhakar, and other gifts worth two lakhs of rupees in all. The heroic deed was celebrated in Urdu and Persian verses. The Poet Laureate, Saidai Gilani, surnamed Bedil Khan, got Rs. 5,000 for his ode. Shuja was praised for his gallant exertions. Another sum of 5,000 gold pieces was distributed by the Emperor in charity.†

Thereafter we get occasional glimpses of Aurangzib. Next year the Emperor paid a visit to Kashmir. Aurangzib accompanied him, and was presented with the parganah of Lukh-bhavan near Sahibabad or Achbal (September, 1634).‡

* Hamiduddin Khan’s Ahkam-i-Alamgiri, Ir. MS. 15a & b. Dara Shukoh is unjustly taunted with cowardice in the above speech. He was at some distance from Shuja and Aurangzib, and could not, even if he had wished it, have come to Aurangzib’s aid as the affair was over in a few minutes. For another version of the incident, see Dow, iii. 136.

† Abdul Hamid, I. A. 493.

‡ Abdul Hamid, I. B. 52. Achbal, in the Kuthar Pargana,
Hitherto Aurangzib had been getting, like other Mughal princes before they were old enough for military appointment, a daily allowance of Rs. 500. But on 13th December, 1634, though not yet sixteen, he got his first post in the Mughal peerage, with the rank of a Commander of Ten Thousand Horse, with an additional following of 4000 troopers. He was also permitted to use the red tent, which was a royal prerogative.* The governorship of the Deccan was intended for him, and there, under the guidance of the highest generals of his father’s Court, he was expected to receive the best education then possible for a man of action and a leader of men. As a preparation for this high and difficult post he was given his first lessons in the art of war and the control of men by being sent to the Bundela Expedition in September, 1635.†

75°17 E. Long. 33°41 N. Lat., famous for its beautiful springs described by Bernier (Constable’s ed. p. 413). At the western end of the Pargana and 5 miles to the s. w. of Achbal is the village of Lokbavan. King Lalitaditya is said to have built a town here. A small garden-palace erected in Mughal times near the spring is partly constructed of old materials. (Stein’s Rajatarangini, i. 50n, ii. 468.)

* Abdul Hamid, I. B. 65.
CHAPTER II.

THE BUNDELA WAR, 1635.

As the old road from Agra to the Deccan leaves Gwalior, it skirts on its left hand side an extensive jungly tract known as Bundelkhand. The Jumna river and the Kaimur range, meeting in a sharp angle near Mirzapur, enclose this district on the north, east, and south. Its western boundary is the edge of the Malwa plateau. The river Betwa flowing north-eastwards to the Jumna cuts it into two.

The country took its name from its dominant race, the Bundelas, a clan of Gaharwar Rajputs, whose mythical genealogy stretches up to Rajah Pancham, a sworn devotee of the goddess Vindhya-basini, and even beyond him to Rama, the hero of the Ramayana.* The only element of truth that we can extract from

this mass of fiction is that a great ancestor of the family migrated from the Benares, through the Mirzapur District, and established his rule over this tract by dispossessing its older rulers, Afghans and aborigines.* Urchha, on the Betwa, was their first capital, (founded in 1531). Here lived the head of the clan. The Bundelas multiplied fast, and the younger branches established principalities all over the land, each centring round a fort. One of these, Mahoba, sheltered within a network of ravines, rose to prominence in the latter half of the seventeenth century, under, Champat Rao and his son Chhatra Sal, who long troubled the Imperial government. Other scions of the family reigned at Simroha Shahpur, and many another town.†

The Bundela power reached its zenith under Bir Singh Dev, the agent employed by Jahangir in murdering his father’s beloved minister Abul Fazl. There was hardly any favour which the Emperor could

* Elliot’s *Memoirs...of the Races of the N. W. P.* ed. by Beames, i. 45-46. *Imperial Gazetteer (ed. 1906)* ix, 68, 70, *Masir-ul-Umara*, ii. 131.

† Pogson, 11. *Urchha* is situated 7 m. south-east of Jhansi fort. *Mahoba* is midway on the railway line between Jhansi and Manikpur.
refuse to this Rajah.* Bir Singh grew in wealth and power, and towards the close of his patron's reign, when the Imperial administration grew slack, he freely levied contributions from the neighbouring princes, for none durst complain against the favourite. As a still higher mark of his master's favour he was permitted to build grand temples at Mathura, Urchha, and other places; — a fact which the Muhammadan historian can explain only by supposing that the Islamic Emperor was then sinking into dotage!† With all his lavish expenditure on temples and ghats, gifts to Brahmans, and construction of palaces, forts and lakes, Bir Singh died in 1627, the master of fabulous wealth, fully two krores of rupees,— which in Bundela fashion was buried in wells and other safe places in the pathless jungles, and their secret confided only to a few.‡

His eldest son Jhujhar Singh had given offence to Shah Jahan by leaving the capital for his home without permission, soon after the

* Blochmann's Ain-i-Akbari, i. 488 and xxv-xxvi M.U. ii. 197—199.
† M.U. ii. 199. Abdul Hamid's Padishahnamah, I. A. 293.
‡ Abd. Ham., I. B. 117.
Emperor's accession. But an army of 34,500 soldiers—cavalry, foot musketeers, and sappers, penetrated into his country from three directions, stormed the fort of Irich, slaughtered 2000 of the garrison including "many young and old," and quickly forced the Rajah to make submission. He secured pardon only by promising a large tribute and sending a contingent of his clansmen to fight in the Emperor's wars in the South.*

To this race of primitive warriors a peaceful life was impossible. War was their sole occupation, their sole means of earning glory and riches, and their only amusement. This restless spirit made the Bundelas, when not usefully occupied

* Abdul Hamid, I. B. 240—242, 246—248. Jhujhar's life in given in M.U. ii. 214—217. The cause of his flight is stated to have been his fear lest the stricter administration of Shah Jahan should make him disgorge his father's unauthorised annexations of territory. Dow says that "having come to pay his respects at the court of Agra, he found that an addition was made in the books of the Imperial Treasury, to the tribute which he and his ancestors had formerly paid to the house of Timur. Instead of petitioning for an abatement of the impost, he fled without taking leave of the Emperor." (iii. 108.) Khafi Khan, i. 406, says that Jhujhar was alarmed and fled on learning that Shah Jahan had been thinking of extirpating his father for his annexations and exactions during Jahangir's last years. Irich is situated on a bend of the Betwa river, 40 miles N. E. of Jhansi (Ind. Atlas, sheet 69 N. W.).
in war, a bye-word for robbery and disturbance throughout the seventeenth century.*

Jhujhar could not long remain quiet. He led an army to Chauragarh, an old Gond capital, beyond the Narmada, captured it, and, in violation of his plighted word, slew the Rajah Prem Narayan and seized his ancestral hoard, amounting to 10 lakhs of rupees. The victim's son appealed to Shah Jahan, but strangely enough, the Mughal Emperor's righteous indignation was not roused by this act of spoliation, he only demanded a share of the booty† and offered to

* Imp. Gazetteer, ix. 70.
† Abdul Hamid, I. B. 95, gives the Gond king's name as Bim (=Bhim) Narayan. The Imp. Gaz. xviii. 387, has Prem Narayan. Shah Jahan's message to Jhujhar ran thus: "As you have shed the blood of Bhim Narayan and his family and seized the country of Garha without my permission, it is best for you to present the country to my officers. But if you wish to be confirmed in that country you must give up your jagirs near your home, in exchange of it, and send to me 10 lakhs of rupees out of the cash taken from Bhim Narayan." This is the official account revised by Shah Jahan himself. Not a word is said here about making restitution to the murdered Rajah's son. Khafi Khan, who admittedly took his facts from this book, however, says, "Shah Jahan repeatedly wrote to Jhujhar to restore Bhim Narayan's property to his heirs, but in vain" (i. 507).
leave Jhujhar in possession of his conquest if he ceded an equivalent territory to the Mughals! This the Bundela was most unwilling to do. Deciding on a policy of resistance, he secretly recalled his son Yograj (surnamed Vikramajit), whom he had left in charge of his contingent in Balaghat. The youth slipped away unperceived. But an energetic Mughal officer, Khan-i-Dauran, was soon at his heels, reached Ashta from Burhanpur by forced marches in five days, and overtook Vikramajit, who fled defeated and wounded to his father at Dhamuni.*

A habitual plunderer and refractory chieftain could not be left unsubdued on the edge of the Deccan road. Shah Jahan organised an expedition to hunt him down. Three armies were to converge upon the rebel’s country: Syed Khan-i-Jahan with 10,500 men from Budaun, Abdullah Khan Bahadur Firuz Jang with 6,000 men from the north, and Khan-i-Dauran with 6,000 men from the southwest. The Bundela army

* Abdul Hamid, I. B. 95-96. Chauragarh is in the Narsinghpur District, C. P., about 10 miles S. E. of the Gadarwara Station. Dhamuni is near the Dhasan river 24 m. north of Saugor in C. P. (Ind. Atlas, 70 S. W.).
numbered less than 15,000 but were aided by the rocks and jungles of their home. *

Among the Hindu mercenaries of the Mughal army was a Bundela claimant in whom Shah Jahan found a useful tool. Devi Singh was the representative of the eldest branch of the Rajahs of Urchha, which had been set aside by Jahangir when he gave the throne to his favourite Bir Singh Dev. Jhujhar had duly succeeded his father; but in Devi Singh's eyes the usurpation continued, and he himself was the rightful heir to the Bundela throne. He was now earning his bread as a Captain in the Mughal army, and waiting for some opportunity of winning the Emperor's favour and ousting his rival. Shah Jahan now offered to make him Rajah of Urchha, and got the invaluable help of a Bundela contingent burning with hatred of Jhujhar and eager to guide the invaders through the jungles and disclose all the weak points of their native land. †

The three Mughal generals were of equal rank,

* The Bundela army consisted of about 5000 cavalry and 10,000 infantry, whereas in the Mughal army the horse outnumbered the foot several times.

and it would have been hard to ensure unity of plan and co-operation among them if they had been left to themselves. A supreme commander was needed, whose high position would of itself enforce discipline and obedience. For this purpose the Emperor sent his son Aurangzib, then a lad of sixteen, with the rank of a Commander of 10,000 and escorted by 1000 archers of the guard and 1000 horse. He was to be the nominal chief of the expedition, and stay far in the rear. The three generals were to advise him about every military operation, but his voice was to be decisive, and they were not to act without consulting him.*

In the meantime an ultimatum had been

* Abdul Hamid, I. B. 99-100. Dow's highly coloured account is very amusing to read: "Aurungzebe was sent against him. This was the first opportunity given to that young lion of rioting in blood....The war was protracted for two years...Aurungzebe though but thirteen years of age, displayed that martial intrepidity...which could not be restrained. He was present in every danger, &c." (iii. 132). If the campaign was meant to be Aurangzib's baptism of fire, we must say that the baptism was performed at a great distance from the fire. Throughout the war the young prince was kept by his guardian safe in the rear, many miles behind the fighting line.
presented to Jhujhar Singh: he must submit, pay a fine of 30 lakhs, and cede a district. But these terms had been rejected. After the rainy season the three divisions united together near Bhander, about 25 miles north-east of Jhansi, and marched upon Urchha. Every day the pioneers cut the jungle and extended the road, while the Bundela skirmishers shot at them under cover of the trees, but with no success. On 2nd October, 1635, the army arrived at a village two miles from Urchha; and the Bundela prince in the Imperial camp, fired with domestic hatred and ambition, stormed the hillock where the enemy had mustered in force and took many prisoners. At this Jhujhar lost heart, removed his family to Dhamuni and soon afterwards fled thither himself. Early in the morning of 4th October the Mughals scaled the walls of the Bundela capital, while the small garrison left by Jhujhar escaped through the opposite gate. *

A day was spent in taking full possession of the city and installing Devi Singh as Rajah. Then the Mughal army crossed the Betwa and hastened southwards to Dhamuni. But their

* Abdul Hamid, I. B. 98—100, 106-107.
prey had again fled. Jhujhar Singh had found no safety in Dhamuni, but gone further south, across the Vindhya hills and the Narmada river, to Chauragarh in the land of the Gonds. Dhamuni had, however, been prepared to stand a siege. The houses round the fort had been razed to the ground and a gallant Rajput named Ratnai left in command. On 18th October the Imperialists arrived before the fort and began siege operations. The garrison fought till midnight, and then sent a man to Khan-i-Dauran to beg for quarter. But a body of Ruhelas had run their trenches to the edge of the bamboo thicket adjoining the eastern wall of the fort, and occupied the jungle under cover of the darkness. After mid-night some of them entered the fort from that side and began to plunder. Khan-i-Dauran soon arrived and tried to restore order in the darkness. The fort was rapidly filling with the victors when suddenly a powder magazine in a tower of the southern wall took fire from the torch of a careless plunderer; a dreadful explosion followed, blowing up 80 yards of the enormously thick wall and killing 300 Rajputs standing under the wall and also 200 horses.*

News arrived about the exact route of the

* Abdul Hamid, I. B. 108—110.
fugitives, and on 27th October the pursuit was resumed. Arriving at Chaurahar through Garh the Imperialists found that Jhujhar had evacuated that fort also, after breaking up the artillery, burning all property, and blowing up the old Gond palaces. A Mughal garrison was posted here, but the main army encamped four miles off, at Shahpur. Here they learned that Jhujhar was flying south through the Gond kingdoms of Deogarh and Chanda, with 6000 soldiers and 60 elephants, and making about 16 miles a day. Though he had got a start of 14 days, the Mughal generals took up the chase from Shahpur with a light force which daily covered 40 miles. On the frontier of Chanda they came upon his traces and doubled their speed. Jhujhar turned at bay, fought the Mughals obstinately, but was defeated and driven into the jungle, and the pursuit was resumed. The fugitive, encumbered with women and property, and hindered in his movements by his paucity of horses, had no peace. He could not snatch any sleep, nor refresh his worn-out horses. As soon as he halted for the night, he heard of the approach of the pursuers, broke up his camp and urged his tired men and beasts on again. All means of escape were tried; the foot-tracks
of the elephants were rubbed out; treasure-laden elephants were sent by another path to lure the Mughals away from the road taken by the Bundela chief. But the Imperialists were too astute; they neglected everything else and steadily pursued the rebel himself. They also bribed the local landowners, who showed them the way and kept them regularly informed of the movements of Jhujhar, so that the jungle was now a hindrance rather than a shelter to him. And from the thievish Gonds no Bundela could expect mercy.*

Jhujhar's party was now divided, but all to no purpose. His sons were overtaken, and got no time to slay their women, as was the Rajput custom when death was to be preferred to dishonour. A few of the ladies had been stabbed, when the Mughals fell upon them, slew the guards, and captured the Bundela royal family.†

The rebel chief and his eldest son Vikramajit had fled into the heart of the jungle, where their doom overtook them. The Jhujhar murdered by the Gonds.

The Thievish Gonds, moved by their instinct of plunder and hope of reward from the Mughals, surprised the exhausted princes

† Abdul Hamid, I. B. 114-115.
in their sleep and cruelly did them to death.* Their heads were cut off and sent to the Emperor (December, 1635), who exposed them on the gates of his camp at Saihur.†

But their lot was happy in comparison. Happy

* The following very graphic and seemingly true account of their end is given by Dow (iii. 133); but we know not what Persian history he translated, and hence we cannot verify and accept his narrative. "The unfortunate Prince was, at length, overcome with fatigue. He came into a forest, and finding a pleasant plain in the middle, he resolved to halt; dreaming of no danger in the centre of an impervious wood. Both he and his followers alighted, and tying their horses to trees, betook themselves to rest. A barbarous race of men possessed the country round. They had not seen the Raja's troops, but the neighing of his horses led some of them to the spot. Looking from the thicket into the narrow plain where the fugitives lay, they perceived, to their astonishment, a number of men richly dressed, sleeping on the ground; and fine horses standing near, with furniture of gold and silver. The temptation was too great to be withstood by men who had never seen so much wealth before. They rushed upon the strangers and stabbed them in their sleep. While they were yet dividing the spoil, Nuserit came. The robbers were slain, and the head of the Raja was brought back to the army."

† Abdul Hamid, I. B. 116-117. Khafi Khan describes the war in i. 506—516.
too was Rani Parvati, Bir Singh's widow, who died of her wounds. A more terrible fate awaited the captive ladies who survived: mothers and daughters of kings, they were robbed of their religion, and forced to lead the infamous life of the Mughal harem,*—to be the unloved plaything of their master's passion for a day or two and then to be doomed to sigh out their days like bondwomen, without knowing the dignity of a wife or the joy of a mother. Sweeter far for them would have been death from the hands of their dear ones than submission to a race that knew no generosity to the fallen, no chivalry to the weaker sex.

Three captives of tender age, (two sons and one grandson of Jhujhar,) were made Musalmans. Another son, Udaybhan, and Shyam Dawa the old and faithful minister of the house, who had taken refuge in Golkonda and been delivered to Shah Jahan, refused to apostatize and were executed in cold blood.†

The fort of Jhansi, with its big guns and war

* Abdul Hamid, I. B. 133. Khafi Khan, i. 519.
† Abdul Hamid, I. B. 133, 139. Khafi Khan, i. 519, 523. According to the latter the converts were Durgabhan,
material was forced to capitulate at the end of October. The Imperial officers now organised a regular hunt for the buried treasure of Bir Singh. The jungle was carefully searched and many wells filled with gold and silver were discovered in its untrodden depths. The spoils of war amounted to one krore of rupees besides other valuable property.*

As for the Gonds, their services against Jhujhar were forgotten. The Imperial forces in pursuit had reached the frontier of Chanda, the leading Gond kingdom. Such an honour had to be dearly paid for. The Rajah of Chanda was compelled to wait on the victors on his frontier, on the bank of the Pranhita river, pay down 6 lakhs in cash, and promise an annual tribute of 20 elephants or Rs. 80,000 as an equivalent.†

This opened the door to future troubles, and his kingdom was subjected to repeated exactions by the Mughals in the next reign.

a son of Jhujhar, and Durjan Sal and Narsingh Dev, his grandsons.

* Abdul Hamid, I. B. 133, 139, 119, and (for buried treasure) 110, 117, 123.

† Abdul Hamid, I. B. 117-118.
During the campaign in the Gond country Aurangzib had come to Dhamuni, far in the rear of the fighters. At his request Shah Jahan paid a visit to the newly conquered country, reaching Datia and Urchha at the end of November. At the Bundela capital "the Islam-cherishing Emperor demolished the lofty and massive temple of Bir Singh Dev near his palace, and erected a mosque on its site."* To this Devi Singh, the newly appointed Rajah, made no objection. The temples of his gods might be defiled, his brave and proud clansmen might be butchered, insolent aliens might trample his fatherland down "with the hoofs of their horses," the princesses of his house might be dragged into a shame worse than death,—but he could now enjoy the lordship of the country, he could now sit on the throne of Urchha and call himself a Rajah and the head of the Bundela clan, and therefore he rejoiced. For this he had laboured, and now he had his reward! Among the Hindu Rajputs who assisted at this pious work by fighting under the Mughal banner were Sisodias and Rathors, Kachhwahs and Hadas.†

* Abdul Hamid, I. B. 121-122.
† A large body of Rajputs served in the army sent against
But the noblest of the Bundelas did not bow down to the traitor. They of Mahoba kept up their opposition, gathered under the brave Champat Rao of Mahoba, crowned Jhujhar’s infant son Prithwiraj, and raided the territory of Urchha. This boy-king was soon afterwards captured and lodged in the state-prison of Gwalior.* But though one faineant Rajah after another reigned at Urchha, Champat Rao and his heroic son Chhatra Sal continued their wars to the end of the century. With them, however, it was a fruitless struggle. They could not hope to hold Urchha for good and unite the Bundelas under one sceptre; they only devastated the territory loyal to the Mughals, and spread havoc and insecurity over the land, till in the next century a mightier race of plunderers, Jhujhar. Their captains are named in Abdul Hamid, I. B. 96-97, 99-100. To contrast the Hindu spirit with the Muhammadan let us consider an imaginary parallel. Suppose that when Clive after winning Plassey marched to Murshidabad and placed Mir Jafar on the throne, he had ordered the chief mosque of the town to be converted into a Christian church, where pigs would be sacrificed every year on Atonement Day, would Mir Jafar have consented to take the crown on such a condition, would the Muslim troops in the East India Company’s service have submitted to this insult to their religion?

* Abdul Hamid, ii. 136, 193-194.
derers appeared on the scene, and Muslim and Bundela alike bowed down to the Maratha.*

Aurangzib returned from Dhamuni to wait on his father near Urchha, and together they travelled through the country, viewing its lakes and forts, beautiful scenery, and coverts for game. By way of Sironj they reached Daulatabad, where Aurangzib on 14th July, 1636, formally took leave of the Emperor to act as Viceroy of the Deccan.†


† Abdul Hamid, I. B. 118, 122-123, 134, &c., 205. Topographical Notes.—The fort of Urchha had walls made of stones laid on one another without mud or mortar. It had no battlement. The walls were about 8 miles in length. The river Betwa washes its eastern face. (I. B. 122). The northern, eastern and southern faces of the fort of Dhamuni were too steep to allow mining or trenching operations by besiegers. On the western side, where the ground is level, there were ditches 20 cubits deep, close to bamboo thickets under the walls. (107).
CHAPTER III.

FIRST VICEROYALTY OF THE DECCAN, 1636—1644.

Towards the close of Akbar's reign, the Mughal Empire began to extend beyond the Narmada river, which had so long been its southern boundary, except for the coast-strip running from Guzerat to Surat. Khandesh, the rich Tapti valley, was annexed in the year 1599.* Taking advantage of the discord and weakness reigning in Ahmadnagar, Akbar wrested from it Berar, the southern portion of the present Central Provinces. The murder of the heroic Chand Bibi by her factious nobles delivered the city of Ahmadnagar into his hands (1600); the boy Sultan was deposed and the kingdom annexed.† Thus in a few years the Mughal frontier had been pushed from the Narmada to the upper

* Berar in Elliot, VI. 84, 94, 98. Khandesh, VI. 134—146.
† Elliot, VI. 99—101.
courses of the Krishna river (here called the Bhimá). But the annexation was in form only. The new territory was too large to be effectively governed or even fully conquered. Everywhere, especially in the south and the west, local officers of the old dynasty refused to obey the conqueror, or began to set up puppet princes as a screen for their self-assertion. The Sultans of Bijapur and Golkonda seized the adjacent districts of their fallen neighbour.

During Jahangir's feeble reign the Mughal advance was stayed and even beaten back. The Emperor lay under the voluptuous spell of Nur Jahan. His generals took bribes from the Deccani kings and let the war languish.* A great leader, too, arose in the South. Malik Ambar, an Abyssinian of rare genius and capacity, became prime minister of the shadowy king of Ahmadnagar, and for a time restored the vanished glories of the house. His wise revenue system made the peasantry happy, while enriching the State. A born leader of men, he conciliated all parties, maintained order, and left a

* For the Mughal wars in the Deccan in Jahangir's reign, see Abdul Hamid, I. B. 182—201, Khafi Khan, i. 282—294, 304—307, 314—324, 347—350. Gladwin, 19, 21, 25, 37—39, 51—54, etc.
name for justice, vigour and public benefit which has not been forgotten yet.* Building up a grand alliance of the Deccani Powers he attacked the Mughals in overwhelming force, drove them back to Burhanpur, and closely invested their Viceroy in that city (1620). The crisis broke the sleep of Jahangir. His brilliant son Shah Jahan was sent to the Deccan with a strong relieving force, and by firmness and skill he recovered much that had been lost since the death of Akbar. But the internal discords of the Mughal Court during Jahangir’s dotage prevented the effectual conquest of the Deccan and the cause of the Imperialists did not prosper.

With the accession of Shah Jahan to the throne of Delhi the scene changed. He began a vigorous policy in the Deccan. His generals soon felt that their new master could not be befool ed or disobeyed. Husain Shah, the last king of the Nizam Shahi dynasty, was captured (1633), and the old possessions of his house began to be won by his vanquisher.†


† This king of Ahmadnagar, a mere puppet in the hands
But a fresh complication now arose. The Sultans of Bijapur and Golkonda cast longing glances at the adjacent forts and districts of Ahmadnagar, and tried to secure parts of the floating wreckage of the ruined kingdom. Nizam Shahi officers entered the service of the Bijapur king or were secretly aided by him in resisting the Mughals. He bribed them to give up to him some of their late master's forts. Shahji Bhonsla, the father of the celebrated Shivaji, with his light cavalry gave the Mughals great trouble. He could not be finally subdued without first getting control over Bijapur and Golkonda.*

The occasion called for heroic exertions, and Shah Jahan made his preparations on a befitting scale. For more efficient administration, Daulatabad and Ahmadnagar were now separated from the province of Khandesh and made an

of his minister Fatih Khan (the son of Ambar), was given up to the Mughals at the capture of Daulatabad, 17th June 1633 (Abdul Hamid I. A. 528) and imprisoned in Gwalior in September (540). Shahji set up another prince, whom he surrendered in November or December 1636. This boy is called a son (I. B. 135) and elsewhere a kinsman (khesb) of Nizam Shah (I. B. 36, 229, 256).

* Abdul Hamid, I. B. 35, 135, 140.
independent charge, with its separate viceroy
and capital, (November, 1634). Early in the
next year a Mughal force from Daulatabad gave
Shahji a long chase, but returned to Ahmadnagar
without being able to catch the swift Maratha.
The Emperor himself arrived at Daulatabad to
direct the operations (21st February, 1636.)*
Three large armies, totalling 50,000 men, were
held ready to be launched upon Bijapur and
Golkonda if they did not submit, while a fourth,
eight thousand strong, under Shaista Khan, was
despached to capture the Nizam Shahi forts in
the north-west, and to take possession of the
Junnar and Nasik districts.†

The news of this immense armament cowed
down Abdullah, the king of
Golkonda submits.

Golkonda, and without striking
a blow in defence of his inde-
pendence he agreed to become a vassal of the
Mughals. With an abjectness shameful in a
crowned head, he promised an annual tribute,
coined gold and silver pieces at his capital in
the name of Shah Jahan, and caused the Mughal
Emperor to be proclaimed from the pulpit as

† For Shaista Khan's operations, Abdul Hamid, I. B.
135-141, 146-150, Khafi Khan, i. 521-523.
his suzerain, while he stood by in loyal approval! (April, 1636.)*

The king of Bijapur had not fallen so low as that. He made a stand for the power and dignity of his ancestors. But the three Mughal armies at once entered his kingdom from three points, Bidar in the N. E., Sholapur in the W. and Indapur in the S. W. With a ruthlessness surpassing that of the French who desolated the Palatinate, the Mughal invaders everywhere destroyed all traces of cultivation, burnt down the houses, drove off the cattle, butchered the villagers, or dragged them away to be sold as slaves. With a refinement of cruelty they forced their prisoners to carry their own property for the benefit of the captors! Flourishing villages were ruined for ever, and the population thinned.†

But like the Dutch of a generation later, the


Bijapuris opposed to their foes the courage of despair. They cut the dam of the lake of Shahpur, flooded the country round the capital, and thus saved the city from invasion. The Mughal raiders returned baffled to their own territory.* Both sides now felt the need of peace, and a compromise was soon arrived at. Shah Jahan made a treaty with the king of Bijapur† on the following terms—

(1) Adil Shah, the king of Bijapur, must acknowledge the overlordship of the Emperor and promise to obey his orders in future.

(2) The pretence of a Nizam Shahi kingdom should be ended and all its territories divided between the Emperor and the Bijapur king. Adil Shah should not violate the new Imperial frontier nor let his servants hinder the Mughal officers in occupying and settling the newly annexed districts.

(3) The Sultan of Bijapur was to retain all his ancestral territory with the following additions from the Ahmadnagar kingdom:—in the west, the Sholapur and Wangi mahals, between the

* Abd. Ham. I. B. 153, Khafi Khan, i. 527.

† For the treaty with Bijapur see Abdul Ham. I. B. 168—173, 203, and Khafi Khan, i. 531—534, 537. For the treaty with Golkonda, Abd. Ham. I. B. 177—180.
Bhima and the Sina rivers, including the forts of Sholapur and Parenda; in the north-east, the parganahs of Bhalki and Chidgupa;* and that portion of the Konkan which had once belonged to the Nizam Shahs, including the Puna and Chakan districts. These acquisitions comprised 50 parganahs and yielded a revenue of 20 lakhs of hun (or eighty lakhs of rupees). The rest of the Nizam Shahi dominion was to be recognized as annexed to the Empire beyond question or doubt.

(4) Adil Shah should pay the Emperor a peace-offering of twenty lakhs of rupees in cash and kind. But no annual tribute was imposed.

(5) Golkonda being now a State under Imperial protection, Adil Shah should in future treat it with friendship, respect its frontier (which was fixed at the river Manjira, or roughly at 78° East longitude), and never demand costly presents from its Sultan, to whom he must behave "like an elder brother."

(6) Each side undertook not to seduce the

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officers of the other from their master's service, nor to entertain deserters, and Shah Jahan promised for himself and his sons that the Bijapur king would never be called upon to transfer any of his officers to the Imperial service.

(7) Shahji Bhonsla, who had set up a prince-ling of the house of Nizam Shah, should not be admitted to office under Bijapur, unless he ceded Junnar, Trimbak, and some other forts still in his hands to Shah Jahan. If he declined, he was not to be harboured in Bijapur territory or even allowed to enter it.

On 6th May, 1636, Shah Jahan sent to Adil Shah a solemn letter impressed with the mark of his palm dipped in vermilion, promising the above terms with an appeal to God and the Prophet to be witnesses. A portrait of the Emperor enclosed in a frame set with pearls and emeralds and hung by a string of pearls, which Adil Shah had begged, accompanied the letter. The Bijapur king received them on the 20th and in return delivered to the Mughal ambassador an autograph letter sealed with his own seal, formally agreeing to the treaty, and in the presence of the ambassador swore on the Quran to observe the conditions.*

* Abdul Hamid, I. B. 167, 173, 175.
For the ratification of the treaty an abstract of it was engraved on a gold plate and delivered to Adil Shah.

A still happier settlement was effected with the Sultan of Golkonda. On 25th June presents worth 40 lakhs of rupees arrived from him, with an autograph letter in which he vowed allegiance to the Emperor. Out of the four lakhs of hun, which he was bound to pay every year to the kings of Ahmadnagar, one-half was transferred to the Emperor, and the other remitted for the future.* This tribute was stipulated for in huns, a South Indian gold coin weighing about 52 grains. But as the exchange value of the hun in relation to the rupee afterwards varied, the king of Golkonda sowed another of the seeds of his future disputes with the Mughals.†

Thus after forty years of strife the affairs of the Deccan were at last settled. The position of the Emperor was asserted beyond challenge, his boundaries clearly defined, and his suzerainty over the Southern kingdoms formally established. A long period of peace could be now looked forward to, except for the hunting down of Shahji

* Abdul Hamid, I. B. 177—179.
† Adab-i-Alamgiri (Khuda Bakhsh MS.) 56a.
(who still led a shadowy Nizam Shahi king by the string), and the capture of a few forts like Udgir and Ausa, where the old Nizam Shahi officers still defied the Mughals. The Bijapur king, therefore, requested Shah Jahan to return to Northern India, as his continued presence with a large army was scaring away the Deccan peasantry from their homes and fields, and preventing the restoration of cultivation. As for the five forts in Shahji’s hands, Adil Shah himself would wrest them from the usurper for the Mughals.

Nothing being now left for Shah Jahan to do in the Deccan, he turned his back on Daulatabad (11th July, 1636) and set out for Mandu. Three days afterwards he sent away Aurangzib after investing him with the viceroyalty of the Deccan.*

The Mughal Deccan at this time† consisted of four provinces:—

I. Khandsesh or the Tapti valley, between the Satpura range in the north and the Sahyadri mountain in the south, with its capital at Burhanpur and fort at Asirgarh.

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* Abdul Hamid, I. B. 202, 205.
Abdul Hamid, I. B. 205, 62-63.
II. Berar, south-east of Khandesh, being bounded on the north by the Mahadeo hills and the Gond territory at the heart of the modern Central Provinces, and on the south by the Ajanta range and the Painganga river. Its capital was Ellichpur, and fort Gawilgarh.

III. Telingana, a vast and undefined territory of hills and forests, with a sparse and savage population, stretching south of Berar from Chanda and the Wainganga river to the northern and north-eastern frontiers of Golkonda. The whole of it was upland (Balaghat).*

IV. Daulatabad, with Ahmadnagar and other dependencies. This was the Deccan proper and contained the seat of the viceroy at the fort of Daulatabad, while the civil station founded by Malik Ambar a few miles off, at Khirki, rapidly grew in size and splendour under Aurangzib and was newly named Aurangabad. The province was bounded on the north by the Ajanta hills and the Painganga river. Its eastern frontier as now defined was an imaginary line drawn about 77°15 East longitude, along the Manjira river, from Nander to Qandahar† and Udgir.

* The Golkonda frontier was along the Manjira river, west of Karimungi, 9 m. N. E. of Bidar (sheet 56) Abdul Hamid, I. B. 230, has Kumgir, evidently a mistake.
† Qandahar in the Deccan, 35 miles north of Udgir (Ind.
From the last named fort the line took a sharp turn due west to Ausa (a little above the 18th degree of North latitude), and then bent north-westwards by the northern limit of the Sholapur district, and the forts of Visapur, Parner and Junnar, till it struck the Western Ghats. At this part the Ghod river was the southern limit. Beyond Junnar, the boundary ran northwards along the Ghats, till it met the s. w. frontier of Khandesh at the angle where the Chandor hills branch off eastwards.*

There were in all 64 forts, mostly perched on hills, in these four provinces, and the total revenue was five krores of rupees, with which Aurangzib was to meet all the charges of administration. All fief-holders in the Deccan received orders to wait on the prince with their fixed contingents of troops, as ten forts had yet to be conquered.

Shah Jahan had before his departure deputed two generals, one to besiege Udgir and Ausa in the s. e., and the other to conquer Junnar in the west and crush Shahji.

At. 56). Nilang, a fort midway between Udgir and Ausa, belonged to Bijapur.

* Chamargunda is spoken of as near the frontier of Mughal Ahmadnagar (Abd. Ham., I. B. 137). The province of
Khan-i-Dauran with his division arrived before Udgir* on 19th June and at once took possession of the village under the fort. Trenches were opened on the s., the w., and the s. w., and mines run from the western side. As the mines approached the wall, the garrison lost heart and their leader, an Abyssinian named Siddi Miftah, opened negotiations for surrender. But he demanded too high a price, and the siege was pressed on. A mine was fired and the outer earth-work (technically called Shir Haji,) a hundred yards in circuit, was blown down with all its guns, ballista and other armaments. But as the citadel was unharmed, no assault was delivered. At last on 28th September, after a defence of more than three months, the fort capitulated; Siddi Miftah was taken into Imperial service with the title of Habsh Khan and the rank of a Commander of Three Thousand.†

Meantime Ausa had been invested and a detach-

Daulatabad included the sarkars of Ahmadnagar, Patan, Bir, Jalnapur, Junnar, Sangamnir, and Fatihabad or Dharur (Ibid, 62.)

* Udgir, 18°21' N. 77°10' E. (Indian Atlas, Sh. 56) 24 miles north of Bhalki. Ausa, 18°15' N. 76°33' E., five miles south of the Towraj river which flows into the Manjira (Ibid.).

† Abdul Hamid, I. B. 217-219, 248.
ment left under Rashid Khan to carry on its siege. The fall of Udghir set free a large force for strengthening the attack, while it damped the ardour of the defenders of Ausa. The commandant, a Rajput named Bhojbal, kept up a ceaseless fire on the besiegers. But when the trenches reached the edge of the ditch and mining was started, Bhojbal at last lost heart, gave up the fort (19th October), and was taken into the Imperial army as a Commander of One Thousand.*

Khan-i-Zaman's division had been equally successful in the Junnar district and the Konkan.†

A Bijapur contingent under Pursuit of Randaula Khan co-operated with him according to the new treaty. Leaving Ahmadnagar about the end of June, he marched on Junnar, of which the town was held by the Mughals and the fort by the Marathas. Two thousand men were told off to invest it, while the general himself marched with the rest of his army to capture Shahji's home near Puna. Heavy rain detained him for a month on the bank

* Abdul Hamid, I. B. 220-221.

of the Ghod river.* When at last the Mughals reached Lauhgaon on the Indrayani river, 34 miles from Shahji’s camp, the Maratha chief fled south to the hills of Kondhana (Sinhagarh) and Torna.†

The Mughals could not follow him at once as they had to cross three big rivers and also waited to see whether Randaula Khan would succeed in inducing Shahji to give up his forts peacefully. At last they crossed the Bhor-ghat in three divisions. Meanwhile Shahji had fled to the Konkan by the Kumbhá Pass and begged for asylum in vain at Danda-Rajpuri and other places. Then he doubled back by the same pass. But hearing that the Mughals had entered the Konkan, he lost his head, and fled towards the fort of Mahuli, some 32 miles north-east of Bombay. Khan-i-Zaman followed hard on his track, leaving his baggage behind. News came to him that Shahji was at Muranjan, 30 miles ahead. The Mughals pushed on thither in spite of the mud; but as soon as they were seen descending from a hillock

* He evidently halted at Sirur, close to which is the cantonment of Ghodnadi (Ind. At. 39 N. W.).
† Lohogaon, 10 m. N. E. of Puna and three miles south of the Indrayani (Ind. Atlas, Sh. 39 S. W.) on the way to Sirur. For Torna the text has Tornad.
6 miles behind the place, the Marathas lost heart and fled, leaving much of their property behind. At this the Mughals galloped on, slew many of Shahji’s rear-guard, and chased them for 24 miles, till their horses gave up in sheer exhaustion. Shahji then effected his escape; but his camp, baggage, spare horses, and camels, and the royal kettledrum, umbrella, palki, and standard of his creature, the boy Nizam Shah, were all captured. The Maratha leader fled fast and in twenty-four hours reached Mahuli, dismissed his unnecessary retainers, and prepared to stand a a siege. Khan-i-Zaman made another forced march through the rain and mud, seized the village at the foot of the fort with its store of provisions, and sat down before the two gates of Mahuli, stopping all ingress and egress. Shahji, after higgling for terms, at last capitulated: he entered the Bijapur service, and gave up to the Mughals his Nizam Shahi princeling, together with Junnar and six other forts still held by his men. Evidently he got good terms out of the Imperial Government, but the Court-historian is discreetly silent about the details. The campaign was over by the end of October, and Khan-i-Zaman returned to Aurangzib at Daulatabad to act as the Prince’s chief adviser.
Khan-i-Dauran,* after capturing Udgir and Ausa, had extorted from the
king of Golkonda a famous elephant named Gajmati, or
“the Pearl among Elephants”, priced one lakh of rupees, with another lakh of rupees for covering it with gold plates and hawda to make it worthy of presentation to the Emperor. He
next marched into the Gond country, between the Wardha and the Wainganga, levying contributions. First he seized the forts of Ashta and Katanjhar (Katanjhiri) from the hands of some refractory Gond chiefs, and then besieged Nagpur, the stronghold of Kukia, the Gond Rajah of Deogarh, who had refused to pay contribution. Three mines were fired, overthrowing two towers and parts of the wall; the assault was delivered, and the commandant Deoji taken prisoner. Kukia now came down on his knees: he interviewed Khan-i-Dauran (16 January, 1637), and made peace by presenting one and a half lakhs of rupees in cash and all his elephants (170 in number) and promising an annual tribute of one and one-third lakhs of rupees. Nagpur was restored to him.

The victorious Khan-i-Dauran returned to the Emperor, with 8 lakhs of rupees levied from the

Gond chiefs and others, and was extolled by his master above all his other generals, and given the high title of *Nusrat Jang* or "Victorious in War".*

The period of warfare which began with the Bundela Expedition in September, 1635, and ended now, enriched the Mughal treasury with tribute and booty amounting to two *krores of rupees*, and added to the empire a territory which *when cultivated* yielded a revenue of one *krore*. The Emperor now despatched a pompous letter to the Shah of Persia boasting of these conquests and gains.†

Aurangzib, however, was not long idle. The new treaties with Bijapur and Golkonda and the submission of the Gond country barred his aggression in the south and north-east. So, the Emperor authorised him to enrich himself and extend his dominion towards the north-west by conquering Baglana.‡

Between Khandesh and the Surat coast lies the district of Baglana. It is a small tract, stretching north and south for about 160 miles from the Tapti river to the Ghatmata hills.

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* Abdul Hamid, I. B. 246-247.
† Abdul Hamid, I. B. 257-266, 181.
‡ Abdul Hamid, I. B. 280.
of the Nasik district, and 100 miles east and west across the Ghats. It contained only a thousand villages and nine forts, but no town of note. Small as was its area, its well-watered valleys and hill-slopes smiled with corn-fields and gardens; all kinds of fruits grew here and many of them were famous throughout India for their excellence. The climate, except in the rainy season, is cool and bracing. The State was further enriched by the fact that the main line of traffic between the Deccan and Guzerat had run through it for ages.*

A Rathor family, claiming descent from the royal house of ancient Kanauj, had ruled this land in unbroken succession for fourteen centuries. The Rajahs styled themselves Shah and used the distinctive title of BAHARJI. They coined money in their own names and enjoyed great power from the advantageous situation of their country and the impregnable strength of their hill-forts, two of which, Saler and Mulher, were renowned throughout India as unconquerable.†

* For a description of Baglana, see Ain-i-Akbari, ii. 251, Abdul Hamid, II. 105-106, Imp. Gaz. vi. 190—192. Tavener's Bergram (i. 37) probably stands for Baglana. Khafi Khan, i. 561. Finch and Roe, (Kerr, viii. 277, ix. 256).
† Saler, 20'43 N. 70 E. 5263 feet above sea-level, 9 miles s. w. of Mulher (Ind. At. 38 N. W.) Mulher, 20'46 N. 74'7 E. on the Mosam river (37 S. W.) Pipla, 20'35 N. 74 E. 9 m. s. of Saler (38 N. W.)
But this position and these strongholds became the cause of their ruin when the Mughals conquered Guzerat and Khandesh and wanted to join hands across Baglana. An independent prince and master of mountain fastnesses could not be left in possession of the main route between these two provinces of the empire. The great Akbar had invaded the district, but after a seven years' fruitless siege* he had compounded with the Rajah, Pratap Shah, by ceding to him several villages as the price of protection to all merchants passing through his land. Bairam Shah was now seated on the throne of Pratap.

Aurangzib sent an army of 7000 men under Maloji, a Deccani officer in the Imperial service, and Muhammad Tahir Khurasani (afterwards Wazir Khan) to besiege the capital Mulher.† This fort covers the spacious top of a low hill close to the Mosam river, 9 miles north-east of Saler. As is the case with all Deccani forts, it shelters a walled village lower down the hill side, called the Bari or in the language of further south the Pettah. Here lived the Rajah and his family. On 16th January,

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* *Imp. Gaz.* vi. 191. I can find no support of this statement in Abul Fazl or Badauni.

† *M. U.* iii. 937, 522.
1638, the Mughal army in three divisions stormed the lower fort or Bari, with heavy loss on both sides.* The Rajah with some 500 men retired to the upper fort and was there blockaded. A month's close investment reduced him to submission. He sent his mother and minister to

Baglana annexed. offer to Aurangzib the keys of his other eight forts and to beg for himself a post in the Emperor's service, (15th February). The overture was accepted; he was created a Commander of Three Thousand and consoled with an estate in Sultanpur, a district of Khandesh, north of the Tapti. On 4th June, he evacuated Mulher; his kingdom was annexed, and its revenue fixed at 4 lakhs for the present. A month later, his kinsman Rudbá surrendered the fort of Piplá, 9 miles south of Saler. One hundred and twenty pieces of artillery, large and small, were seized in the forts.†

Bairam Shah's son-in-law, Somdev, ruled over Rámnagar. But as the revenue of this petty

* Khafi Khan says that a daredevil Mughal officer named Syed Abdul Wahhab Khandeshi, with 4 or 5 Syeds expert in hill climbing, one standard-bearer, one trumpeter and one water-carrier, made a secret march by an unfrequented jungle path for three successive nights and on the fourth day appeared on the ridge of the Bari, and suddenly attacked it with a great noise. Encouraged by his example, the Mughal forces on the plain charged up hill and stormed the Bari.

† Abdul Hamid, II. 106—109; Khafi Kh. i. 542, 561—564.
State fell short of its public expenditure, it was deemed unworthy of annexation. A contribution of ten thousand rupees was, however, exacted from him.

Aurangzib's first viceroyalty of the Deccan extended from 14th July, 1636 to 28th May, 1644. During these eight years he paid four visits to his father in Northern India, leaving some great noble, usually his maternal uncle Shaista Khan, to act for him. He gradually rose in rank, being promoted to a Command of Twelve Thousand (his additional force being 7,000 troopers) on 14th August, 1637, and next to the rank of a Commander of Fifteen Thousand (the additional troopers being 9,000) on 23rd February, 1639.* Only a few incidents of this period are recorded in history.

Kheloji Bhonsla, the first cousin of Shahji, had held a high rank among the Nizam Shahi officers. In 1629 he came over to the Mughals with his two brothers, Maloji and Parsuji, got the rank of a Commander of Five Thousand, and distinguished himself under the banners of his new master. But in 1633 when the fort of Daulatabad, the last stronghold of Nizam

* Abdul Hamid, I. B. 277, II. 138.
Shah, was about to fall into the hands of the Imperialists, Kheloji deserted to Bijapur and repeatedly fought against the Mughal armies. The Maratha general’s wife, when going to bathe in the Godavari, was captured by the Mughal Subahdar, who sent him word, "A man’s wealth is only for saving his honour. If you pay me four *lakhs* of rupees I shall release your wife without doing harm to her chastity." No husband can resist such an appeal, and Kheloji paid this huge ransom. Soon afterwards, he was dismissed by the Bijapur Sultan who had made peace with Shah Jahan. Ruined by these losses, Kheloji came to the home of his forefathers near Daulatabad and took to a life of plunder and lawlessness. Aurangzib, on getting news of his place of hiding, sent a party of soldiers under Malik Husain and put the Maratha free-booter to death (about October, 1639).*

In 1640, "the Zamindar of Gondwana" (*i.e.*, the new Rajah of Deogarh) waited on the young viceroy at Burhanpur with a thanks-offering of four *lakhs* of rupees in return for his being allowed to succeed his late father.†

On 25th March, 1642, a costly set of presents offered by Aurangzib and consisting of gems,

* *Abdul Hamid, II. 166, *Masir-ul-Umara*, iii. 520-521.
† *Abdul Hamid, II. 197.*
jewelled ware, rare products of the Deccan, and elephants, was displayed before the Emperor, who accepted out of them one lakh and twenty thousand rupees' worth, and suitably rewarded the giver in return.*

CHAPTER IV.

Marriage and Family—Viceroyalty of Guzerat.

The fort and district of Qandahar had been given by the Persian king Shah Tahmasp I. of the house of Safawi, to his nephew, Sultan Husain Mirza as an appanage. Husain's son Mirza Muzaffar Husain exchanged the lordship of barren Qandahar for a high rank and splendid salary in the service of Akbar. His younger brother Mirza Rustam, too, emigrated to India in Akbar's reign and rose to eminence under Jahangir.

The Mughal emperors made the most of this opportunity of ennobling their blood by alliances with the royal family of Persia and marry into even through a younger branch. Muzaffar Husain's daughter was married to Shah Jahan, and two daughters of Mirza Rustam to the princes Parviz
and Shuja. Rustam's son was now a high grandee with the title of Shah Nawaz Khan. One daughter of Shah Nawaz, named Dilras Banu, was betrothed to Aurangzib, 1637, and next year another daughter was married to Murad Bakhsh.†

On 15th April, 1637, Aurangzib arrived at Agra for his marriage.‡ Shah Jahan wrote him a most loving invitation in verse to come and see him quickly and without ceremony. Next day the Prince had audience of his father. The royal astrologers had fixed 8th May as the date of the marriage. In the preceding evening was the ceremony of *hennabandi* or dyeing the bridegroom's hands and feet with the red juice of the *henna* (*Lawsonia inermis*). Following the Indian custom, the bride's father sent the *henna* in a grand procession of the male and female friends of his house, servants and musicians. With the *henna* came an infinite variety of presents, a costly full dress suit for the bridegroom, toilet needments, embroidered scarfs for his kinsfolk, perfumed


† A generation afterwards (4 March, 1683) Azarm Banu, the daughter of Shah Nawaz's son, was married to Aurangzib's youngest son, Kam Bakhsh (*M. A.* 225.)

‡ Abdul Hamid, I. B. 255, 267-270.
essence, sugar candy, huge quantities of confects, dried fruits, prepared betel-leaves, and fire-works.

In the Private Hall of the Palace, the Prince's hands and feet were stained red with the henna, by ladies concealed behind a screen, and he was robed in the bride's presents, smeared with perfumes, and fed with the lucky sugar-candy. Then he held a reception of his male guests, which his uncle Yaminuddaula and other nobles attended, while the ladies looked on from behind lattice-screens. In the richly furnished hall the wedding gifts were displayed on trays, the scarfs, confects and betel-leaves were distributed, and the fire-works let off outside. All the time singing and dancing went on. The night's work was concluded with a supper to which the bride-groom sat down with all his guests.

Next night the marriage took place. The astrologers had selected four hours before dawn as the luckiest time for the ceremony. A long while before that hour the grand wazir Yaminuddaula Asaf Khan and Prince Murad Bakhsh went to Aurangzib's mansion on the Jumna, and conducted him by the river-side road to the fort-palace, to make his bow to the Emperor, who gave him costly presents of all kinds,—robes, jewels,
daggers, horses, and elephants, and with his own hands tied to the bridegroom's turban a glittering sehra or bunch of pearls and precious stones falling over his face like a veil. Then the marriage-procession was formed. Led by Murad, Yaminuddaula and other grandees on horseback, the long line paraded the streets of the capital, with music, lights, and discharge of fireworks that baffle description. When it reached the bride's house, the guests were made welcome and entertained by her father. Shah Jahan arrived by boat just before the ceremony, and in his presence the Qazi united the young pair in wedlock. The bridegroom promised his wife a dowry (kabin) of four lakhs of rupees; this she was to get from him in case of divorce. Her father kept himself aloof from the ceremony, for such is the custom of the Indian Muslims.

The marriage being over, another reception was held (14th May) in Aurangzib's house at which the Emperor was present. Wedding gifts were presented to the nobles, who bowed their thanks first to the Emperor and then to the bridegroom. The newly married Prince spent more than three happy months with his father at Agra and then, on 4th September, took his leave for the Deccan.*

* Abdul Hamid, I. B. 280.
We may here conveniently describe Aurangzib's wives and children. *Dilras Banu*, his consort, bore the high title of *Begam* or Princess. She died at Aurangabad on 8th October, 1657, from illness following child-birth, and was buried in that city, under the title of 'the Rabia of the Age' (Rabia-ud-daurani.) Her tomb was repaired by her son Azam under order of Aurangzib, and is one of the sights of the place. She seems to have been a proud and self-willed lady and her husband stood in some awe of her.†

The Emperor's secondary wives were styled *Bais* and *Mahals*. To this class belonged Rahmat-un-nissa, surnamed *Nawab Bai*, the mother of Bahadur Shah I. She was the daughter of Rajah Raju of the Rajauri State in Kashmir, and came of the hill-Rajput blood.‡ But on her son's accession to the throne of Delhi a false pedigree was invented for her in order to give Bahadur Shah a right to call himself a Syed. It was asserted by the flatterers of the Imperial Court that a Muslim

† *Anecdotes of Aurangzib*, §27.
‡ Irvine's *Storia do Mogor*, ii. 57n, 276n.
saint named Syed Shah Mir, sprung from the celebrated Syed Abdul Qadir Jilani, had taken to a life of retirement among the hills of Rajauri. The Rajah of the country waited on him and in course of time so adored the holy man as to offer him his maiden daughter. The saint accepted the virgin tribute, converted and wedded her, and thus became the father of a son and a daughter. Then he went on a pilgrimage to the holy land of Islam, where all trace of him was lost. The Rajah brought up his deserted grand-children as Hindus, keeping their parentage a secret. When Shah Jahan demanded from him a daughter of his house, the Rajah sent him this grand-daughter, who was noted for her beauty, goodness and intelligence. In the Imperial harem the girl was taught languages and culture by a set of masters, governesses, and Persian women versed in good manners, and in due time she was united to Prince Aurangzib. Such is one of the many conflicting accounts of the origin of Nawab Bai. Khafi Khan narrates it as mere hearsay,* and we may reject it as the invention of courtiers eager to flatter their master.†

* Khafi Khan, ii. 604.
† But there is nothing improbable in the story. In Bhimbar, another district of Kashmir, Hindus and Muslims used to intermarry, and the wife, whatever might have
She built a serai at Fardapur, at the foot of the pass, and also founded Baijipura, a suburb of Aurangabad.* The misconduct of her sons, Muhammad Sultan and Muazzam, who disobeyed the Emperor under the influence of evil counsellors, embittered her latter life. Her advice and even personal entreaty had no effect on Muazzam,† who was at last placed under arrest. Nawab Bai seems to have lost her charms and with them her husband’s favour rather early in life, and ended her days some time before the middle of 1691‡ at Delhi, after many years of separation from her husband and sons.

Another secondary wife was Aurangabadi Mahal, so named because she entered the Mughal harem in the city of Aurangabad. The bubonic plague carried her off in October or November 1688, at the city of Bijapur.§

been her father’s creed, was burnt or buried as her husband happened to be a Hindu or Islamite. But in October, 1634, Shah Jahan forbade the custom and ordered that every Hindu who had taken a Muslim wife must either embrace Islam and be married anew to her, or he must give her up to be wedded to a Muslim. This order was rigorously enforced. (Abdul Hamid, I. B. 57).

* Khafi Khan, ii. 605.
† M. A. 101, 293, (and for Sultan) 30, 121.
‡ M. A. 343.
§ M. A. 318. Her tomb is thus described by Manucci, “The king caused a magnificent tomb to be erected to the
Her death removed the last rival of Aurangzib's youngest and best loved concubine, Udipuri Mahal, the mother of Kam Udipuri Mahal Bakhsh. The contemporary Venetian traveller Manucci speaks of her as a Georgian slave-girl of Dara Shukoh's harem, who, on the downfall of her first master, became the concubine of his victorious rival.* She seems to have been a very young woman at the time, as she first became a mother in 1667, when Aurangzib was verging on fifty. She retained her youth and influence over the Emperor till his death, and was the darling of his old age. Under the spell of her beauty he pardoned the many faults of Kam Bakhsh and overlooked her freaks of drunkenness,† which must have shocked so pious a Muslim.‡

princess, provided with a dome of extraordinary height, the whole executed in marble brought expressly from the province of Ajmer.” (Storia, iii. 269)

* Irvine’s Storia do Mogor, i. 361, ii. 107.
† Ibid, ii. 107, 108.
‡ That Udipuri was a slave and no wedded wife is proved by Aurangzib's own words. When her son Kam Bakhsh intrigued with the enemy at the siege of Jinji, Aurangzib angrily remarked,—

'A slave-girl's son comes to no good,
Even though he may have been begotten by a king.' (Anecdotes of Aurangzib, § 25. He is also called 'a dancing-girl's son' (Storia, ii. 316n). Orme (Fragments, 85) speaks of her as a Circassian, evidently on the authority of Manucci. In a letter written by Aurangzib on his death-bed to Kam Bakhsh, he says "Udipuri, your
Besides the above four there was another woman whose supple grace, musical skill, and mastery of blandishments, made Zainabadi the heroine of the only romance in the puritan Emperor’s life. Hira Bai surnamed Zainabadi was a young slave-girl in the keeping of Mir Khalil, who had married a sister of Aurangzib’s mother. During his viceroyalty of the Deccan, the Prince paid a visit to his aunt at Burhanpur. There, while strolling in the park of Zainabad on the other side of the Tapti, he beheld Hira Bai unveiled among his aunt’s train. The artful beauty “on seeing a mango-tree laden with fruits, advanced in mirth and amorous play, jumped up, and plucked a mango, as if unconscious of the prince’s presence.” The vision of her matchless charms stormed Aurangzib’s heart in a moment; “with shameless importunity he took her away from his aunt’s house and became utterly in-

mother, who has been with me during my illness, wishes to accompany [me in death].” From this expression Tod, (Annals of Mewar, Ch. XIII, note) infers, “Her desire to burn shews her to have been a Rajpoot.” Such an inference is wrong, because a Hindu princess on marrying a Muslim king lost her caste and religion, and received Islamic burial. We read of no Rajputni of the harem of any of the Mughal emperors having burnt herself with her deceased husband, for the very good reason that a Muslim’s corpse is buried and not burnt. Evidently Udipuri meant that she would kill herself in passionate grief on the death of Aurangzib.
fatuated with her." So much so, that one day she offered him a cup of wine and pressed him to drink it. All his entreaties and excuses were disregarded, and the helpless lover was about to taste the forbidden drink when the sly enchantress snatched away the cup from his lips and said, "My object was only to test your love for me, and not to make you fall into the sin of drinking!" Death cut the story short when she was still in the bloom of youth. Aurangzib bitterly grieved at her loss and buried her close to the big tank at Aurangabad.*

More than half a century afterwards, when this early love-passage had become a mere memory, the following inaccurate version of it was recorded by Hamiduddin Khan, a favourite servant of the Emperor, in his Anecdotes of Alamgir. It is extremely amusing, as showing that the puritan in love was not above practising wiles to gain his end!

"When Aurangzib as Governor of the Deccan was going to Aurangabad, on arriving at Burhanpur...he went to visit his aunt. The Prince entered the house without announcing himself.

* Masir-ul-Umara, i. 790—792. Mir Khalil was posted to the Deccan shortly before Aurangzib's second viceroyalty began, so that the earliest possible date of the episode is 1653, when Aurangzib was 35 years old.
Hira Bai was standing under a tree, holding a branch with her right hand and singing in a low tone. Immediately after seeing her, the Prince helplessly sat down there, and then stretched himself at full length on the ground in a swoon. The news was carried to his aunt. She clasped him to her breast and began to wail and lament. After three or four gharis the Prince regained consciousness. However much she inquired about his condition, saying, ‘What malady is it? Did you ever have it before?’ the Prince gave no reply at all, but remained silent. At midnight he recovered his speech and said, ‘If I mention my disease, can you apply the remedy?’ She replied, ‘What to speak of remedy? I shall offer my life itself to cure you!’ Then the Prince unfolded the whole matter to her......The aunt replied, ‘You know the wretch, my husband. He is a bloody-minded man and does not care in the least for the Emperor Shah Jahan or for you. At the mere report of your desire for Hira Bai he will first murder her and then me. Telling him about your passion will do no other good.’

Next morning the Prince came back to his own quarters and discussed the case in detail with his confidant, Murshid Quli Khan, the Diwan of the Deccan. The Khan said, ‘Let me
first despatch your uncle, and if anybody then slays me, there will be no harm, as in exchange of my life my master's work will be done.' Aurangzib forbade him to commit a manifest murder and turn his aunt into a widow... Murshid Quli Khan reported the whole conversation to the Prince's uncle, who exchanged Hira Bai for Chhattar Bai, a slave-girl of Aurangzib's harem.'*

History records the name of a certain Dilárám, a hand-maid of Aurangzib's early life. But though she is described in the same terms as Aurangabadi Mahal, viz., ṣarastar-i-qadim-ul-khidmat,† it appears from the context that she was not his mistress, but only a servant. Her daughter was married to an officer of the Emperor's bodyguard. On her tomb at Delhi the Emperor placed an inscribed stone in 1702, many years after her death.

Aurangzib had a numerous progeny. His principal wife, Dilras Banu Begam, bore him five children:

1. Zeb-un-nissa,‡ a daughter, born at Daula-

* Anecdotes of Aurangzib, § 5.
† M. A. 465, 318.
‡ Abdul Hamid, ii. 22; Khafi Khan, i. 590; MA. 462, 538; Rieu's British Museum Catalogue, ii. 702b: M. U. ii. 828; Makhsan-ul-Gharai b by Ahmad Ali Sandilavi (1218
tabad, on 15th February, 1638, died at Delhi on 26th May, 1702, buried in the garden of 'Thirty Thousand Trees', outside the Kabuli gate. Her tomb was demolished to make room for a railway. But her coffin and inscribed tomb-stone are now in Akbar's mausoleum at Sikandra, where the epitaph can still be read.

She seems to have inherited her father's keenness of intellect and literary tastes. Educated by a lady named Hafiza Mariam she committed the Quran to memory, for which she received a reward of 30,000 gold-pieces from her delighted father. A mistress of Persian and Arabic, she wrote different kinds of hand with neatness and grace. Her library surpassed all other private collections, and she employed many scholars on liberal salaries to produce literary works at her bidding or to copy manuscripts for her. As Aurangzib disliked poetry, her liberality compensated for the lack of Court patronage, and most of the poets of the age sought refuge with her. Supported by her bounty, Mulla Safiuddin Ardbeli translated the Arabic Great Commentary under the title of Zeb-ut-tafasir, the authorship of which is vulgarly ascribed to his patroness. Other tracts and works also unjustly bear her

name. She wrote Persian odes under the pen-name of Makhfi or the Concealed One. But the Divan-i-Makhfi which is extant cannot with certainty be called her work, because this pseudonym was used by many other royal ladies, such as one of the wives of Akbar.

Scandal connected her name with that of Aqilmand Khan, a noble of her father's Court and a versifier of some repute in his own day.

2. Zinat-un-nissa, afterwards surnamed Padishah Begam, born probably at Aurangabad, 5th October, 1643. She looked after her old father's household in the Deccan, for a quarter of a century till his death, and survived him many years, enjoying the respect of his successors as the living memorial of a great age. Historians speak of her piety and extensive charity.* She was buried in the Zinat-ul-masajid, a splendid mosque built (1700) at her expense in Delhi, but her grave was removed elsewhere by the British military authorities when they occupied the building.†

* Abdul Hamid, ii. 343; M.A. 539; Khafi Khan, ii. 30 (inspires a plot against the Syed brothers). She was alive in the reign of Farukhsiyar. (Ibid, 736).
† Fanshawe's Delhi: Past and Present, 68. Cunningham, Arch. Survey Reports, I. 230, states, "The Zinat-ul-masajid, more commonly called the Kuari Masjid or 'Maiden's Mosque', because built by Zinat-un-nissa, the daughter of Aurangzib. The people have a tradition
3. Zubdat-un-nissa, born at Multan, 2nd September, 1651, married to her first cousin, Sipihr Shukoh (the second son of the ill-fated Dara Shukoh) on 30th January, 1673, died in February, 1707.*

4. Muhammad Azam, born at Burhanpur on 28th June, 1653, slain at Jajaw, in the war of succession following his father’s death, 8th June, 1707.†

5. Muhammad Akbar, born at Aurangabad, on 11th September, 1657, died an exile in Persia about November, 1704.‡ Buried at Mashhad.

By Nawab Bai the Emperor had three children:

6. Muhammad Sultan, born near Mathura, 19th December, 1639, died in prison, 3rd December, 1676.§ Buried in the enclosure of Khawajah Qutbuddin’s tomb.

7. Muhammad Muazzam, surnamed Shah Alam, who succeeded his father as Bahadur Shah that Zinat-un-nissa demanded the amount of her dowry from her father, and spent it in building this Mosque, instead of marrying."

* M.A. 540, 125, 154.
† Waris’s Padishahnamah, 79b; M.A. 536.
‡ M. A. 547, 483. Kambu, 6b. But the Tarikh-i-Muhammadi gives the date of his death as 31 March, 1706, New Style (Storia, iv. 257n).
§ Abdul Hamid, ii. 170; M.A. 534, 159-160.
I., born at Burhanpur on 4th October, 1643, died 18th February, 1712.*

8. Badr-un-nissa, born 17th November, 1647, died 9th April, 1670.† Of her we only know that she learnt the Quran by rote.

Aurangabadi Mahal bore to Aurangzib only one child:

9. Mihr-un-nissa, born 18th September, 1661, married to her first cousin Izid Bakhsh (a son of the murdered Murad Bakhsh) on 27th November, 1672, died in June, 1706.‡

Udipuri Mahal was the mother of

10. Muhammad Kam Bakhsh, born at Delhi, 24th February, 1667, slain in the war of succession, near Haidarabad on 3rd January, 1709.§

We shall now resume the story of Aurangzib’s career. His first viceroyalty of the Deccan which extended over eight years, ended strangely in his disgrace and dismissal.

On the night of 26th March, 1644, the princess Jahanara burnt. Jahanara was coming from her father’s chambers to her own in Agra fort, when her skirt fell on one

* Abdul Hamid, ii. 343; M.A. 534.
† M.A. 539-540, 100.
‡ M.A. 120, 515, 540.
§ M.A. 538. Alamgirnamah, 1031.
of the candles lighting the passage. As her robes were made of exquisitely fine muslin and were besides perfumed with atar and other essences, the flames wrapped her round in a moment. Her four maids flung themselves on her to smother the fire with their persons, but it spread to their own dress and they had to let go their hold in agony. By the time aid arrived and the fire was put out, the princess had been dreadfully burnt: her back, both sides, and arms were severely injured.*

She was the best loved child of Shah Jahan, and well did she deserve his affection. Ever since her mother's death, her care and forethought had saved him from domestic worries. Her sweetness of temper and gentleness of heart, even more than her mental accomplishments, soothed his mind in fatigue and anxiety, while her loving kindness healed all discords in the Imperial family, and spreading beyond the narrow circle of her kinsfolk made her the channel of the royal bounty to orphans, widows, and the poor. In the full blaze of prosperity and power her name was known in the land only for her bounty and graciousness. In adversity she rose to a nobler

* Abdul Hamid, ii. 363—369; Khafi Khan, i. 598—600.
eminence and became an Antigone to her captive father. Happier than the daughter of much-enduring Ædipus, she finally won her father's forgiveness for the son who had wronged him so cruelly. And after death the memory of her piety and meekness of spirit has been preserved by the lowliest epitaph ever placed on a prince's tomb. The stone records her last wish:

Cover not my grave save with green grass,
For such a covering alone befits the tomb of

Shah Jahan was in anguish at this accident.

Her treatment He was ever at her bed-side, for his hand must lay the medicine to her wounds, and hold the diet up to her lips. All but the most urgent State affairs were neglected; the daily darbar was reduced to a sitting of a few minutes. Every physician of note from far and near was assembled for treating her. Vast sums were daily given away in charity to win Heaven's blessings on her. Every night a purse of Rs. 1000 was laid under her pillow, and next morning distributed to the beggars. Officials undergoing imprisonment for defalcation were set free, and their debts, amounting to seven lakhs, written off. Every evening Shah Jahan knelt down till midnight, weeping and imploring God for her recovery.
For four months she hovered between life and death. Indeed, there was little hope of her recovery, as two of her maids, though less severely burnt, died in a few weeks. By a happy accident, the physician of the late king of Persia, who had fled from the wrath of his successor, reached Agra only twenty days after this mishap. His judicious medicines removed many of her attendant troubles, especially fever and weakness.

But both he and Hakim Mumana, the Physician Royal of Delhi, laboured in vain to heal her burns. Where the medical science of the age failed, quackery succeeded. A slave named Arif prepared an ointment which entirely healed her sores in two months.

On 25th November began a most splendid and costly festivity in celebration of her complete recovery.* Jahanara was given jewels worth ten lakhs by her rejoicing father; every member of the household and every officer of the State received a gift on the joyous occasion; the beggars got two lakhs. The princes who had hastened to Agra on hearing of her accident, had their share of the Imperial bounty. But none of them was so great a gainer as Aurangzib, for, at

* Abdul Hamid, ii. 395—400.
her request he was restored to his father's favour and his former rank and office, which he had lost in the meantime.

Aurangzib had arrived at Agra on 2nd May to see his sister. Here three weeks afterwards he was suddenly dismissed from his post, and deprived of his rank and allowance. The reason as given by the historians is obscure. The Court annalist, Abdul Hamid Lahori, writes that Aurangzib was thus punished because "misled by the wicked counsels of his foolish companions, he wanted to take to the retired life of an ascetic, and had also done some acts which the Emperor disapproved of." Khafi Khan says that the Prince in order "to anticipate his father's punishment of his bad deeds, himself took off his sword and lived for some days as a hermit," for which he was dismissed. But neither of them describes the exact nature of his misconduct.*

From one of Aurangzib's letters we gather that he resigned his post as a protest against Dara's persistent hostility and Shah Jahan's partiality to his eldest son which robbed Aurangzib of the Emperor's confidence and support. The

† Abdul Hamid, ii. 373, 376: Khafi Khan, i. 600, and ii. 398.
Prince's recommendations were overridden and he was so often interfered with and trusted with so little power that his prestige was lowered in the public eye and he could not govern the Deccan consistently with self-respect or with any chance of doing good service. As he wrote indignantly to his sister Jahanara in 1654, when similar distrust and hostility were shown to him by the Court during his second viceroyalty: "If His Majesty wishes that of all his servants I alone should pass my life in dishonour and at last perish in an unbecoming manner, I have no help but to obey......But as it is hard to live and die thus and I do not enjoy [his] grace, I cannot, for the sake of perishable earthly things, live in pain and grief, nor deliver myself up into the hands of others,—it is better that by order of His Majesty I should be released from the shame of such a life, so that harm may not be done to the good of the State and [other] hearts may be composed about this matter. Ten years before this I had realised this fact and known my life to be aimed at [by my rivals], and therefore I had resigned my post,... so that I might retire to a corner, cause no uneasiness to any body's heart, and be saved from such harassment."*

* Adab-i-Alamgiri, 177a.
A literal interpretation of a Persian phrase* has given rise in some English histories to the myth that young Aurangzib turned hermit in a fit of religious devotion. The fact is that at this time he felt no religious call at all; his motive was political, not spiritual: he merely resigned his office, but did not actually take to a hermit's life. Under the Mughals, every officer, civil or military, had to hold a rank in the army and wear the sword as a part of his full dress. Hence, laying the sword aside from one's belt was a visible symbol of resignation.

If we may trust the gossipy anecdotes compiled in Aurangzib's old age by Hamiduddin Khan Nimchah, the Prince's disgrace was the outcome of his open jealousy of Dara Shukoh, his eldest brother and the intended heir to the throne. It is narrated that Dara invited his father and three brothers to see his newly built mansion at Agra. It was summer, and the party was taken to a cool underground room border-

* "Turning recluse" (manzavi ikhtiar kardan) is a phrase commonly used in the Persian histories of India to mean the laying down of (military) rank, office, and uniform in such a manner as not to imply a defiance of the Emperor's wishes. We often read how an officer under Imperial displeasure who had "turned hermit" in this sense, was afterwards reinstated in his rank and office on recovering his master's grace.
ing on the river, with only one door leading into it. The others entered, but Aurangzib sat down in the doorway. To all inquiries of Shah Jahan about the reason of his strange conduct he gave no reply. For this act of disobedience he was forbidden the Court. After spending seven months in disgrace, he told Jahanara that as the room had only one entrance he had feared lest Dara should close it and murder his father and brothers to clear his own way to the throne. To prevent any such attempt Aurangzib had (he said) occupied the door as a sentinel! On learning this Shah Jahan restored him to his favour. But it was

He is reinstated. impossible to keep Aurangzib at Court with Dara, whom he hated so bitterly and suspected so cruelly.* Therefore on 16th February, 1645, he was sent off to Guzerat as Governor.† His viceroyalty of this province ended in January, 1647, when he was appointed to Balkh. But even in this brief period of less than two years he showed his administrative capacity and firmness.

Of all the provinces of the Mughal empire,

* Anecdotes of Aurangzib § 2.
† Abdul Hamid, ii. 411.
Guzerat was the most turbulent. A land subject to frequent droughts and a soil mostly of sand or stone yielded a poor and precarious harvest to reward the labour of man in many parts of the province. All its ardent spirits naturally turned from the thankless task of tilling the soil, to the more profitable business of plundering their weaker and richer brethren. Robbery was the hereditary and time-honoured occupation of several tribes, such as the Kulis and the Kathis, who covered the land from Jhalor to the sea.* The Guzerati artisans, whose fame was world-wide, flourished in the cities under shelter of the walls. But the roads were unsafe to trader and traveller alike. The prevailing lawlessness added to the misery of the peasants and the poverty of the land by discouraging industry and accumulation of wealth. Any rebel or bandit leader could in a few days raise a large body of fighters by the promise of plunder, and if he was only swift enough in evading pitched battles with the forces of Government, he could keep the whole country in a state of constant alarm and disturbance. Thus did the Mirzas violate public peace in Guzerat for a full generation in Akbar's reign.

* Abdul Hamid, ii. 231.
Many a pretender to the throne of Delhi gathered formidable military support here. Indeed, Guzerat bore the evil title of *lashkar-khez*, or a land 'bristling with soldiers.'*

Such a province ever required a strong hand to govern it. A former viceroy, Azam Khan, (1635—41), had vigorously punished the robber tribes, built forts in their midst to maintain order, and forced the ruler of Nawánagar, to promise tribute and obedience to the Imperial Government.† For a time the roads became safe, and the land enjoyed unwonted peace.

Aurangzib, too, followed an active and firm policy towards the robber tribes and rebels of Guzerat. In order to check them effectually he engaged soldiers in excess of the men whom he was bound by his present rank as a *mansabdar* to keep. The Emperor, pleased to hear of this ardent spirit of duty, gave him a promotion, raising his salary to sixty lakhs of rupees a year (8th June, 1646).‡ He thus established in his father's eyes a reputation for capacity and courage, and it was not long before he was called

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* *Kalimat-i-Tayyibat* (A. S. B. MS. E, 27), 87a, 107a.
† Abdul Hamid, ii. 231-232.
‡ Abdul Hamid, ii. 510, 715.
away to a far-off scene where there was supreme need of these qualities.

On 4th September, Shah Jahan wrote to him to come away from Guzerat, after making over the Government to Shaista Khan. The Prince met his father at Lahore on 20th January, 1649, and was next day created Governor and Commander-in-chief of Balkh and Badakhshan. Three weeks later he was sent off to his distant and dangerous charge.*

* *Ibid, 583, 625, 627, 532.
CHAPTER V.

THE WAR IN CENTRAL ASIA, 1647.

To the north of Kabul the Hindu Kush mountain range running north-east and the Oxus river flowing westwards enclose between them two provinces, Balkh and Badakhshan. The eastern half, Badakhshan, is a mere succession of ridges and valleys, with a scanty population and scattered patches of cultivation. The mines of ruby and turquoise which once gave it fame throughout the eastern world, now yield very little. It is a province thrust into a forgotten nook of the world, and hemmed in by fierce mountain tribes; the squalor and poverty of its people is equalled only by their ignorance and helplessness.*

Balkh is a more open and fertile country. Irrigation canals and numerous streams have given its favoured

tracts abundance of agricultural wealth, both of crops and fruits. Its rivers descending from the Hindu Kush form fertile valleys which grow broader and broader as they wind northwards to the Oxus. The hills are mostly bare and arid.* Now and then sandstorms from the western desert sweep over the face of the land.

On the south it is separated from Afghanistan by lofty mountains, wide plateaus, and narrow passes.† But its northern boundary, the Oxus river, presents no such natural barrier to an invader, and nomadic hordes from Central Asia have in every age crossed the river and overrun the land. In the southern hills from Kabul to Herat live predatory tribes, the Hazarahs and Aimaks,‡ hungrily watching for a chance to cut off travellers and traders in the passes or to swoop down upon the flourishing hamlets and orchards of the lowlands near the Oxus in the rear of some foreign invader. Against a regular army their hardiness and ferocity were rendered unavailing by their primitive savagery, ignorance,

* Leyden, xxx ; Wood's Journey, lxvii, 175, 257; Ferrier's Caravan Journeys, 208.
† For the passes leading northwards into Balkh, see Leyden, 139, 199; Wood's Journey, lxiv; Abdul Hamid's Padishahnamah, ii. 668—670.
‡ Wood, 127, Elias & Ross, Tarikh-i-Rashidi, Intro. 91, Vambery's Travels in Central Asia, 263.
and lack of organisation. But through the south-western corner, which touches Khurasan, the stream of civilisation has flowed into Balkh. By this path came the Persian, the Greek and the Arab, and each has left his stamp on the culture of the conquered people.*

Placed between two powerful neighbours it has been the fate of Balkh to be the scene of conquest and plunder age after age since the dawn of history; its people have been relieved of masters from the south or west only by fiercer masters from the north; their ancient culture and learning, which boasted of a Hellenistic origin, had been all but trodden out under the iron heels of Chenghiz Khan.† Their cities were now in ruin and their wealth destroyed beyond hope of recovery.

Besides the wild robbers of the southern mountains and the tame cultivators of the northern lowlands, there was a third element of the population,—"primitive nomads who occupied tracts of barren steppe land, and drove their flocks from hill to valley and valley to hill, in search of pasture according to season."‡

* Vambery's Travels, 233, 239; Elias & Ross, Intro. 82, 107; Skrine & Ross's Heart of Asia, 6, 30, 38, 76, 131.
† Wood, lxi, lxvii, 155, 162; Vambery's Travels, 233, 244; Ferrier's Caravan Journeys, 207.
‡ Elias & Ross, Intro 31.
A land of this nature could support but a small population, and was too poor to maintain an army on its own produce. The salaried troops of the king of Balkh numbered only 3000 men, and his revenue (including that yielded by Badakhshan) was only 25 lakhs of rupees,—the stipend of a third-rate peer of the Mughal empire, as the Delhi historian has noted with contempt. His chief minister was paid only Rs. 80,000 a year.*

Poor as were the resources of the country and tame as were the men of its plains, an invader from the south found it hard to keep hold of his conquest. He had to guard his own communications with the rear over the long and difficult passes of the Hindu Kush. But numberless hordes of savage horsemen, the Mongols and Turkomans, came from beyond the Oxus to oppose him, burning crops and villages, carrying off the loyal peasantry into slavery, hovering round his army on the march, cutting off detachments and stragglers, and when chased maintaining a Parthian fight. Indeed, his camp was ever in a state of siege. On them he could make no successful reprisal, deal no

* Abdul Hamid, ii. 542-543.
crushing blow which might win for him peace and the growth of revenue. The enemy had "no forts or towns or immovable property, worthy of the name, for an invader to destroy, and no stationary population, left undefended, upon whom he might wreak his vengeance......Mobility must have been the quality they relied on more than any other, both in attack and retreat, and we find them baffling their enemies more by their movements than by their fighting power."* When reduced to the worst, they fled across the Oxus to their homes. Mughal troops who had served in the Deccan, immediately noted that the Uzbaks fought like the Marathas but were far more hardy.†

Savage and uncouth as the Uzbaks were, they had at least the faith of Islam in common with their foemen from India. But the Turkoman tribes (miscalled Alamans) were worse still. They had not yet accepted the creed of Muhammad, but clung to their old heathenism.‡ Plunder was their sole livelihood. In their forays they burnt the Quran

* Elias & Ross, Intro. 55.
† Abdul Hamid, ii. 705.
‡ Alaman is a Tartar word meaning 'a predatory expedition' (Vambery, 317.) The historian Abdul Hamid took it to be the name of a Tartar tribe, whose manners he describes in ii. 619 and 453.
and massacred holy men and children with as little pity as they showed to fighting foemen. In one place, they shut up in a mosque and roasted alive a pious darvish and 400 school-boys whom he had led in a procession to entreat their mercy. Similar atrocities were committed by them elsewhere. These ferocious robbers were not hampered in their marches by any baggage or provisions; the coarsest food sufficed for them. The deepest rivers they crossed by swimming their horses, in a long line, the bridle of one being fastened to the tail of another, while the saddles, which were mere bundles of sticks, could not be damaged by water. The men crossed on rafts made from the reeds that grew plentifully on the river bank. The horses, as hardy as their riders, lived on the wild wormwood of the steppe and yet covered a hundred miles a day. From Bukhara beyond the Oxus their forays extended to Khurasan, and the well-mounted Persian cavalry could not overtake them.

For many centuries Balkh, with its adjunct of Badakhshan, had been a dependency of Bukhara, and was governed by a viceroy (often a prince of the blood) and garrisoned by the fierce and hardy Scythians from beyond the Oxus.* Early in the seventeenth century, the

* Skrine & Ross, 160, 192.
wise and good Imam Quli Khan, of the Astara-
khan-ide dynasty, adorned the throne of Bukhara
for 32 years, and when in 1642 age and infirmity
induced him to leave his weeping subjects for
monastic repose in Medina, his younger brother
Nazar Muhammad succeeded to
the throne.* The new Khan
had governed the family appa-
nage of Balkh during his
brother’s reign. As a ruler of Bukhara he was a
failure. Its climate disagreed with him after
his forty years’ residence in the more genial soil
of Balkh; his extreme avarice and niggardli-
ness alienated his generals. Yet his ambition
led him to annex Khwarizm. The Uzbaks began
to hate him for his jealous policy of withdrawing
all power from their leaders and doing everything
himself. A man without discretion or force of
character, he openly taxed his chiefs with what
backbiters had told him about them. The army
seethed with discontent at his reduction of their
allowances, seizure of pastures, and resumption
of grants of rent-free land.†

* Skrine & Ross, 194—199. Vambery’s History of
Bukhara, 304—333; Abdul Hamid, ii. 251—256; Skrine has
Naeir instead of Nazar. Howorth’s History of the Mongols,
Pt. II. Div. ii. 747-752 (has Nadir for Nazar.)
† Abdul Hamid, ii. 435—442.
So the Bukhara troops mutinied and proclaimed as king his eldest son Abdul Aziz, who was in their midst as his father's viceroy, (17 April, 1645). Rebellion immediately broke out in many other parts of his vast and diverse territory, and savage hordes roamed over the country to take advantage of the disorder by plundering. At last the helpless father had to make peace by yielding Trans-oxiana to his rebel son and retaining Balkh and Badakhshan for himself. But meantime a new combatant had stepped into the arena; Shah Jahan had invaded Badakhshan.

It is difficult to see what drew him into the war, unless it was greed of conquest.

True, Nazar Muhammad Khan had not been a good neighbour. Eighteen years ago, on the death of Jahangir, he had invaded Afghanistan, besieged Kabul (29 May, 1628), and fled back precipitately at the approach of Mughal troops. But this raid had been forgiven, and since then there had been an exchange of friendly messages and embassies between him and the Emperor of Delhi. Even recently when the Mughal forces were massed in Afghanistan for operations near

† Abdul Hamid, I. A. 2c6—214.
Qandahar and Imam Quli had feared lest his country should be invaded by them, Shah Jahan had assured him that he would be left in peace.* That rebels from Afghanistan were harboured in Balkh† could not have been a cause of war, because it has always been recognised among eastern kings as a sacred duty to give asylum to suppliants. The Afghan frontier was exposed to private raids by Nazar Muhammad’s subjects, but these could not have extended far, and must have been looked upon as common incidents in that debateable land from time immemorial. The Court historian Abdul Hamid is, therefore, right when he says that Shah Jahan determined to conquer Balkh and Badakhshan, “because they were the heritage of Babar and also lay in the way to Samarqand, the capital of Timur, the founder of the Mughal dynasty.” The civil war in Balkh supplied him with an opportunity for carrying out his long-cherished scheme.‡

But if Shah Jahan really hoped to conquer and rule Central Asia with a force from India, we must conclude that the prosperity of his reign

* Abdul Hamid, ii. 152.
† Ibid, ii. 13, 528, 529.
‡ Ibid, ii. 482-483. Howorth, 752. ("Nadir appealed to Shah-Jahan for assistance, who greedily seized the opportunity.")
and the flattery of his courtiers had turned his head, and that he was dreaming the vainest of vain dreams. The Indian troops detested service in that far-off land of hill and desert, which could supply no rich booty, no fertile fief, and no decent house to live in. The occupation of that poor inhospitable and savage country meant only banishment from home and comfort and ceaseless fight and watching against a tireless and slippery enemy. The finest troops might be worn out and the richest treasury exhausted in the attempt to keep hold of such a country, and no gain either in glory or wealth was to be expected. Poor as the revenue of the new conquest was at the best of times, the Mughals during their two years of occupation could collect only one half and one-fourth respectively of this small sum,* while their war expenses were sixteen times as high!

A Mughal officer began the war by marching with a force from Ghorband, on the northern frontier of Afghanistan, and capturing the fort of Kahmard (June, 1645). But he soon abandoned it to the enemy.† Shah Jahan disapproved both of the capture and of the abandonment as unwise, and turned his immediate attention to the

† Ibid, 457—459.
conquest of Badakhshan. A strong reconnoitring force moved rapidly north-east from Kabul across the Hindu Kush and along the Panjshir river basin. On its return after examining the Parwan and Tul passes which lead into southern Badakhshan, he sent a large body of sappers to make a road. Rajah Jagat Singh took upon himself the task of conquest, advanced from Kabul (15 Oct., 1645) with a large Rajput contingent, conquered the Khosht district and built a wooden fort between the Sarab and the Anda-rab. Thence he returned to Afghanistan by the Panjshir valley (4 Nov.).* But the Rajput garrison left by him gallantly held the stockade and beat the Uzbaks back from its walls time after time.

The way being thus cleared, the grand campaign began next summer. In June, 1646 Murad Bakhsh, the youngest son of the Emperor, led 50,000 men into southern Badakhshan by the Tul pass. With him went Ali Mardan Khan, the premier noble, a Persian of rare genius and ability who had left the Shah's service to adorn the Court of Delhi. Marching by way of the Sarab and Deh-i-Tajikan, they reached Narin, whence a detachment under Asalat Khan pushed

on and took possession of the fort of Qunduz on the north-eastern border of Balkh (22 June). The Prince met with no opposition and entered the city of Balkh on 2nd July, 1646. The natives gazed with wonder at the Indian army with its huge elephants covered with cloth of gold and silver plates, steeds with bridle sets with precious metals, troopers clad in cuirass embossed with gold and gems, endless columns of musketeers and sappers, and gorgeous standards and drums.* Such a display of wealth and pomp they had never seen before. Shah Jahan had written to Nazar Muhammad Khan offering to leave Balkh to him if he remained friendly. The Khan had answered by professing submission. But on Murad’s arrival at Balkh he doubted the Emperor’s sincerity, feared a stratagem, and at night took his flight from his capital towards Persia. His fabulous wealth, hoarded for so many years and estimated at 70 lakhs of rupees, was mostly plundered by his followers and subjects, and the victorious Mughals could seize only 12 lakhs in cash and kind, besides 2500 horses and 300 camels. Asalat Khan and Bahadur Khan went in pursuit, but were too late to capture him.†

* Abdul Hamid, ii. 483—488, 512—537.
† Abdul Hamid, ii. 529—534, 539—541, 548—553.
The country was conquered without a blow, but Murad was already sick of it. In his very first letter to the Emperor he begged hard to be recalled, and he continued to press the request ever after, in spite of repeated refusal. Most of his officers were no less eager to return to the pleasant land of Hindustan and escape from the dull and uncongenial soil of Balkh. This news disheartened and distracted the loyal peasantry, and the Mughal soldiers, too, got out of hand and took to plundering.

The matter soon came to a crisis. The infatuated Prince, then only 22 years of age, wanted to return home without permission, leaving Bahadur Khan in charge. The Mughal army of occupation, left without a supreme leader, would have been placed in a perilous condition. At Shah Jahan's command the wazir Sadullah Khan hastened to Balkh (10th August), tried to move Murad from his foolish purpose, and on his refusal removed him from the command. Arrangements were made for the new government; the army was distributed under different generals and stationed at important centres to keep hold of the country.

Bahadur Khan and Asalat Khan were left in Balkh as joint viceroys, and Qalich Khan in Badakhshan. After 22 days of hard toil, the great wazir finished his task and returned to Kabul by a rapid ride of four days only (6 September).* The Prince, who had preceded him, was disgraced, deprived of his rank and government, and forbidden the Court.†

The Mughal outposts were exposed to attack from the Uzbaks, and many of them lived in a state of siege, fighting frequent but indecisive skirmishes with the enemy. All waited for the arrival of a supreme commander and reinforcements at the end of winter.‡

During the recess the Emperor made grand preparations for opening the campaign in the spring of 1647. His sons Shuja and Aurangzib were called up from their provinces, large sums of money were conveyed to Afghanistan, and troops were massed at convenient stations from Peshawar to Kabul, in readiness to move at the first order.§

* Abdul Hamid, ii. 560—565, 584.
† Ibid, 579.
§ Ibid, 603, 633, 641-642.
Aurangzib was in his government of Guzerat when he received his father's letter, dated 4th September 1646, ordering him to come away after leaving Shaista Khan, the governor of Malwa, in his place. On 20th January, 1647, he arrived at Lahore with his two eldest sons and had audience of the Emperor. Next day the provinces of Balkh and Badakhshan were conferred on him, with 50 lakhs of rupees for his expenses. On 10th February he took his leave with a present of 5 lakhs of rupees, and advanced to Peshawar, where he was to halt till the spring.* Thence he reached Kabul on 3rd April, and set out for the seat of war four days afterwards. Ali Mardan Khan accompanied him as his chief adviser and right hand man, and no better selection could have been made.†

But from the very beginning Aurangzib was handicapped by the smallness of his fighting force. Last year Murad had marched into Balkh with 50,000 men, but after the conquest a part of the army had been recalled. Of the remaining troops many were in garrison at the various

* Abdul Hamid, ii. 583, 625—628, 632.
† Ibid, 670, 671.
forts or guarding the line of communication with the base in Afghanistan. High officers in full strength held important districts like Taliqan and Qunduz in the east, Rustaq in the north-east, Balkh, Tarmiz on the Oxus, north of Balkh, Maimana in the south-west, and Andkhui in the north-west. Aurangzib wisely kept them at their posts, lest the country should pass out of his control. But this step weakened his own immediate command.

Some of the Indian nobles under orders to join him lingered at home or reached no further than Afghanistan. So the Prince had to fight his battles with less than 25,000 men, while the enemy were a nation in arms and outnumbered the Mughals as three to one. True they did not fight pitched battles and had a wholesome dread of musketry-fire; but their "Cossak tactics" wore out the Mughals, and their superiority in number enabled them to bear easily a loss ten times as large as the casualties of the invaders. Against these light forayers the small Imperial army could not hope for a crushing victory.

* Abdul Hamid, ii. 702-704. Khafi Khan computes his force at 35,000 and the Uzbek army at 1,20,000 men. (i. 671.)

† Abdul Hamid, ii. 704, 705.
After leaving Kabul, 7 the April 1647, Aurangzib marched by the Shibur Pass and Aq Rabat to Kahmard, which was a half-way depot of the invaders. Thence the road to Balkh runs over a tableland, through which winds the Dehas river with its narrow valley called the Derah-i-Gaz. Here the Uzbaks assembled in force under Qutluq Muhammad to dispute the passage. The Prince sent a reconnoitring force of 500 men under Khalil Beg, who charged the enemy, regardless of the odds against him. On hearing of his dangerous plight the Vanguard, mostly composed of Rajputs and a force of musketeers, was pushed up. The Uzbaks fled, but only to take post further off (20th May).*

* Abdul Hamid, ii. 671—673. Aurangzib advanced from Kabul by the Abdarah and Gaz passes, according to the Persian account. Yule takes Abdarah to be the upper valley of the Surkhab, below Zohak (Wood’s Journey, lxv). This was therefore “the Shibr Pass, which was most commonly used by Baber.” (Leyden, 139). Aurangzib’s stages are thus named: Kabul—(by way of Ghorband) to Aq Rabat (two stages from Kahmard)—Bajgah—the pass of Badar Hamid (=?= Babar’s “Madr on the Khulm road”),—Kishan Deh Khurd—Puni (or Buni) Qara (“which is the beginning of the valley of Gaz”—Balkh. He seems to have marched from Kabul northwards to Charikar, thence westwards by way of Ghorband to Zohak and Bamian, next northwards across the Dandan-Shikan Pass to Kahmard or even to Qara Kotal, whence he turned northwest to the mouth of the valley of Gaz (crossing one affluent of the Dehas river on the way). The entire route from Kabul to Balkh city is spoken of as 123 kos or 246 miles, (Abd. Ham. ii. 669).
Next day, Aurangzib led the main army by the eastern bank, while Ali Mardan Khan was sent with the Van across the two upper affluents of the Dehas to dislodge a strong body of the enemy from the hills and ravines that crossed the path.

The front division of the Mughal army, as it issued from a defile, was attacked by the Uzbaks and suffered some loss; but the wings soon came up and broke the enemy's centre. The battle now became general. Ali Mardan Khan drove the enemy from the field and from some hillocks behind it, chased them for four miles over broken ground, and returned to camp with some wounded prisoners. This was Aurangzib's first victory in Balkh.

The city of Balkh was reached without further opposition (25th May). Madhu Singh Hada was left in command of the fort, and the leading citizens were detained in custody in Aurangzib's camp to prevent them from making mischief.* Reinforcements in men and money continued to arrive from Kabul, where Shah Jahan himself was present.†

At the head of the Bukhara national defence

* Abdul Hamid, ii. 673—675, 686—687.
stood Abdul Aziz Khan, the eldest son and sup-planter of the weak king Nazar Muhammad. He now sent another army under Beg Ughli across the Oxus river to Aqcha, 40 miles north-west of Balkh. Here the fugitives from the pass of Gaz, under Qutluq Muhammad, joined the new arrivals.*

After a three days' halt at Balkh, Aurangzib March on Aqcha. left his baggage there in charge of his eldest son, and set out with light kit towards Aqcha to meet the assembled Uzbaks. The Imperial army moved with great caution, Bahadur Khan leading the Van, Aurangzib seated on an elephant commanding the Centre which enclosed in its bosom the baggage and camp followers, and Ali Mardan Khan bringing up the Rear. The artillery supported by foot musketeers cleared the line of advance. The Uzbak squadrons charged repeatedly but only to be broken and driven back. They formed again at a safe distance and took advantage of the many canals and gardens of the region to obstruct the Imperialists, who steadily advanced to Timurabad (2nd June).†

† Ibid, 687-688.
Hardly had the wearied force of Aurangzib dismounted at their camp here, when the Uzbaks attacked them from all sides. After a harassing fight they succeeded in driving the enemy back in front and right, and Ali Mardan Khan with the Rear went in pursuit and plundered the camp of Qutluq Muhammad. But the Mughal left wing was weak in number and its leader Said Khan Bahadur Zafar Jang was an old man in bad health. The enemy quickly discovered this weak spot, and their troops, repulsed at other points, flocked here to swell the attack. Said Khan sent a detachment of 400 men to hold a stream which skirted the camp and to prevent the enemy from crossing it. But a clever ruse of the Uzbaks lured the indiscreet Mughals to the other bank, where they were surrounded and almost exterminated by the mobile enemy. Said Khan sent up reinforcements and at last himself marched out in spite of his illness. But he was wounded and thrown down from his horse, and his two sons were slain with many other soldiers. Just then Aurangzib arrived to succour the hard-pressed division. Two furious elephants were driven before him, and his soldiers rushed into the lane that was thus cleared. The enemy
were routed and the left wing saved from extinction.*

The Second of June was a terrible day for the Imperialists. They had marched from dawn to midday and then got no rest in their camp, but had to fight incessantly till sunset before they could gain the much needed safety and repose. Ali Mardan Khan now returned with the victorious Rear. The camp was entrenched and carefully guarded, many of the captains doing patrol duty all night, without dismounting.

Next day the tired soldiers and their chief alike wished to halt. But under Ali Mardan’s wise advice they advanced to seize Beg Ughli’s base and reap the utmost fruit of their victory. The Uzbaks as usual hovered round the marching army and kept up a running fight. Thanks to their superior mobility, they could attack or retreat as they chose. Leaving screens at safe distances on the Right and Left, their massed troops fell on the Van, but only to be shattered by the Mughal artillery. The same tactics were repeated against the Rear, but with no better success. The march continued, the enemy seizing every disorder or weakness

* Ibid, 688—692; Khafi Khan says that this encounter took place next morning (i. 662).
to come closer and gall the Imperialists with showers of arrows. But the Scythian militia was no match for regular troops, and their general's camp at Pashai was seized by Aurangzib, and the peasantry whom they had carried off into captivity were released.*

After two days of march and fighting the Prince could no longer deny his troops a halt. Meantime the baffled enemy slipped away from his front to his rear at Aliabad. Another large army arrived from Bukhara under Prince Subhan Quli, evidently to attack the city of Balkh.†

The news made Aurangzib beat a retreat from Pashai (5th June) and hasten Retreat to Balkh. eastwards to defend the capital. The enemy became more aggressive than before, and at two places penetrated into his camp for a time.‡ Artillery, rockets, and muskets alone could keep their hordes at a safe distance. Next day he turned a little aside to Shaikhabad to release two of his officers who were invested in a

* Abdul Hamid, ii. 692—694.
† The following points in Aurangzib's advance from Balkh are mentioned: Yulbugha (near some canals)—Aliabad—Timurabad, 'one kos from Fatihabad'—Pashai in the district of Aqcha.
‡ Khafi Khan (i. 668) says that three or four thousand Uzbaks dashed into the Mughal camp, and carried off many camels loaded with baggage and many women and children of the Mughal troops. Ali Mardan Khan recovered only a little of the booty.
garden. Thence he marched towards Faizabad on the Balkhāb river.

On the 7th the situation grew worse. The Bukhara army put forth a Grand battle with the Uzbaks.

supreme effort. It was now in full strength. Its highest commanders, Abdul Aziz the king, Subhan Quli his brother, and Beg Ughli the Uzbak chieftain, were all present, and directed the attack on three points of the Imperial army. But again musketry and superior discipline gave the Mughals the victory. The retreat continued till the 9th with the usual ineffective molestation from an enemy that lacked fire arms, and whose arrows were powerless except in a close encounter. At last in the evening of the 9th the Bukhara king demanded a parley and sent a friendly message. The Mughals were not molested during the next two days, and they reached Balkh in peace on 11th June.

This march towards Aqcha and retreat to Balkh had taken up ten days, during which the Mughal army had been a stranger to repose.

* Abdul Hamid, ii. 694—697.
† Abdul Hamid, ii. 697—701. The following points in Aurangzib's retreat from Pashai are named in the Persian history: Aliabad—digression to Shaikhabad—Faizabad on the Balkhab River—Yanki Ariq—Bridge of Dost Beg (on the Balkhab?)—Naharab or canal—Yandarak—Balkh city.
Day after day a strenuous fight had to be maintained against the tireless and mobile enemy, while hunger raged in the Imperial ranks. The soldiers were ever on the move, and food could be cooked only on the backs of the marching elephants! Bread sold at one rupee or even two rupees a piece and water was equally dear. Happy were those who could get the necessaries of life even at this price, for there was not enough for all. Such was the condition of the Prince’s personal following. The lot of the common soldiers may be imagined. But in the midst of all this hardship and danger, Aurangzib’s firmness and control prevented any slackness or disorder; his watchful eye and active body hastened to the succour of every weak spot, and his wisdom and courage brought the army back to safety.*

Evil as was the plight of the Mughal army, the enemy were worse off. Aurangzib’s splendid courage. Aurangzib’s grim tenacity had gained its object. Abdul Aziz now desired to make peace. His hope of crushing Aurangzib had failed. He had personally witnessed a striking proof of the Prince’s cool courage; for, one day the hour of evening prayer

* Khafi Khan, i. 668 and 669. Howorth (752) says, “The devastation caused such a famine that an ass’s load of corn cost 1000 florins.”
arrived when the battle was at its hottest; Aurangzib spread his carpet on the field, knelt down and calmly said his prayers, regardless of the strife and din around him. He was then, as during the rest of the campaign, without armour and shield. The Bukhara army gazed on the scene with wonder, and Abdul Aziz, in generous admiration, stopped the fight, crying, “To fight with such a man is to court one’s own ruin.”*  

The Bukhara king could no longer pay and keep his vast host together. The hope of an easy plunder of the Imperialists had brought his men together. That design having failed they were eager to return home. The Turko-mans in particular sold their horses to the Imperial army and decamped across the Oxus.†  

Abdul Aziz proposed that Balkh should be delivered to his younger brother Subhan Quli, as Shah Jahan had publicly offered to restore the country to their father. Aurangzib referred the question to the Emperor, and Abdul Aziz left the neighbourhood of Balkh, and from Khulm turned sharply to the north, crossing the

* Masir-i-Alamgiri, 531; Abdul Hamid, ii. 704.
† Abdul Hamid, ii. 701 & 702, 708.
Oxus at Aiwanj on inflated skins, his soldiers following his example wherever they could.* The historian Abdul Hamid has blamed Aurangzib for not immediately giving chase and killing or capturing Abdul Aziz.† But he forgets that the Uzbak war was a national rising and did not depend on any individual leader, even when that leader was a powerful and able prince like Abdul Aziz Khan.

The war was now practically over, at least for a season. But a settlement was still far off. Shah Jahan had no doubt decided to give the country back to Nazar Muhammad Khan, but that king must first offer submission and beg pardon before Imperial prestige could be satisfied. Meantime in the Mughal army officers and men alike were sick of their exile and longed to return home. High commanders like Bahadur Khan secretly thwarted Aurangzib, fearing that if they captured the king of Bukhara, the Emperor would annex Transoxiana and leave the Indian troops in permanent garrison there, while the failure of the expedition would lead to their speedy return home! The country had been devastated by the Turkoman freebooters, the

* Abdul Hamid, ii. 700, 706 & 707.
† Abdul Hamid, ii. 709.
crops burnt, and the peasantry robbed or dragged away. Aurangzib, therefore, wrote to his father that he could do no good by staying there.*

Soon after the Prince's return to Balkh about the middle of June, negotiations had been opened by Nazar Muhammad, then in refuge at Belchiragh.† But three months were wasted in a fruitless exchange of messages and vain attempts to allay the ex-king's suspicions of treachery if he interviewed Aurangzib. He demanded this fort and that as a security, and on 13th September sent Qafsh, the Qalmaq chieftain, as his agent to Aurangzib. On the 23rd, he sent his grandsons to the Prince, excusing himself on the ground of illness.‡

With this Aurangzib had to be contented, as the winter was fast approaching. The passes of the Hindu Kush would be soon closed by snow. His army was faced with starvation, as grain was selling in Balkh at ten rupees a maund. They had no winter quarters in that poor and desolate country.

* Waris, 3b, 4a.
† For Nazar Muhammad's adventures in Persia and after his return, see Abdul Hamid, ii. 658—668.
‡ Waris, 6b, 7a.
Already tribes of Turks and "Alamans" had recrossed the Oxus and begun to cut off small parties of the Mughals. Aurangzib, as his officers urged, had no time to lose; he could not even wait for the Emperor's consent. So at last, on 1st October, 1647, he formally delivered the city and fort of Balkh to Nazar Muhammad's grandsons. His distant garrisons fell back on him at the rumour of peace, without waiting for his order.*

On 3rd October the Mughal army marched from the plain outside Balkh and began its retreat to Kabul. Ali Mardan Khan and Rajah Jai Singh commanded the Right and Left wings, and Bahadur Khan the Rear. The artillery accompanied the Van. The pass of Ghazniyak was crossed slowly and painfully, the enemy harassing them from the rear and boldly falling upon them at their least disorder or difficulty. Ghori was reached on 14th October, the Uzbaks still hanging on the tail of the retreating force. Shah Jahan had wished to retain this fort and Kahmard as the southern gates of Balkh, but his officers refused to stay there.†

* Waris, 7b.
† Waris, 8a.
The retreat continued. The wild hillmen called Hazarahs now took the place of the Uzbaks in harassing and plundering the Mughals. The winter of that year set in very early and with unusual severity. The Imperialists, encumbered with 10 lakhs of rupees but having few transport animals and porters, toiled slowly and painfully through a narrow and steep pass east of the Surkhab river (21st and 22nd October) and the hardened ice on the Hindu Kush (24th October). South of these mountains lay Afghanistan and safety, and Aurangzib could now hasten in advance to Kabul, which he reached on the 27th. Ali Mardan Khan too crossed with ease. But the rest of the army, especially the Rajputs under Jai Singh, the treasure-escort under Zulqadar Khan, the stores, and the Camp and Rear under Bah-

* Vambéry's History of Bukhara, 332.
† Aurangzib returned from Balkh to Kabul by the Ghazniyak—Haibak—Ghori—Ghorband route, which is called in the Persian history the Khwajah Zaid Road (Aabd. Ham. ii. 669). He seems to have crossed the Hindu Kush either by the Kushan Pass, because "this pass leads under the great peak specially known as that of Hindu Kush", (Wood, lxv) or, what is more likely, by the Chardarya or Kipchak Pass, (for which see Wood, lxv. and Leyden, 139). The stages of his homeward march from Balkh are thus given:—Ghazniyak Pass—Ghori—Surkhab river—Bek Shahar—Chahar Chashma—Pass of Hindu Kush—Ghorband—Charikar—Kabul. (Waris, 8a & b).
dur Khan, were several days' march behind. They suffered untold hardships from heavy and incessant snowfall for three days together. Men and beasts of burden alike slipped on the snow or lost the narrow track and went rolling down into the depths below. The exhausted camels lay down in the ice never to rise again. The intense cold drove every man away in search of shelter. Zulqadar Khan alone, with a handful of men, guarded his charge on the bare top of the pass for seven days, regardless of snowfall, till the Rear under Bahadur Khan came up and took him away. This last officer's march had been slow, as he had constantly to face round and drive back the hillmen who clung to him in the hope of plunder. One night, in the midst of wind and snow, he had to bivouac on the top of the pass, and many benumbed men and beasts of his party perished.* The last part of the army reached Kabul on 10th November.†

The total loss of the Imperial army in crossing the passes was 10,000 lives, about one-half of the number being men, and the rest elephants, horses, camels and other beasts. Much property, too, was left buried under the snow, or flung into the ravines.

* Waris, 8b, 9a.
† Waris, 9a.
for want of transport. The horrors of the British Retreat from Kabul were anticipated by these Indian mercenaries, who had blindly gone to an unrighteous war at the call of their paymaster. Next year when the snow melted it revealed the gruesome spectacle of piles of human bones bordering the path!*

Thus ended Shah Jahan's fatuous war in Balkh,—a war in which the Indian treasury spent four *krores* of rupees in two years and realised from the conquered country a revenue of $22\frac{1}{2}$ *lakhs* only. Not an inch of territory was annexed, no dynasty changed, and no enemy replaced by an ally on the throne of Balkh. The grain stored in Balkh fort, worth 5 *lakhs*, and the provisions in other forts as well, were all abandoned to the Bukharians, besides Rs. 50,000 in cash presented to Nazar Muhammad's grandsons and Rs. 22,500 to envoys. Five hundred soldiers fell in battle and ten times that number (including camp followers) was slain by cold and snow on the mountains.† Such is the terrible price that aggressive Imperialism makes India pay for wars across the north-western frontier.

* Vambery's *Bukhara*, 322.
† Abdul Hamid, ii. 542, 704; Waris, 7b, 6b, 7a.
CHAPTER VI.

GOVERNORSHIP OF MULTAN AND SINDH, 1648—1652.

After sanctioning the retreat from Balkh, Shah Jahan himself returned to India. But steps were taken to guard against any disaster in the rear. Prince Shuja was left behind at Kabul till he should hear that Aurangzib had safely crossed the Hindu Kush again. The expeditionary force was now entirely withdrawn from Afghanistan. But Aurangzib himself, in command of its last portion, was detained at Attock* till March next, without being permitted to cross the Indus and enter Hindustan. The object of this arrangement evidently was that he should be near enough to hasten back to the defence of Kabul, in case of an invasion from Central Asia. But such a fear vanished in time, and in the middle of March 1648 he was appoint-

* Waris, 4a, 8b, 12a.
ed Governor of Multan.* This post he held till 14th July, 1652, when he laid it down to take up the viceroyalty of the Deccan for the second time.†

Of Aurangzib’s personal history during these four years there is little to tell. He was twice called away to fight the Persians at Qandahar; first leaving Multan on 22nd January and returning in December, 1649, and on the second occasion crossing the Chenab on 20th March 1652 and being sent away to the Deccan directly from Qandahar. On the way back from the first siege he spent a fortnight with the Emperor at Lahore (10th to 26th November, 1649); and he paid another visit to his father at Delhi from 2nd January to 12th February, 1651. Promotion came to him on 16th January, 1649, when his rank was raised by 2,000 troopers of his command being made do-aspa and seh-aspa, and his allowance being increased in proportion, so that he was now a Commander of 15,000 men by rank, (his additional contingent being 12,000 troopers, of whom 8000 were do-aspa and seh-

* Waris, 12a.
† Waris, 66a and 67a.
In November of the same year the province of Tatta or Sindh was added to his viceroyalty, and the districts of Bhakkar and Siwistan granted to him as his fiefs.†

On the public side of the Prince's career from 1650 a new and copious source of information is opened to the historian by the Adab-i-Alamgiri. Aurangzib took into his service an elegant and facile secretary, Shaikh Abul Fath, afterwards raised to the title of Qabil Khan and the high post of Munshi-ul-mamalik ("Secretary of the Empire") when his master won the throne of Delhi. The scribe served the Prince for 26 years and retired only when failing eye-sight made him unfit for his task.‡ He kept copies of all the letters he wrote in the name of Aurangzib to the Emperor, the princes, ministers, and generals, and of certain other epistles written to them on his own behalf. These number more than six hundred and fill 427 pages of a foolscap folio manuscript, with 23 lines to the page. They cover the entire period from 1650 to the dethronement and captivity of Shah Jahan. From

* Waris, 24a, 39b, 48a, 49a, 59a. Adab-i-Alamgiri, 3a, 4b, 9a & b.
† Waris, 39b.
‡ Adab-i-Alamgiri, 1b, 209b.
the commencement of the second siege of Qandahar the letters become more full and frequent, and we get a detailed and most authentic account of Aurangzib’s efforts at Qandahar, his feeling at his father’s censure, his financial difficulties in the Deccan, the administrative problems that he handled there, the crooked ways of Mughal diplomacy with Bijapur and Golkonda,—and lastly, of his hopes and fears, plans and movements during the war of succession, and his relations with his captive father. Half a century later, Sadiq of Ambala collected Qabil Khan’s drafts, supplemented them with a history of the war of succession extracted from the Amal-i-Salih and the Alamgir-namah, added 131 letters* which he himself had written as secretary to the luckless prince Muhammad Akbar, and published the whole to the world. In the Khuda Bakhsh MS. the collection forms a folio volume of 586 pages, of inestimable value to the historian of the epoch.†

The province of Multan contained a war-like and unsettled population divided into a number

* These contain many details of the Mughal war with Maharana Raj Singh, and come to a close only a month before Akbar broke into rebellion against his father.

† The Adab-i-Alamgiri was compiled in 1115 A. H. (1703-1704 A.D.) by Sadiq at the request of his son Md. Zaman, (2a and b).
of clans by differences of race, creed, and traditions, and often engaged in war with one another. The addition of Sindh to his charge brought Aurangzib in contact with the wildest and most untractable Afghan and Baluch septs. For many generations past the royal authority had been hardly obeyed in the western borderland even in name, and the chieftains had lived warred and raided as they liked. Aurangzib was not the man to brook disorder and disobedience. But even he could do no more than make a beginning. The cause of law and order could get no local support among the people governed; everything depended on the strong arm of the ruler. It was impossible for him, in the few years of a viceroyalty, to break to peaceful life and law-abiding habits tribes who had never before known any government and who were in a fluid state of either expansion or extinction. Only justice strictly administered and backed by irresistible force for several generations, could have crushed out the predatory instincts of the Brahuis and Hots and taught them to obey a higher power than their chieftains' will. This moral transformation was reserved for another age and another race of administrators. What Aurangzib, however, could do
was to strike down the most notorious brigand chiefs and secure a nominal profession of allegiance to the Emperor from the border clans. The Imperial suzerainty once admitted in theory, its practical working out might be left for better times.

A large Baluch tribe name Hot had migrated into Sindh and the Panjab under Mir Chakar Rind of Sibi, and split up into branches. One section held the upper Derajat for two centuries with Dera Ismail Khan as their capital. Their chiefs bore the title of Ismail Khan from generation to generation and stretched their lordship over Darya Khan and Bhakkar east of the Indus. In the Sind Sagar Doab stood Mankera, another Hot stronghold, and the capital of a principality which in the beginning of the 17th century stretched from Bhakkar to Leiah on the Indus. In course of time the Hots have become assimilated to their Jat and Rajput neighbours, and their power and number have declined.* But the seventeenth century was the period of their greatness. Their chief, Ismail Hot, sent presents to Shah Jahan and secured a patron in Dara Shukoh. Taking advantage of his position on

the boundary between the two provinces, he now claimed to be subject to the Governor of Lahore and refused to admit the jurisdiction of the Subahdar of Multan. Aurangzib was prepared for this subterfuge. He had mentioned the case in an audience with the Emperor and got his answer that Ismail Hot was in future to be subject to Multan. The Hot chief, on the strength of a letter of Dara's, refused to wait upon the new Governor of Multan, and continued in his career of aggression. He took three forts from Mubarak of Babri, another Baluch chief.

Aurangzib, armed with the Emperor's sanction, at once asserted his authority and sent a force to restore the forts to their rightful owner. But during Mubarak's absence, Ismail conquered the forts again. Severer measures were now taken against him; he was compelled to surrender Mubarak's possessions and to pay his respects to the Prince at Multan (20th June, 1650). Aurangzib now conciliated him, as he was a rich chieftain with a good body of armed retainers, and could assist the Imperial government in subduing the Nohani tribe and also supply provisions during the Qandahar war.*

* Abdul Hamid, ii. 233, (Ismail presents horses and camels, 26 May, 1641.) Waris, 85a. Adab-i-Alamgiri, 2b, 3a.
Another Baluch tribe, which has now strangely declined and almost disappeared, is the Nohani, the hereditary enemy of the Hots. But their power in the 17th century was strong enough to cause anxiety to the government. Aurangzib at first tried to win over Alam, the Nohani chief, whose lands adjoined those of the Hots and lay across one of the shortest roads from Multan to Qandahar. But his friendly letter produced no effect; the proud chieftain refused to wait on the Governor at Multan. So Aurangzib took steps to expel him by force, after getting sanction from the Emperor.

In the Kirthar and Lakhi hills separating Sindh from Baluchistan, dwelt many lawless men of the Nahmardi and Jukia tribes. In Akbar’s time the former clan could place in the field more than 7,000 men. Their strongholds were Bela, (the capital of the district of Las), and Kahra, from which

* "Noh or Nuhani.—Not now found. Said to have been on the side of the Lasharlis against the Rinds" (Dames’s Baloch Race, p. 56). "Throughout the Brahui, Baloa, and Lasi tribes, and even among the Sibi Afghans, sections or sub-sections called Nodh, Nodhani, and Nothani, &c. are to be found" (H. Buller’s Census of Baluchistan, p. 83).

† Adab-i-Alamgiri, 3a, 3b, 4a, 5a.
‡ Ain, ii. 337. The Adab-i-Alamgiri mentions Kahra and Bela as 10 stages from the frontier of Tatta, and as the
they sallied forth to rob and to slay. No ruler of Sindh, from the days of the Tarkhan dynasty, had extorted even a nominal submission from these border brigands. Aurangzib sent his able lieutenant, Malik Husain of the Abdali clan, against them. The force marched for ten days beyond the frontier of Lower Sindh, exacted promises of submission and tribute from Harun and Khatartal (the Nahmardi chiefs), and Murid (the headman of the Jukias), and caused the Emperor's name to be read from the pulpit as a public mark of his suzerainty. This show of strength evidently had a good effect on the neighbours, for Jafar Nahmardi, a kinsman of the zamindar of Panjghur* and Kech Makran, and four other chiefs offered their allegiance to the Imperial government.

Another Nahmardi chief named Madh, had descended from the hills of Southern Afghanistan to raid Bela and Kahra. But Malik Husain with the Imperial troops made a forced march of 140 refuge of these two clans. The Ain speaks of a range of mountains named Karah, evidently west of Bhakkar. (ii. 337).

* The Adab-i-Alamgiri, 3b, has Banchur or Panjur "and Kaj and Makran". I take the place to be Panjghur, 27°30 N. 63°E., north north-east of Kaj (or Kech), described in Masson's Kalat, 219. The chief objection to the identification is that it is more than 300 miles away from Tatta.
miles, and surprised the robber's camp, slaying him and bringing away his daughter and forty of his retainers as captives. Thus the Emperor's suzerainty was publicly declared throughout the coast tract of Makran, and the army returned to Tatta with flying colours.

Sata Hala, the son of the zamindar of Kakrala, paid a visit to Aurangzib at Multan, but in the meantime his rival crossed over from Cutch and seized his lands. A detachment from Malik Husain's force, assisted by a gun-boat, drove away the usurper, who fled without standing a battle.* Everywhere lawless men and frontier clans felt that they had got a new master, who could not be safely defied.

While thus securing internal peace, Aurangzib was equally mindful of developing the trade of the province and increasing its revenue. Early in the century Tatta had been one of the chief commercial centres of India, and trade of great value used to pass up the Indus. But accumulations of sand at the mouth of the river increased year by year and closed the passage to ocean-going ships.† Tatta ceased to be an emporium.

* Adab-i-Alamgiri, 3h.
† "There is no city of greater trade in all the Indies than Tatta in Sindh; its chief port being Larry Bunder, three days' journey nearer the mouth of the river. From Tatta
Aurangzib now set about reviving the commerce of the province by affording facilities to the maritime trade. He opened a new port at the mouth of the Indus, and built there a fort and dock to give it security and usefulness. But it took time for the new harbour to become known to mariners, and for some months the only ship that used it was a vessel belonging to the Prince. The Emperor excused the duty on merchandise in order to attract trade to it.*

We read of his financial difficulties at this time. His jagirs produced little revenue, as the result of drought, the locust plague, and floods, in three successive seasons. He begged for financial assistance from the Emperor, saying that he had no hoard of gold pieces, but had spent all his income in keeping his army efficient, as he did not care to buy jewels like other princes. But the Emperor gave him an angry refusal.†

Aurangzib's administrative capacity, however, must not be judged from these few achievements

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* Adab-i-Alamgiri, 6a.
† Adab, 172a.
in Sindh. He lived in the province for barely three years, and in the very first year of his vice-royalty Qandahar cast its shadow over his work. Home affairs were subordinated to foreign, and every other question was neglected for the supreme one of recovering Qandahar. Multan became one of the two bases for the war with Persia, and, amidst the bustle of military preparations on a vast scale, the attention and resources of its ruler were necessarily diverted from the internal administration.
CHAPTER VII.

First Siege of Qandahar, 1649.

The province of Qandahar occupies the southern part of Afghanistan. It is a comparatively level country, of which the heart is formed by the river Helmand and its tributaries. On the east it is separated from India by the extensive net-work of hills centring round Thal-Chotiali. On the south impassable deserts lie between it and Baluchistan. On the north stretch the hill ranges of Ghazni and Kabul. Westwards, from a little beyond the city of Qandahar up to Isfahan, the country is fairly level, but so very hot and barren that for days and days together not a green herb or blade of grass refreshes the traveller’s eye, while the dry sandy soil affords only a scanty supply of brackish water at long intervals. A few forts have been built on the rivers, mainly for military purposes,—to guard the fords, to protect caravans,
and to afford resting places to troops on the march. Patches of cultivation and walled hamlets dot the river banks in an otherwise desolate wilderness.*

Qandahar proper is an open and well-watered district penned within hills and its crops and canals. The Arghandab and the Tarnak, two tributaries of the Helmand, give fertility to its north-eastern corner beyond Kalat-i-Ghilzai, on the road to Ghazni. Numberless canals have drawn away water from the Helmand, and turned the environs of Qandahar into one long expanse of orchards and cornfields, vineyards and melon-beds. The Afghans of this part have used every contrivance that human ingenuity sharpened by want can suggest, to utilise the precious water of their few streams in irrigating their fields. Rightly do the people name their river Hirmand or "abounding in blessings," because they owe their all to it.† But the country is so bare of trees that firewood is very dear, and for lack of timber the people build their houses of sun-

* Journey of Richard Steel and John Crowther, in Purchas, I. 519—528 (quoted in Kerr's Voyages and Travels, ix. 212 and 213).

† Imperial Gazetteer, i. 12. Ain-i-Akbari (Jarrett), ii. 394. Masson's Journeys, ii. 186, 189. Forster's Journey (1798), ii. 102—104 and 106.
dried clay, with earthen domes for roofs. Burnt bricks are seldom used, even in building the walls of forts. Away from the river, agriculture cannot flourish, and sheep form the chief wealth of the people.

The great Hindu Kush range running through the heart of Asia, strikes westwards into Persia, and thus completely separates Central Asia from Afghanistan, Baluchistan and India. But north of Herat its formidable heights sink to insignificant levels, with comparatively gentle gradients, which offer an easy passage to an invading host from Central Asia marching to take Kabul from the rear and strike India on her western flank. Herein lies the strategic importance of Qandahar: only 360 miles of level country separate it from Herat,—a ten days' dash for cavalry. Through Qandahar must pass, and there must be turned back, if ever at all, any considerable land force, with artillery and other modern impedimenta, coming to invade India from Persia or Central Asia. The master of Kabul must hold Qandahar and

* Masson's Journeys, i. 280.
† Holdich's Gates of India, 528.
‡ Kandahar (a pamphlet), with an Introduction by Ashmead Bartlett, (1881).
Herat, or his dominion is unsafe. In an age when Kabul was a part of the Delhi Empire, Qandahar was our indispensable first line of defence.

In the seventeenth century Qandahar was even more important as a gateway of commerce than as an outpost of the empire. The Portuguese navy then dominated the Indian Ocean, and their quarrels with Persia often stopped the sea-borne trade by way of the Persian Gulf. All merchandise from India and even the Spice Islands had to follow the land route through Multan, Chotiali, Pishin and Qandahar. In spite of the length and hardships of the road, in spite of the toll levied by every petty chieftain and local officer whose jurisdiction had to be crossed, in spite of the total cost of transport being as high as Rs. 125 for every camel’s load,—the traders had practically a monopoly of the Persian market, and their profits were large enough to attract numbers to the traffic. In 1615, the English traveller Richard Steel noted that fourteen thousand laden camels annually passed into Persia by this route. Many merchants of India, Persia and Turkey met at Qandahar and often concluded their exchange of commodities there, and so great was the con-
course of trade that provisions grew very dear in the city in spite of the natural abundance of the district, and the houses were extended till the suburbs became larger than the city itself.*

From its position Qandahar was naturally a bone of contention between India and Persia. Early in the sixteenth century two powerful monarchies strang up side by side, when Babar conquered Delhi and Shah Ismail founded the glorious "Sophy" dynasty in Persia. In 1522 Babar finally wrested the province of Qandahar from the Arghun family who had held it under nominal submission to the ruler of Herat. On his death, it passed as an appanage to his younger son Kamran. In 1545, Humayun, then a fugitive from India, captured the fort from his brother Askari, but broke his promise of ceding it to the son of the Persian king, who had given him shelter and whose forces had aided the conquest. But this breach of faith availed him little. In the troubles following Humayun's death and Akbar's minority, the Persian king conquered Qandahar (1558) and bestowed it on his nephew Sultan Husain Mirza. Akbar's turn came in 1594, when Sultan Husain's successor,

* Purchas, i. 519—528, as quoted in Kerr, ix. 209, 212, 213. Tavernier, i. 90.
Mirza Muzaffar Husain, surrendered his principality to the Mughal Emperor and entered his service as a high grandee. So also did Muzaffar's brother Rustam, the lord of Dawar. For the next twenty-nine years Qandahar remained united to Delhi, though a fruitless attack was made on it in 1606, just after Akbar's death. But the Persians were not to be denied. After negotiating in vain with Jahangir for a friendly cession of the fort, Shah Abbas the Great in 1623 besieged it for 45 days, and took it from Abdul Aziz Khan Naqshbandi, who was holding it for the Emperor. Fifteen years afterwards, Ali Mardan Khan, the Persian Governor of Qandahar, alarmed at the hostile intentions of the Shah, saved himself and his family by betraying the fort into Mughal hands (Feb., 1638) and entering the Imperial service, where he gained the highest rank and office, and the personal friendship of his new master. Shah Jahan, on getting possession spent immense sums in strengthening the defences and replenishing the stores and arsenals of Qandahar and its dependencies, Bist and Zamin Dawar.*

* For the history of Qandahar see Erskine's History of India, i. 215, 220, 355; ii. 311—319, Blochmann's Ain-i-
It now became a point of honour with the Persian sovereign to recover Qandahar. Shah Abbas II, who had ascended the throne of Isfahan in 1642 as a boy of ten only, wanted to signalise his coming of age by a great exploit. In August, 1648, he began to assemble matchlockmen and pioneers in Khurasan, lay in stores of grain at convenient centres, and mobilise a large force at Herat. At the same time the traffic from Persia to Qandahar by this route was stopped, in order to withhold news from the doomed city. But preparations on such a vast scale cannot be kept secret. At the end of September Shah Jahan learnt of the project; he was even informed that the Persians would make the attack in winter, when the heavy snowfall of Afghanistan would prevent the arrival of relief from India. Shah Jahan, then at Delhi, took counsel with his ministers. It was at first decided to move the Court to Kabul, and to warn the nobles to join the expedition with their quotas of troops. But a

_Akhari_, i. 313-314, 409, 504; Elliot, vi. 130; _Raqat-i-Shah Abbas Sani_, 77—79, _Alam Arai Abbasi_ (Mulla Firuz MS.), ii. 119; _Khafi Khan_, i. 115—122, 326; Abdul Hamid, ii. 24—40; _Masir-ul-Umara_, ii. 795—798 (Life of Ali Mardan Khan), iii. 296 et seq; _Encyclopædia of Islam_, i. 167 and 168.
winter march to Afghanistan was unpleasant; several provincial commanders delayed joining the Emperor. Courtiers were not wanting to suggest that there was no need for hurry, as a Persian campaign in the depth of winter was most unlikely. In a weak moment Shah Jahan listened to the carpet knights of his Court; the march of the grand army was put off till the next spring. Only the Mughal Governor of Kabul threw 5,000 men and five lakhs of treasure into Qandahar to add to its defensive power.*

Empire is not for the ease-loving; victory is not for the indolent. The Persians besiege Qandahar.

The natural consequence of neglecting an enemy followed. The Persian king belied his tender age and character of a drunkard. He triumphed over the depth of winter, his lack of provisions, and other difficulties on which the courtiers of Shah Jahan

* Waris, 20b-21a, 23a; Khafi Khan, i. 684—686; Muhammad Afzal Husain’s Zubdat-ut-Tawarikh, (Khuda Bakhsh MS.) 42a, (very brief). Rugat-i-Shah Abbas Sani, the Shah’s letters to Shah Jahan before and after the siege, 52—64, his letter calling upon Daulat Khan to surrender the fort, 120—126, and some other epistles in which he exults over his victory, 105—120 (including the failures of Shah Jahan’s sons). One of the letters to Shah Jahan contains the curious request, “Won’t you make a free gift of Qandahar to me, who stand in the relation of a son to you?” (59) Tarikh-i-Shah-Abbas Sani by Mirza Tahir Wahid (Mulla Firuz Library) has a brief account of the Persian capture and the failure of the Mughal sieges.
had built their hopes, and laid siege to Qandahar on 16th December, 1648.

Daulat Khan, surnamed Khawas Khan, the Mughal commandant, adopted a foolish scheme of defence. He threw his picked troops into the citadel, named Daulatabad, as if matters had already come to the worst. Three quarters of a mile from the citadel, on the north face of the hill, stood two projecting guard-towers above a flight of forty steps carved in the solid lime-stone rock. Daulat Khan durst not hold this isolated position. But it was a fatal omission. The Persians at once seized this eminence,* which dominated the citadel and the market place of Qandahar. On 5th January, 1649, three big guns, each carrying 74 lb shot, reached their camp. Platforms had been already raised for them, and the bombardment of the city began. The parapets and screens above the fort-walls were demolished, and the Persian trenches were safely run to the edge of the ditch.

Progress of the siege.

Thence they crossed the moat on wooden bridges and secured a lodgement under the walls of the outwork named Shir Haji and began to lay

* Manucci mentions a story that they surprised the Mughal sentry on the hilltop by following a goat-track up the hill at night under the guidance of a goat-herd. (Storia, i. 186.)
mines. Here the fiercest fighting took place at close quarters, the outwork being repeatedly lost and recovered. The presence of their king spurred the Persians on to heroic exertions.

Early in February, the garrison began to lose heart. They had held their own for a month and a half against superior odds, and no relief was in sight. Nor were traitors wanting to fan their discontent and alarm. Two Tartar chiefs, Shadi Uzbak and Qipchaq Khan, with their retainers, had entered the Mughal pay at the end of the war in Balkh, and were now in Qandahar. These foreign mercenaries thought only of saving their families and property, without caring for their master's honour. They intrigued with the timid and the slothful among the garrison and created a spirit of despair by dwelling on the impossibility of reinforcements arriving before spring, and painting the horrors of an assault by the Persians. Their arts succeeded. A portion of the garrison mutinied, deserted their trenches and opened negotiations with the enemy. Daulat Khan was not the leader for such a crisis: he lost control over his men; instead of making an example of the ring leaders, asserting his own authority by a stern suppression of the mutiny, and animating the
loyal by constant visits to the different points, he vainly reasoned with the mutineers, and then left them absolute masters of their quarters. On 5th February, the traitors admitted a Persian envoy within the lines against orders, and soon a crowd of Mughal officers gathered round him to hear the Shah’s letters read. An Imperial officer from Bist was also brought in to convince the garrison of the surrender of that fort to the Persians. This took away what little courage the defenders had still left in them. The commandant begged for a five days’ truce, which was granted. On 11th February, the garrison surrendered on a promise of safety from the Persian king, marched out of the fort and set out for India. Thus Qandahar with all its stores and armament was lost to India.* The siege had lasted 57 days, and the relieving force succeeded in coming in sight of the fort only three months after its fall!

No greater blow was ever struck at Mughal prestige than the loss of Qandahar. And the shame of it was equalled only when three grand and costly expeditions, led by the Emperor’s sons, failed to wrest it from the Persians. The success

* (For the siege by the Persians) Waris, 23a—27a; Khafi Khan, i. 686—690 and 693.
of Shah Abbas II served only to deepen the disgrace of the subsequent failures of Aurangzib and Dara Shukoh at the same place.

For the fall of Qandahar Shah Jahan and his advisers alone must be held responsible. They had underrated the enemy's powers; they had delayed their own preparations; and above all they had left Daulat Khan in charge. Before the Persians arrived, men and money had been thrown into the fort, but not the man needed for the occasion; and in war it is not men but the man that counts.

Daulat Khan* had risen to be a commander of five thousand. By birth a Mughal commandant, Bhati of the Panjab, his extreme beauty in youth had gained him Jahangir's favour and the easy office of Captain of the Imperial Body-guard. Under Shah Jahan he had distinguished himself by personal bravery and enterprise in the wars of the Deccan and the arrest of a powerful rebel. But he was now verging on sixty and had evidently lost his old energy and leadership of men. He had neither resourcefulness nor power of initiative, nor the iron will that nerves heroes to hold a fortress till the last moment in scorn of

famine and impending massacre. Above all, he utterly failed to keep in hand the diverse races,—Rajputs and Hindustani Musalmans, Afghans and Turks,—who formed the garrison of Qandahar. With an impregnable fort, a garrison of 7,000 men, and provisions and munitions for two years,* his task was easy in comparison with that of many an English subalterm known to fame, an Eldred Pottinger or a Grant (of Thobal); and he failed in it. If he had held out a month longer, the Persians would have raised the siege through lack of provisions. The garrison had lost only 400 men out of 7,000 effectives when he opened the gates to the enemy.†

Shah Jahan had received news of the Persian preparations for the siege of Qandahar as early as 30th September, 1648, but he suffered his courtiers to persuade him to delay his own march to Kabul till the next spring. On 16th January, 1649 at Lahore he received a despatch

* When the Persians captured the fort, it had a garrison of 4,000 men armed with the sword or the bow, 3000 men armed with matchlocks, a number of large guns, vast quantities of powder and shot, many thousand stands of arms, besides money, grain, oil and other provisions sufficient for two years. (Waris, 26a and b.)

† Waris, 26a and b.
from Qandahar stating that the Shah had arrived and begun the siege exactly a month before. Orders were immediately sent to Aurangzib and the prime minister Sadullah Khan, to hasten to Qandahar with 50,000 men. A bounty of Rs. 100 was paid for every trooper who joined the expedition, while the commanders and ahadis got three months' pay in advance.*

The troops moved in two divisions,—under Sadullah Khan from Lahore and under Aurangzib from Multan, —and met together at Bhera. Thence the Prince himself advanced by way of Bangash, Kohat, Jamrud and Jalalabad, arriving at Kabul on 25th March, while the progress of the army was delayed by the snow on the roads and the lack of fodder for the beasts of transport. Meantime Qandahar had fallen, and Aurangzib's new orders were to push on and besiege the fort before the Persians could consolidate their conquest. The Emperor himself proceeded to Kabul to support and direct the siege from the rear.

Leaving Kabul (on 5th April) after a halt of eleven days, Aurangzib reached Ghazni on the 18th, where the absolute want of grain and fodder

* Waris, 23a and b, 27a.
rendered his further advance impossible. But the Emperor was inexorable. The Prince gathered what provisions he could during a fortnight’s stay at Ghazni, and then resumed his march. From Qalat-i-Ghilzai Sadullah pushed on with five divisions of the army, and encamped before Qandahar on 14th May. Aurangzib brought up the rear two days later.*

Two miles outside the modern city of Qandahar, a traveller proceeding towards Old Qandahar described. Herat comes upon the ruins of old Qandahar,† which Alexander the Great is said to have built and which Nadir Shah destroyed in 1738. It stood on an exceedingly strong position, along the base and eastern slope of a high ridge of bare rock that rises abruptly from the plain. The site of the city is marked by the crumbling walls of houses and confused heaps of bricks and debris, which cover several acres of surface. The lines of defence are still traceable by portions of walls that extend with broken intervals along the crest of the ridge. The city consisted of three distinct

* Waris, 27a-28b (for the details of the march).
† This description is based upon Ferrier’s Caravan Journeys (ed. 1856), 317; Bellew’s Journal of a Political Mission to Afghanistan, 232 & 233; Masson’s Journeys, i. 279; Waris, 26a.
parts, each on a separate eminence, and capable of mutual defence. On the serrated crest of the hill stood many towers united by curtains. The highest of these, called Lakah, was almost impregnable. It contained rock-cut tanks of water for the city and commanded the citadel (named Daulatabad), which stood lower down on the second eminence, while the town and market-place (Mandavi), both walled round, were situated further below on the first tableland above the eastern plain. Beyond the city stretched gardens, pleasure-houses and fields for miles and miles, to the north, east, and south-east. Three walls surrounded the city at such a distance from it as to enclose a large open space for the encampment of a garrison in time of war.

The ramparts* of the old town were built of dried clay, strengthened by the mixture of chopped straw and stones. The material, thoroughly wetted and stamped out, was laid in layers of eighteen inches high at a time and allowed to dry before the next layer was put on. Their thickness at places was ten yards. An English officer in 1878 wrote of these walls as about the stiffest

* This description is based on Ferrier, 317; Le Messurier's Kandahar in 1879, pp. 70 and 71.
things of the kind he had seen. On firing a revolver at 10 yards, the bullet was merely lodged in the face of the wall and could be picked out with the nail. Such walls, according to him, might have stood modern battering guns for a length of time, and in fact some of the British artillerymen doubted if any impression to speak of could have been made on them.*

Beyond the triple walls, on the side of the plain was a wide and deep ditch, supplied with water from the canals of the Arghandab river.

On the north face of the ridge against which the fort nestled, there are forty steps cut in the rock and leading up to a cave half way up the hill. On the two sides of the entrance, are two couchant leopards, and the cave itself contains a bow-shaped chamber with a domed roof.†

Two guard-towers had been built during the Mughal occupation on adjacent projections of the rock to oppose an enemy's assault by this path, because from the top of the Forty Steps guns could command both the citadel and the city. The fort of Lakah crowned a peak in the middle of the ridge and defended Qandahar on its western flank, where the hill descended to the plain in a steep

* Le Messurier, 130 and 131.
† Bellew, 232 and 233.
scarp. It had a gate named Ali Qábi.※ Proceeding along the city wall from the north-eastern corner of the ridge where the wall first leaves the hill, we come in succession to the gates of Baba Wali, Waisqaran, Khwajah Khizir, and Mashuri, till at last the wall strikes the ridge again at the south-western corner of the fort, where stood an earth-work bastion and a redoubt (hissar).†

The outposts of the province in the direction of Persia were Kushk-i-Nakhud, situated about 40 miles west of Qandahar on the right bank of a tributary of the Helmand which drains the Maiwand valley, the fort of Bist, 50 miles further west on the margin of the Helmand, and Zamin Dawar, north-west of Bist. The Persian frontier station was Girishk, some thirty miles up the Helmand from Bist.‡

Aurangzib arrived before Qandahar and began the siege on 16th May, 1649.

The Mughals completed their

* So far as we can judge from the Persian accounts, Qaitul was the name of the whole ridge. At places it looks as if it were a peak identical with or adjacent to Lakah, but the Adab-i-Alamgiri, 12b, distinctly calls the whole ridge the hill of Qaitul.

† For the gates, Waris, 24b, 28b, 65a; Adab-i-Alamgiri, 12b, 14a.

‡ Holdich’s Gates of India, 204, Purchas, i. 519—528 (quoted in Kerr’s Voyages and Travels, ix). Ain-i-Akbari (Jarrett), ii. 393—398.
investment by throwing up entrenchments opposite the gates and behind the ridge, and began to run covered lanes towards the ditch of the fort. A body of scouts watched the ferry at Kushk-i-Nakhud, to get early news of the coming of any relieving force from Persia.

Next day a *coup de main* was attempted. Rajahs Man Singh of Gwalior and Bhao Singh of the Kangra Hills, led their Rajputs up the Forty Steps and reached the platform on the top, but the Persian musketeers from within the guard-towers plied their matchlocks with deadly effect at point-blank range, and the Rajputs were driven with heavy loss half way down the hill, where they constructed a stockade and held it for some time.*

Despite a heavy fire from the fort guns, three covered lanes were carried to the edge of the ditch by 4th July. From one of these a transverse was dug along the bank to the front of the Khwajah Khizir gate. Windows were opened in this and through them earth and tree loppings were flung into the ditch to form a bridge, (2nd August). An underground channel was dug which partly drained the ditch and lowered the water-level by one yard. Another

* Waris, 28b and 29a.
mine was carried under the ditch till it reached the base of the outermost wall. *

Hitherto the Imperial troops had worked under cover and carried out their lack of siege tasks. Now they had to come out into the open and storm the fort. This could have been effected only after overpowering the batteries of the defenders or breaching the walls. But Aurangzib’s expedition had been planned for throwing reinforcements into the fort and was therefore not at all equipped for the unexpected task of conducting a siege. He had not a single piece of large cannon, while the fort in the hands of the Persians contained many. An assault in the face of superior artillery could have been carried out only by troops of desperate courage and markedly higher skill and discipline, and after a heavy sacrifice of lives. But in this case the superiority lay with the defenders. The Delhi historian frankly admits, “The Persians had grown expert in the capture and defence of forts, by their long wars with the Turks since the days of Shah Abbas. They were masters of fire-arms and artillery. They held such a strong and well-provisioned fort, with big guns and skilful

* Waris, 34a and 34b.
gunners, who in one day fired 25 times on the covered lane which had arrived half way across the ditch and destroyed it. Qasim Khan's mine was also discovered and demolished by the fire from the fort guns... The Imperialists had no gun big enough to overthrow the parapet under shelter of which the fort-gunners fired their pieces, not to speak of silencing their fire."

“So the Imperialists failed with all their efforts.” The capture of the fort was hopeless, and on 5th September, Aurangzib, obeying the Emperor's command, began his retreat from Qandahar. He had sat down 3 months and 20 days before the fort, but all in vain. The retreat was hastened by the approach of the terrible Afghan winter which Indians cannot bear, and the news that a large Persian force, estimated at 20,000 strong, was coming to relieve Qandahar.

An Imperial force under Qalich Khan had been posted for two months near the fort of Bist with orders to corrupt its Persian garrison, ravage the district of Dawar, and send supplies of grain to Qandahar. But in August reinforcements from Persia began to

* Waris, 33b, 34b.
advance towards Qandahar, and make Qalich Khan’s position untenable. Khanjar Khan whom he had detached with 4,000 Indian troops to cross the Helmand and loot the district of Kuraishi, was defeated by Najaf Quli, the Persian Master of the Horse, and driven back across the river with a loss of 700 slain besides many others who perished in swimming the stream (during the second half of July). Qalich Khan rapidly fell back before the enemy’s superior numbers till he reached Sang Hissar on the Arghandab, some 24 miles south-west of Qandahar. Here strong reinforcements sent by Aurangzib under Rustam Khan Deccani reached him, after driving away a band of Persian cattle-raiders who had penetrated to within a few miles of the Prince’s camp.*

The two generals joined their forces and on 25th August at Shah Mir fought a great battle with the enemy. The Indian army under Rustam Khan stood in battle order on the bank of the Arghandab, barring the road to Qandahar. The Persians, reported to be 30,000 strong, stretched in a vast line for four miles from the hill of Kushk-i-Nakhud to the river bank. Large reinforcements had reached them that

*S blis, 29a, 34b—36a.
very morning under Murtaza Quli Khan, the Fauji Bashi. The new arrivals, eager to share in the battle, issued from Kushk-i-Nakhud, without stopping to water and refresh their horses. Their general vowed that he would not break his fast before defeating the Indians!

It was an hour past noon when the rival hosts clashed together. The small Indian army was beset in front and the two flanks, and for three hours waged a fierce struggle. At first the vigour of the Persian charges shook and pressed back the Indian Right Wing, but the troops were picked men and did not lose order; strengthened by the Reserve under Rustam Khan himself, they made a counter-charge and repelled the attack. A dust-storm put an end to the battle. The Persians, on unrefreshed horses, suffered much from the hot wind and retired, leaving the Indians masters of the field. In the hurry of their flight they abandoned some of their artillery, carts, horses, and arms, which the Imperialists captured. Next day the victors advanced, but found that the Persians had evacuated Kushk-i-Nakhud at night and could not be caught up even after a pursuit of 20 miles.*

* Waris, 36a-37b. The Persian version is in Zubdat-ut-Tawarikh, 42b and 43a, where it is stated that as the
This victory cast a dying gleam on the Mughal arms, and Shah Jahan celebrated it with great pomp and pride: the Imperial band played for three days, the Court went into rejoicing, and honours and promotions were bestowed on the generals. But the siege of Qandahar was already hopeless, and ten days after this victory it was abandoned. Aurangzib had lost two to three thousand men and double that number of horses, camels and oxen in the siege, and his army had been severely tried by scarcity of grain and fodder.* Mihrab Khan, the Persian commandant of Qandahar, died on the day the Imperialists began their retreat; but he had held his trust inviolate.

wind was very hot and their horses not yet watered and baited, the Persians retired and found next day that "the Indian troops in awe of the Persians had retreated and joined Aurangzib!"

* Khafi Khan, i. 695—700.
CHAPTER VIII.

SECOND SIEGE OF QANDAHAR, 1652.

The first siege of Qandahar had failed for want of heavy guns and material. The honour of the Mughal arms required the attempt to be repeated. The next three years were spent in preparations on a scale worthy of the grandeur of the task. Big guns were cast, provisions accumulated at convenient depots on the route, thousands of camels assembled for transport, the friendship of Baluch chiefs purchased along the line of communication from Multan, and money and munitions stored at the base at Kabul.

Aurangzib had been appointed to command the expedition. From his government of Multan he had sent men to explore the routes to Qandahar, and at last selected the Chacha-Chotiali-Pishin line as the shortest. For years his agents had visited the Baluch country and
contracted with the tribal chiefs for the supply of provisions to the Prince's army during the march and siege.

The force sent against Qandahar numbered between 50,000 and 60,000 men, of whom one-fifth were musketeers and artillery men. The officers formed one-twentieth of the strength. The artillery consisted of eight big cannon, some of which carried 70 lb. shot, twenty of smaller calibre, each carrying 4 or 5 lb. shot, twenty swivels mounted on elephants and a hundred on camels. The transport was entrusted to ten choice elephants from the Emperor's own stables, besides many others owned by the generals, and three thousand camels. Two krores of rupees were set apart for the expenses. The Emperor himself stayed at Kabul with a reserve of 40 to 50 thousand men, to reinforce the besiegers if necessary, and to keep their communication with the north open.

The main army, led by the Prime Minister Sadullah Khan, entered Afghanistan by the Khaibar Pass and reached Qandahar by way of Kabul and Ghazni. Aurangzib with a smaller

* Adab-i-Alamgiri, 3a, 4a, 5a, 7a, 10a, 11a, 90b.
† Waris, 60a—61a. He says that about 56,000 troops were sent to Qandahar. Khafi Khan (i. 710) wrongly gives the number as 70,000.
body, containing many officers and some five thousand soldiers of his own contingent, started from Multan, followed the western route through Chhotiali and Pishin, and debouched through the Panjmandrak (=Khojak ?) Pass.* The two divisions met near Qandahar on 2nd May, 1652.

On that day the siege was begun. The divisional commanders occupied their appointed places round the fort and set themselves to run trenches and erect batteries. Aurangzib took post on the west of the fort, behind the hill of

* For the details of the marches, Waris 64a, and especially Adab-i-Alamgiri, 9a—11b, which gives Aurangzib's movements thus:—Left Multan 16th February, but halted long outside it,—crossed the Chenab 20th March (sent his family back to Multan),—reached the Indus by four marches, and crossed it on 26th March—Lakia,—Chacha, 6th April,—Chhotiali on 13th April,—Duki on 14th,—Tabaq-sar on 19th,—Pishin (probably on 23rd, because the dates in the above two authorities conflict),—the Panjmandrak Pass on 26th,—reached Qandahar, 2nd May. The whole distance between Multan and Pishin is given as 124 kos.

The route followed by the English travellers Richard Steel and John Crowther in 1615 was,—Multan—the Chenab—Patuali village (20 kos from the river—the Indus—Lacca (=Lakia),—enters the mountains 12 kos from Lacca,—Chateza (=Chacha),—Duki—Secotah (=seh kotah, three castles),—crosses a mountain pass,—Coasta—Abdun—Pasinga (=Pishin),—crosses a high mountain, and descends into the plain—Qandahar, 60 kos from Pasinga. (Kerr, ix. 210—212, quoting Purchas.) Pishin is spelt in the Persian MSS. as Fushanj or Qushanj or Qushakh. A map of Biddulph's route in 1879 is given in Shadbolt's Afghan Campaigns, i. and with Temple's article in the Royal Geographical Soc. Journal, 1880, pp. 190-319.
Lakah; his Chief of Artillery, Qasim Khan, south of the fort, with orders to drain the ditch dry; Sadullah’s position was south-east; while in the extreme north-west, facing the Forty Steps, lay Rajah Rajrup with his Kangra hillmen. Four other generals, occupying the intervening spaces completed the investment.*

The work of sapping necessarily took time. Meanwhile attempts were made to capture some of the outlying defences by sudden assault. Mahabat Khan and Rajah Rajrup, in charge of the northern line of attack, dragged two heavy guns to their trenches and bombarded the two towers on the Forty Steps, doing some damage to the works. But the position was impreg-

* Waris, 65a., Adab-i-Alamgiri, 12b. The following was the distribution of trenches, going from the west, by the north, to the east and south:—

Opposite Lakah Fort—Aurangzib, Qalich Khan, Shah Nawaz Khan, Rajah Pahar Singh Bundela.

Opposite the Ali Qabi Gate—Baqi Khan.

,, the Forty Steps—Rajah Rajrup.

,, the Baba Wali Gate—Mahabat Khan and Rajah Anurudh.

,, the Waisqaran Gate—Najabat Khan.

,, the Khwajah Khizir}—Qasim Khan (Chief Gate to the Mashuri { of Artillery). Sadullah, Gate

,, the Earthwork Bastion—Rustam Khan.

The Adab-i-Alamgiri places Rustam Khan opposite the Mashuri Gate, but his real position was at the south-west corner of the fort. Qasim Khan’s position was also shifted by Sadullah. This explains the slight differences between the two authorities quoted above.
nable; the assault delivered here by Bhao Singh during the first siege had failed with heavy loss, and his son Rajrup now shrank from the hopeless task. He next proposed to surprise the peak of the ridge, behind the Forty Steps. Rajrup removed his men to a position facing the gate of Ali Qabi on this hill, and entrenched himself. Under him were many foot-musketeers of the Kangra district, expert in hill-climbing. His plan was to send them secretly up the hill after midnight and, when they had surprised the gate and entered the defences, to push up supports and storm the hill-top itself. Preparations were made for this object; materials were collected for building a stockade on the hill side, and the two chiefs of the army were warned to be ready to send help.

The night of Sunday, 20th June, was chosen for the attempt.* Sadullah Khan poured in men from the trenches on the right and left of Rajrup's and sent 1,000 picked troops of his own division, to form a body of supports at the Rajah's post. Every one took the position previously marked out for him by the Minister.

* For the history of the night-attack, Waris, 65b, and Adab-i-Alamgiri, 16b and 17a. Life of Rajrup in Masir-ul-Umara, ii. 277-281, does not even mention the incident. Khafi Khan, i. 711-712.
Early in the night the Rajah sent his own retainers up by a track which they had discovered for reaching the top. He himself followed them at some distance and piled up a shelter of stones in the hillside as his own station. The supports marched towards the Ali Qabi gate, while their leader, Baqi Khan, with 300 men from among Aurangzib's retainers, joined the Rajah. The success of this hazardous enterprise depended on silence and secrecy. But the Mughals bungled. Indian troops are not accustomed to silent work at night, especially in a hilly region. The supporting body was too large and too variously composed to be led on smoothly and noiselessly. There was some disagreement between Rajrup and an Imperial officer named Muzaffar Husain, and words were exchanged. This created a loud noise. The enemy got the alarm and stood on their defence. A surprise was no longer possible in the face of alert defenders, by men climbing up a narrow hill-track in single file. About three hours before daybreak the moon rose and took away the last chance of Mughal success. Soon afterwards, news came to the Rajah, who had been anxiously waiting so long in his stone shelter on the hillside, that his troops had found the defenders of the fort on the summit awake at one place
and were returning baffled. So he sent his supports back and stayed there for the return of his men. After a while a foolish servant told him that his men had reached the hill-top and entered the fort. The Rajah hastily believed the report, blew his trumpet, and beat his drums. At this signal the returning Imperial troops ran back to him. But the truth was soon discovered; the Sun rose and presented the straggling assailants on the hill-side as a clear target to the Persian marksmen. Many were slain and wounded on the Mughal side, but the main portion of the loss was undoubtedly borne by the Rajah's men who were nearest the enemy. For this error of judgment Rajrup was censured by his chief and sent back to his old trenches.

Thereafter the only hope of taking Qandahar was by carrying the sap nearer and breaching the walls. In both of these the Mughals failed. Aurangzib's trenches, west of the ridge, arrived within 22\(\frac{1}{2}\) yards of the wall, and Sadullah's (east of the fort) to a spot 10 yards from the ditch. But here their progress was arrested. "The trenches could not be carried any nearer in face of the severe fire showered from the fort-walls." "The work [of sapping] was hard, and many of Sadul-
lah's men were wounded and slain....The enemy issued on three sides, and from sunset to dawn fired their muskets incessantly from loop-holes opened in the fort-walls, so as to give no opportunity to Aurangzib's workmen [to make progress]."

In fact the Persian artillery was as excellent as the Mughal was inefficient. The Indian gunners were bad marksmen and their fire produced no effect on the fort-walls. Some of Aurangzib's men were so ignorant that they overcharged two of his big guns with powder, causing them to burst. Five large pieces of cannon now remained, which were insufficient to breach the wall in two places. In fact so notoriously bad were the Indians in handling artillery that the main reliance of their kings was on European gunners, who are praised in contemporary histories as masters of their craft, and were attracted to the Imperial service by high pay and large rewards, though they used to desert as soon as they could get a chance. In the third siege, Dara Shukoh took a body of them with him to Qandahar.

There were other difficulties, too. Within a

† Waris, 65b, Khafi Khan, i. 713; *Lataif-ul-Akhbar*, 9a. *Storia do Mogor*, i. 95, 226, 232, 259.
few weeks of the opening of the siege the work of draining the wet ditch and running mines had to be suspended for lack of materials. Aurangzib now realised that the fort could be taken only by storm. And the Emperor had ordered that no assault was to be delivered without making a breach.∗

According to Sadullah’s plan, all the big guns were assembled on the eastern side, opposite the Mashuri gate. Batteries were raised on the right and left of Sadullah’s trenches (17th and 22nd June.) The famous gun Fatih Lashkar and three other large pieces were mounted here with great labour. Every day ten rounds were fired from each gun, but the damage done to the screens and towers of the fort was always repaired at night, and the Persian artillery was not over-powered.† The Mughal artillery was as weak in number as in efficiency. In the meantime Aurangzib set up four stockades in front of his trenches, holding 3,000 men in all,‡ for making a feint against Fort Lakah when Sadul-

∗ Adab-i-Alamgiri, 17b.
† Adab-i-Alamgiri, 14a, 15b, 17b, 18a, 15a.
‡ From these stockades to the fort-wall there was a fire-swept zone with no shelter except a few boulders, while the soil was too stony to permit sapping. (Adab-i-Alamgiri, 16a.)
lah would breach the wall and deliver an assault on the Mashuri gate.

But the last expectation failed. On 19th June, before Sadullah’s second battery was complete, a large armour-clad force made a sortie from the fort and fell on his trenches. From the top of the fort and the side of the hill a shower of musketry fire was kept up. Though reinforcements drove the enemy out after an hour’s severe fight, the Persians succeeded in killing and wounding many of the Mughals. On some other nights, too, sorties were made, some Mughal guns damaged, and many of the besiegers carried off as prisoners. The Persians could not be pursued, as they quickly went back within shelter of the fort-guns.*

By the end of June it was recognised that the Mughal guns would never breach the wall on that side. So they were removed from the Mashuri gate to the western side. Two of the Surat cannon were sent to strengthen the artillery in Aurangzib’s trenches, and two other big pieces, including Fatih Lashkar, to a new battery opposite the Ali Qabi gate, on his left hand. Here, too, the besiegers fared no better; besides,

* Adab-i-Alamgiri, 16b, Waris, 65b, Khafi Khan, i. 712.
they got no more than a week’s time to use their artillery before orders arrived to abandon the siege.

From the commencement of the leaguer two months had now passed away. Persian losses. An attempt to corrupt Utar, the commandant of the fort, had brought back the taunting reply, “When you have succeeded in weakening the fort or injuring the garrison in any way, it will be time for me to think of deserting to you!” About the middle of June two high Persian officers (including Mir Alam,* their Chief of Artillery), were blown away by a 70 lb. shot from a Mughal gun. On 26th May, when a magazine was opened for distributing powder to the garrison, the store of sulphur caught fire from the hand of a careless servant who was preparing a pipe of tobacco for the Persian officers present. It soon spread to the powder and there was a terrible explosion. Many houses in the neighbourhood were over-thrown, and men and horses wounded by the flying splinters of rock. About 150 sepoys and water-men perished in the fire, and the four

* Called in the Adab-i-Alamgiri, “Mir Alam, surnamed Mir Kalan Sani, the Bishak Bashi and superintendent of the New Bastion and Earthen Bastion,” and by Waris, “Mahammad Beg, Topchi Bashi.”
officers who had opened the magazine were confined to bed by their burns.*

But with all these disasters to the garrison, the Imperialists were no nearer success. Shah Jahan had strictly enjoined that there was to be no assault before breaching the wall, and a breach with their few guns and bad gunners was out of the question. Aurangzib therefore wrote to the Emperor on 3rd July, soliciting a distinct order to storm the walls which were still intact. It would have been madness to sanction such an enterprise. Shah Jahan had been already informed by Sadullah Khan that his guns could effect nothing, and that the munitions had run short, and on 1st July he had replied that the siege was to be abandoned. Aurangzib pleaded hard for a short delay; he offered to lead a desperate assault on the walls, for to leave Qandahar untaken after such grand preparations would destroy his reputation for ever. But the news that a retreat had been ordered spread through the camp, the scouts fell back on the army, and the trenches were deserted. When Shah Jahan at last grudgingly consented to

* Waris 65b, Adab-i-Alamgiri, 13b, 14b, 15a.
continue the siege for another month, it was found impossible to carry out the new order.*

What had hastened the Emperor's resolve to raise the siege was a raid by a body of ten thousand Uzbak horsemen, who had burst through the western hills into the district south of Ghazni, and threatened the Mughal line of communication between Kabul and Qandahar, (about 26th June). The danger was greatly exaggerated by the Court at Kabul, though Aurangzib assured the Emperor that from his experience in Balkh he was sure that a few thousand Mughal troops could expel the raiders. In fact, the Uzbaks fled on hearing of the approach of the Imperial army, and were cut off during their flight by the Afghans with the aid of the officer in command at Ghazni. The Delhi historian boasts that not a tenth of the raiders returned to Central Asia alive.† The Mughal army, however, raised the siege and began its retreat from Qandahar on 9th July. A small party sent back to India by the Pishin-Chotiali-Multan road,—which two centuries

* Aurangzib's letters, (repeating at their commencement the contents of Shah Jahan's letters which are being replied to), are given in the Adab-i-Alamgiri, 18a & b, 19a.
† Waris, 64b & 66a, Adab-i-Alamgiri, 18b, 19a.
later Biddulph’s division followed at the end of the Second Afghan War,—reported that the Baluch clans had already risen and rendered the road unsafe. So, Aurangzib withdrew his outposts from Pishin and Duki, and led the army back to Kabul, joining the Emperor on 7th August. The Van under Sadullah had arrived eight days earlier.*

Bitter was Aurangzib’s humiliation at the ill-success of the expedition. Shah Jahan wrote to him, “I greatly wonder how you could not capture the fort in spite of such vast preparations.” Aurangzib protested that he had done his utmost, but the scantiness of siege materials and insufficiency of artillery had rendered the attempt hopeless, as Sadullah Khan himself had testified. But Shah Jahan angrily rejoined, “I am not going to give up Qandahar. I shall try every means to recover it.” The Prince pleaded hard to be permitted to stay in Afghanistan or the Panjab and to take part, even as a subordinate, in the next attempt on Qandahar, in order to retrieve his character as a general. For this he was willing to forego the viceroyalty of the Deccan

* Adab-i-Alamgiri, 18b, Waris, 66b, Zubdat-ut-Tawarikh, 44a & b, (very meagre).
which was now offered to him. But Shah Jahan was inexorable: he ordered Aurangzib to go to the Deccan at once, and brushed aside the Prince's excuses for his failure with the caustic remark, "If I had believed you to be capable of taking Qandahar, I should not have recalled your army...Every man can perform some work. It is a wise saying that men of experience need no instruction." Aurangzib replied by quoting the proverb, "Whosoever has a particle of sense can know his own good from his harm" and pointing out that he could not have purposely failed in his task, as he knew that it would involve his father's displeasure.*

The Court ascribed the failure to the abandonment of Shah Jahan's plan of operations, which was that Aurangzib should invest the fort with half the force, while Sadullah should advance west with the other half and capture the forts of Bist and Zamin Dawar, when the garrison of Qandahar would see their communication with Persia cut off, lose heart and surrender to the Mughals. But Sadullah Khan opposed such a division of the force and of the scanty supply of provisions and material, and the Emperor

* Adab-i-Alamgiri, 19a—20b.
himself, on being referred to, confirmed the change of plan. *

In truth it is unjust to blame Aurangzib for the failure to take Qandahar. Throughout the siege he was really second in command. The Emperor from Kabul directed every movement through Sadullah Khan. His sanction had to be taken for every important step, such as the removal of guns from one battery to another, the disposition of troops, the date, hour and point of assault. Fast couriers brought his orders from Kabul to Qandahar in four days, and the Prince had merely to carry them out. Indeed so thoroughly subordinate was Aurangzib that during the first month of the siege only one despatch from him reached the Emperor, while Sadullah corresponded frequently and the Emperor's letters were often written to the Prime Minister, to be afterwards shown to the Prince. †

Unjustly held responsible for the defeat, Aurangzib lost the favour and confidence of his father. What added a keener edge to his mortifica-

* Waris, 65b, Adab-i-Alamgiri, 12a and b, 20b.

The plan, even if carried out, would have availed little. In the next siege, a detachment from Dara's army did capture Bist and Girishk, but Qandahar held out for five months all the same, and was not taken at the end.

† Adab-i-Alamgiri, 13b, 17b, 18b, and elsewhere.
tion was that he had given occasion for laughter at his expense to his envious eldest brother and that brother’s party at Court. But Dara’s crowing did not last long; Aurangzib soon tasted the sweets of revenge. Dara* led a still vaster army and a larger part of artillery against Qandahar and vowed to capture it in a week. His siege dragged on for five months and in the end Qandahar was not taken. The long history of Dara’s doings there written by the courtly pen of Rashid Khan (Muhammad Badi)† is remarkable only for the sickening flattery offered by his courtiers and the insane pride displayed by the Prince. It unconsciously but most effectively condemns Dara and by contrast places Aurangzib in an honourable light.

These failures left a lasting sting in the mind of Aurangzib. Half a century later, when he was a dying man, he heard that his son Shah Alam, then Governor of Kabul, was enlisting troops evidently to dispute the succession on the Emperor’s expected death. Aurangzib tauntingly wrote to him, “I hear that inspite of your lack of

* Dara sat down before Qandahar from 28th April to 27th September, 1653, with an army of 70,000 men. Two of his heavy guns carried 112 lb. and 96 lb. shot. He was supplied with 30,000 cannon balls, 5,000 maunds of powder, 1,500 maunds of lead, and 14,000 rockets. (Waris, 70a et seq.) Khafi Khan, i. 717—728.

† Lataif-ul-Akhbar.
money you are engaging highly paid soldiers. Evidently you want to recover Qandahar. God assist you!"* Herein he recognised that the conquest of Qandahar was an impossible feat.

The three sieges of Qandahar cost the Indian treasury more than ten krores of rupees. In addition to this sum, the new fortifications built by the Mughals on taking possession of it from Ali Mardan Khan and the treasure, arms, munitions, and provisions that fell into the hands of the Persians on its capture, must have cost more than a krore.† Thus the Indian tax-payer poured into the sands of Afghanistan about 12 krores of rupees, and more than half the gross annual

* Letter No. 4 in the lithographed Ruqat-i-Alamgiri.
† We have the following data for calculating the cost of the Qandahar wars. For the second siege 2 krores of rupees were brought from Delhi and Agra, out of which one krore was spent on the soldiers and officers in one month. (Waris, 61a). The third siege occupied 5 months (against 2 months in the case of the second) and Dara’s army was probably 70,000, as against the 50,000 men who accompanied Aurangzib. Hence the third siege must have cost about seven krores. The presents to Dara on the eve of the expedition amounted to 20 lakhs, and one krore was sent with him (Waris 70a and 71a). When starting for the first siege, the officers were paid a bounty of Rs. 100 for each trooper placed in the field, and as the force was 50,000 strong, this alone absorbed 50 lakhs (Waris, 23a). Before the Persians arrived, 5 lakhs had been sent to the fort from Kabul. In 1638, when Qandahar was betrayed to Shah Jahan, 20 lakhs were sent with Shuja to meet the cost of the
revenue of the entire empire, for absolutely no return.*

The moral loss was even greater than the material. The Emperor of Delhi might dazzle the eyes of foreign ambassadors and travellers by displaying his Peacock Throne and Koh-i-noor, or the superb marble edifices with which he had adorned Agra and Delhi. But henceforth his military prestige was gone throughout the world. The Persian king could rightly boast† that the rulers of Delhi knew how to steal a fort by means of gold, but not how to conquer it by strength of arm. Shah Abbas II. had conquered Qandahar in less than two months; but two Mughal princes in three long and costly campaigns could not recover it, though they were opposed by mere generals and not by any member of the royal blood of Persia. Naturally the military fame of Persia rose very high. The expedition for driving away the Persians, and 5 lakhs more were spent on the fortifications. (Abd. Ham., ii. 40, Waris 21a and 26a).

* The Revenue of the Mughal empire in 1648 was 22 krores of rupees. (Abdul Hamid, ii. 710.)

† For his exultation at the capture and retention of Qandahar, see Ruqat-i-Shah Abbas Sani, 106—120, (his exact words are different).
Indian troops recognised that in the Persians they had met with more than their match. And throughout the rest of the century the rumour of a projected invasion from Persia used to throw the Court of Delhi into the greatest alarm.*

For years afterwards the Persian peril hung like a dark cloud on the western frontier of India, and the Emperor Aurangzib and his ministers drew their breath more easily when any warlike Shah of Persia died.

CHAPTER IX.

SECOND VICEROYALTY OF THE DECCAN, 1653—1658.

On 17th July, 1652, Aurangzib, then returning from Qandahar, was appointed Governor of the Deccan for the second time. Exactly a month afterwards he took leave of the Emperor in Afghanistan and proceeded to his charge. Crossing the Indus at Attock on 9th September, he passed through Delhi and Agra on 17th and 28th November respectively, and reached the Narmada river on 1st January 1653. As the palace in Burhanpur was not yet ready for his occupation he encamped outside for some days, while the repairs were being completed, and entered this city, the capital of Khandesh, as late as 30th January. Here he wooed and won the graceful singer Hira Bai, surnamed Zainabadi Mahal, and here he lingered for the next nine months inspite of Shah Jahan's repeated orders urging
him to go to Aurangabad, the official capital of Mughal Deccan. At last leaving Burhanpur on 28th October, 1653, he entered the fort of Daulatabad on 25th November.* At Aurangabad he spent the next four years of his life, leaving it only to invade Golkonda and Bijapur, and finally on 5th February, 1658, to contest the throne of Delhi. Here his son Akbar was born (11th September, 1657), and here he buried his wife Dilras Banu (died 8th October 1657,) and his favourite concubine Zainabadi (probably in 1654.)

Of Aurangzib’s life during this period we have his own reminiscences, written in old age to his grandson Bidar Bakht: “The village of Sattarah† near Aurangabad was my hunting ground. Here on the top of a hill, stood a temple with an image of Khande Rai. By God’s grace I demolished it, and forbade the temple dancers (murlis) to ply their shameful profession.... During my viceroyalty, while I was living at Daulatabad and Aurangabad,—the latter city having been populated by me after its first foundation [by Malik Ambar] under

Aurangzib’s life there: hunting and journeys.

* Waris, 66a, 67a and b; his journey south is described in detail in Adab-i-Alamgiri, 21a—24a, 25b, 26a, 27a, 144a and b.

† On the top of a hill, six miles due south of Aurangabad.
the name of Khirki,—I used in my folly to ride about, and make forced marches under the instigations of Satan and of my own passions. I used to go far on horseback to hunt the nilgau and other kinds of game. Other idle deeds did I do. I used to visit the lake of Qatluq in the valley of the watershed, Chamar Tikri and Jitwārā, and to make pilgrimages to the tombs of the saints Burhanuddin and Zainuddin,* or to climb up the hill fort of Daulatabad and to the caves of Ellora, (which are wondrous examples of the Creator's art), sometimes with my family, at others alone.”†

Game was very abundant in the neighbourhood of Aurangabad. Herds of wild deer grazed four miles from the city, and nilgaus were found in plenty in the direction of Lauhgarh and Ambar. Tigers could be shot in the hills which hemmed the valley round. At the lake of Qatluq, near the “valley of the watershed,” six miles from the fort of Daulatabad, countless flocks of heron rested. Aurangzib, and afterwards his sons Muazzam and Azam, delighted to hunt the nilgau and the heron. The nilgaus were shot from a fixed station as they were driven down the

* At Roza or Khuldabad, on the way to the Ellora hill.
† Kalimat-i-Tayyibat, 7b—8a.
narrow valley, and the herons were struck down by trained hawks.*

It was during his second rule over the Deccan that Aurangzib clearly unfolded not only his administrative skill and energy, but also the limitations of his character which finally blighted his fame and wrecked his empire. We have already seen him boasting how he had destroyed the temple on a hill six miles south of Aurangabad. He is taxed by Shah Jahan with being unfriendly to the Rajputs, and tries to answer the charge by recommending a Rajput captain, Rao Karan,† to an administrative post.

Evidently there was no love lost between him and the Rajputs already. People perceive instinctively when they are disliked, and though they may be wrong in guessing the cause, their feeling always indicate correctly the spirit in which they are being treated.

A clearer proof of his religious bigotry even in youth is furnished by the following letter which he wrote at this time to the prime minister Sadullah Khan:

"The Brahman Chhabila Ram, the qanungo of property-tax of the city of Bihar, had uttered improper words with

*Dilkasha, 12 and 49. Ruqat-i-Alamgiri, Nos. 12 and 28.
†Adab, 29a.
reference to the Prophet. After investigation and verification of the charge by order of the Emperor, Zulfiqar Khan and other officers of the place had beheaded him, as was required by justice. Now, the scholar Mulla Muhan has written to me that the brothers of the accursed unbeliever, out of bigotry, have sought justice at the Imperial Court against Shaikh Muhammad Muala, the lord justice, and Shaikh Abdul Mani, the ecclesiastical judge of the province. I, therefore, remind you of this affair, as it is proper for all Muslims to do their utmost to assert the rules of the Prophet's religion, and it is the duty of kings and nobles to protect the scholars of Islam in enforcing the injunctions of the Holy Law. You should exert yourself more than your peers to close the road of the complaint of this wretched tribe [to the Emperor's feet] and to take care of the letters (i.e., explanations) of the guardians of the honour of the Faith."*

The city of Aurangabad† bears the Prince's name and commemorates his first viceroyalty. Originally it was a petty hamlet named Khirki. When Malik Ambar revived the Nizam Shahi dynasty of Ahmadnagar, he transferred the capital to this village, and built a palace

* Adab-i-Alamgiri, 101a.
† This description of early Aurangabad is based on Dilkasa, 9, 11, 12, Tavernier, i. 146, Masir-ul-umara, i. 263, ii. 60, Masir-i-Alamgiri, 223. Burgess, in his Cave Temples in the Bidar and Aurangabad Districts (p. 59) says: In 1616 Malik Ambar built at Khirki the Nurkhand palace and mosque, and his army raised dwellings for themselves around it; ravaged and burnt by Jahangir's army in 1621. Malik Ambar's son Fath Khan named it Fatehnagar (1628). The black stone mosque built by Ambar is described in Murray's Hand-book to India. For a description of the city in 1810, see Seely's Wonders of Elora (2nd ed.), 367—369, 403.
for the Sultan known as the Green Bungalow and a mansion for himself close to the Royal Market (Shahganj). To form a large centre of population in a dry soil like this, the first thing needful is water. So he constructed a big tank close to the town and also brought water to his own house by means of a canal from the river near Arsul. The tank was about four miles round, and the village grew up on its side. Aurangzib at first resided in the fort of Daulatabad. But it could hold only a small body of men. So he looked round for a good site on the plain for the seat of his government, chose Khirki, built a princely palace there close to the tank, and allotted lands to all his nobles and officers to build their quarters on. Then he removed from the fort to the new city, which got his name and grew rapidly as the capital of Mughal Deccan.

The splendid mausoleum or Muqbara of his wife Dilras Banu, surnamed Rabia-ud-daurani, is an imitation of the Taj Mahal. It was built after his accession and was thoroughly repaired by his son M. Azam. It is still the finest architectural ornament of the city, and next to it stands the vast Juma Masjid which was completed by him. Aurangzib's residence, though greatly altered by later occupants, still remains
and is pointed out to travellers as the Alamgiri Mahal.

Years afterwards, when he returned to the Deccan in 1682, a wall four miles long was built round the city by his order to protect it from Maratha raids. The work cost three lakhs of rupees and was completed in four months through the active exertions of Dianat Khan Khafi. The city has undergone much change at the hands of the Nizams whose first capital it was, and of their French officers who lived here with almost regal authority.

We now turn to his public life during these five years.

Since Aurangzib had laid down the vice-royalty of the Deccan in May 1644, the Mughal administration there had not prospered. True, the country enjoyed unwonted repose after a half century of war with Ahmadnagar, Bijapur, and Golkonda. True, there was no disturbance of public peace by invasion from across the frontier, and no expedition against refractory feudatories. But agriculture had not been promoted, the peasantry had not been cherished, and new lands had not been brought under tillage. On the contrary, much cultivated soil had lapsed into the jungle, the cultivators
had declined in number and resources, and the revenue had fallen off greatly.

This wretched state of things was the natural result of a succession of short viceroyalties and incompetent viceroys.* Khan-i-Dauran who had succeeded Aurangzib, was murdered a year afterwards. The veteran of a hundred battles, he also worked hard at the administration, transacting public business for twelve hours a day and inspecting everything himself. But he was so pitiless in exacting money from the village headmen, so harsh in squeezing the ryots, and so rough and strict to all the people under him, that the news of his death threw them into a transport of joy and was celebrated at Burhanpur as a divine deliverance.

Islam Khan Mashhadi, a very old man incapable of riding a horse, next governed the Deccan for two years, and during this short period he estranged the Deccanis by his harsh and strict conduct and enriched himself by selling the Government stores of the forts when

* Khan-i-Dauran succeeds Aurangzib on 28 May, 1644, and is murdered, during absence in N. India, on 22 June, 1645. Jai Singh then officiates for him. Islam Khan is appointed 17 July, 1645, dies on 2 November, 1647. Shah Nawaz Khan then officiates. Murad Bakhsh is appointed on 15 July, 1648, and Shaista Khan replaces him on 4 Sep., 1649, and continues till September, 1652.
prices ruled high and replacing them with fresh purchases made in the season of low prices! He was keen on settling ryots on new lands, but actually effected little during his short term.

Then followed nearly a year (Nov., 1647—July, 1648) of officiating rule by Shah Nawaz Khan. Prince Murad Bakhsh, a dull and indolent youth, not yet twenty-four, was the next viceroy; but he quarrelled with his guardian and de facto governor, Shah Nawaz Khan, the administration fell into confusion, and at the end of a year the Emperor was forced to make another change of viceroys! Shaista Khan replaced Prince Murad in September 1649, and held charge till he was succeeded by Aurangzib. Thus, in eight years there were six viceroys, if we count the acting tenure of Rajah Jai Singh in 1645.*

The Deccan had long caused a heavy drain on the Imperial treasury. The province was large, the country broken, with plenty of jungles, and imperfectly settled and organised, and there were two powerful States across the frontier. Therefore, a very large force had to be stationed there. But as the soil was sterile in com-

parison with the river-plains of Northern India, and the rainfall precarious and variable, bad harvests and scarcities were too frequent, and the standard revenue was never collected. In spite of an abatement of 12 lakhs of rupees on their first assessment made by the Imperial settlement officers in the hope that the collection in future would be more easy and certain, the land revenue still proved to have been pitched too high. For the four provinces which then constituted Mughal Deccan, it stood at three krores and 62 lakhs of rupees a year; but the actual collection in 1652 was only one krore, or less than one-third.*

Out of the total territory, land estimated to yield $37\frac{1}{2}$ lakhs a year was assigned as jagir to Aurangzib and his sons, and the rest to various officers, excluding the portion which was created Crownland (khalsa sharifa) and of which the revenue was collected directly by Imperial officers† and spent at the discretion of the Emperor without being touched by the local governor. The financial condition of the jagirdars depended on the actual collection of land reve-

† Adab, 31a.
nue. Aurangzib and the higher officers also received a part of their salary in cash from the Imperial treasury. This was a fixed amount, not liable to variation with the agricultural condition of the year, as was the case with the income drawn from *jagirs*.

The land revenue actually collected was scanty and variable, and the arrears and remissions from the standard assessment large. Hence, the public income of the Deccan did not balance the expenditure, and the deficit had to be made good by sending money from the older and richer provinces of the empire to support the administration of the South. This had gone on for years. Once only Khan-i-Dauran had tried to reverse the process. By torturing the collectors and mercilessly stripping the peasants he succeeded in collecting a large sum, which he despatched to the Emperor with the boastful remark, "Other Governors had to get money from Hindustan; I am sending money there!" But the policy of killing the goose that laid the golden eggs soon failed. The desolation of the country and the misery of the peasantry became worse than before, and the bankrupt administration of the South had to be kept going by Imperial bounties from Malwa and
Guzerat. Shah Jahan was alarmed at this chronic deficit and strongly urged Aurangzib to improve the peasant’s lot, extend the cultivation, and relieve the Imperial treasury from the annual drain.*

On his arrival in the Deccan, Aurangzib was faced with a serious financial difficulty. The actual yield of the jagirs was only a fraction of their nominal revenue. The Mughal officers posted in the Deccan would have starved if they had to depend solely on their jagirs in that province. Therefore, during his first viceroyalty, both Aurangzib and his chief officers had been given additional fiefs in other and more prosperous parts of the empire, so that they managed to live on the combined income. And now, also, his officers besieged him with clamour, saying that they could not maintain their quotas of soldiers on the poor revenue of their existing jagirs, and demanding that more productive jagirs should be transferred to them, so that they might be sure of getting a fixed portion of their income at least.†

Everywhere Aurangzib found signs of mal-administration, the work of his predecessors. The actual collection was sometimes only one-

* Adab, 31a, M. U. i. 756, iii, 497, Adab, 20a, 23b, 28a.
† Adab, 31a, 24b, 127b.
tenth of the normal assessment. Even Baglana, noted for its fertility, was in no better state than the other districts. "Baglana has not been well administered since Syed Abdul Wahhab's time," he writes to his father. And again, "the affairs of Painghat (Lowlands) are greatly in disorder,"—"the Deccan is in disorder, as it has not been governed well for the last ten years;"—"the ryots of the Ausa mahal complain of Uzbak Khan's oppression...and those of the Trimbak parganah about the tyranny of Darvish Beg Qaqshal."*

The new viceroy found it impossible to make both ends meet. At this time Aurangzib's financial difficulties.

Aurangzib's financial difficulties.

The civil and military expenditure of the Deccan, exclusive of the salary derived by the officers from their jagirs, amounted to Rs. 31,76,000,—out of which the cash allowances of Aurangzib and his sons absorbed Rs. 25,43,000, and the expenses of the artillery department, the cash salary of certain officers, and other necessary disbursements required Rs. 6,30,000. The only means of providing this sum were, first the revenue of the Crownland which actually yielded Rs. 2,40,000, and secondly the tributes from the rulers of Golkonda and Deogarh, eight lakhs and

* Adab, 24b, 23b, 24a, 25b, 26b, 30a.
one lakh respectively. Thus there was an annual deficit of Rs. 20,36,000, which was made good by drawing on the reserve stored in the treasuries of the Deccan, especially in the fort of Daulatabad. This cash balance fell from Rs. 80,60,000 to Rs. 40,50,000, probably in two years. But in such a frontier province it was necessary to keep a large reserve for emergencies. Aurangzib grew alarmed at the rapid decrease of his cash balance and suggested a remedy to the Emperor: he wished to take away from the jagirdars and place under collectors of the Crown as much land as would yield the 20½ lakhs needed to make both ends meet. But where were the dispossessed officers to be provided for? Losing their means of support with the resumption of their jagirs, they would be forced to return to the Emperor's Court and so decrease the Deccan army by one-third. Such a diminution of armed strength was unsafe with two powerful States, Bijapur and Golkonda, across the frontier. To avoid the evil, Aurangzib proposed that jagirs in part should be given to him and his higher officers in other provinces, and that the cash portion of his salary might be made a charge on the flourishing treasuries of Malwa and Surat.*

* Adab, 31a. I have given the figures exactly as in my
Aurangzib shared the difficulty of other jagirdars in the Deccan in having to keep up his normal contingent of troops on an income reduced to a fraction of his normal pay. His fiefs in Multan had been fertile and lucrative; those in the Deccan were estimated to yield 17 lakhs less, and were, besides, liable to frequent and large arrears in collection. He rightly protested to his father, "If your Majesty wishes me to be honoured with a great viceroyalty, give me the means worthy of it." The Emperor ordered him to exchange his own sterile fiefs for more productive ones in the hands of other jagirdars.* Aurangzib took care to leave the estates of his competent officers untouched, but appropriated the fiefs of lazy or minor officers who did not deserve considerate treatment. The Revenue Department was ordered by Shah Jahan to transfer to him good jagirs yielding Rs. 3,17,500 in place of desolate unproductive lands with the same nominal rent-roll. But the jagirdars threatened with dispossession tried to in-

* Adab, 19b, 25a, 173a. But when he was Governor of Multan he had complained of his fiefs there being unproductive! (See Adab, 172a).
fluence the Emperor by accusing Aurangzib of picking out for himself the best villages in each mahal and leaving to them scattered possessions. Aurangzib refuted the calumny and asserted that he had taken entire mahals, as, in his opinion, a mahal divided among a number of owners could not be well administered or made to flourish. So, the Emperor at last confirmed the transfer of lands.*

Aurangzib's second prayer, that the cash portion of his pay should be sent to him from the province of Malwa and the port of Surat, was not granted. He was told to select productive mahals in the Deccan either from the Crownland or from the fiefs of the officers. The Prince, accordingly, asked for Elichpur and Ankot, his cash allowance being reduced by the amount of the revenue of these two districts. But the Emperor fixed the standard revenue of Elichpur greatly above its real collection, and then Aurangzib naturally demanded cash payment as before, instead of taking such a losing jagir. The Emperor was displeased and made caustic remarks about the Prince in open Court.† In 1654 twenty-five lakhs of rupees were

* Adab, 25a, 29a, 32b, 33a, 36a, 41a, 36b.
† Adab, 27a, 28a, 29a.
sent to Aurangzib from the revenue of Malwa, and for the remaining five lakhs he was asked to take away some fiefs from the officers in Nandurbar. But the revenue of that district actually brought in Rs. 92,000, and Aurangzib desired some other jagir to make up the balance.*

The financial wrangle between father and son dragged on for years. Shah Jahan wished to put a stop to the drain of money to the Deccan, and here was Aurangzib asking for cash from other provinces in the place of jagirs in the Deccan! The jagirdars whose lands he had appropriated by Imperial sanction, intrigued at Court and persuaded the Emperor that the Prince was realising from these fiefs more than his sanctioned pay, while the ousted officers, with only sterile jagirs left to them, were starving. An incorrect reading of the revenue papers deepened the same conviction in the Emperor's mind and he angrily wrote to Aurangzib: "It is unworthy of a Musalman and an act of injustice to take for yourself all the productive villages of a parganah and to assign to others only the less productive lands. I order you to take half a lakh worth of less productive land in the parga-

* Adab, 32b, 33a, 37b.
nah of Asir, and decrease your cash stipend by the same amount, so that your actual income [may be made normal.]” Aurangzib replied in a tone of righteous indignation, “I have never in my life acted unjustly, but always tried to please God and His vicegerent on earth. You have censured me for this lakh of rupees......I have not myself taken away these lands; but the revenue officers of your Majesty’s Court, by your order before I left for the Deccan, transferred them from Shaista Khan to me at the same [estimated] revenue. I wonder why the revenue officers, especially the wazir who has a retentive memory, did not point this fact out to you....... Contrary to the usual practice, your Majesty has, without making an inquiry or calling for my explanation, and on merely receiving a complaint, passed orders [in this case] and brought the term Musalman into use in connection with his perishable affair! I am helpless. As they have made you believe that I am getting more than my fixed salary, and you have ordered half a lakh of rupees to be deducted from my cash stipend,—what need is there of giving me anything in exchange [of the latter]?”

When appointing him to the Deccan, Shah

* Adab, 41a.
Jahan had urged Aurangzib to pay special attention to the improvement of the peasantry and the extension of cultivation. Shah Jahan's impatience at the delay in improving the revenue of the Deccan. Aurangzib had promised to do his best for these objects, and appealed to his exertions in the same direction during his first viceroyalty. He only pleaded for a sufficiently long tenure and the men and money necessary for his purpose. The Emperor, however, soon lost patience. Order after order was sent to the Prince to increase the cultivation and population. Aurangzib was hastily censured for his failure as an administrator, as the Emperor imagined it to be, and he was threatened with loss of income in order to make him increase his exertions. But he rightly pleaded that the depopulation and ravage caused by a generation of warfare, followed by ten years of mal-administration, could not be undone in two or three years. He had been (he said) silently and steadily promoting his object and had in three years succeeded in doubling the revenue of many mahals.* Very soon his viceroyalty was destined to become memorable for ever in the history of land-settlement in the Deccan.

* Adab, 20a & b, 26b, 28a, 32a & b, 144a.
For the purposes of revenue administration, Mughal Deccan had been divided into two portions, each with its own diwan or revenue minister. The Painghat or Lowlands comprised the whole of Khandesh and one-half of Berar, while the other 2½ subahs formed the Balaghat or Highlands. The diwan of Painghat was Multafat Khan, a strong civil administrator and a man of pleasant manners, charming by his easy sociability all who came in contact with him. But he was after all a mere departmental head, with considerable executive capacity no doubt, but devoid of any genius for administrative reform or innovation.* Glory of the latter kind belonged to his colleague, Murshid Quli Khan, the diwan of Balaghat, and one of the many noble gifts of Persia to India.

Murshid Quli Khan† was a native of Khurasan who had migrated to India in the train of Ali Mardan Khan, the fugitive Persian governor of

* M. U. iii. 500—503. The diwans of this period were, (1) Dianat Khan, from the 14th to the 21st year of Shah Jahan’s reign, and again from the 22nd to the 27th (M. U. ii. 37), (2) Multafat Khan, diwan of Painghat only from the 25th to the 29th year, (3) Murshid Quli Khan, appointed diwan of Balaghat in 1653 and of Painghat also on 28 Jan., 1656.

† Life of Murshid Quli Khan in M. U. iii. 493—500.
Qandahar. He “combined the valour of a soldier with the administrative capacity of a civil servant.” As Paymaster of Aurangzib’s army in Balkh he had displayed ability, and when Aurangzib came to the Deccan again, Murshid Quli accompanied him as diwan of Balaghat. The Emperor highly commended him to the Prince as his adviser in revenue matters. The Prince, too, valued him as highly, and soon afterwards secured for him the title of Khan or Lord. Three years later Painghat was added to his charge, and he became diwan of the entire Deccan (28th January, 1656). But it was in Balaghat that he began his revenue reforms and first achieved success for his new system.

A century earlier the revenue collection of Northern India had been brought into a system by Todar Mal, the diwan of Akbar. But the Deccan had no system at all. Here the marking out of plots, the measurement of land by chain survey, the assessment of revenue at so much per bigha, or the sharing of the actual produce between the State landlord and the cultivator, were unknown. The

Khafi Khan, i. 714, 732—735. Adab, 24b, 27a, 28a, 43a, 99a, 41a, 30b, 47b. Waris, 67b, 101a, 106a.
peasant in the Deccan cultivated as much land as he could with a plough and a pair of oxen, grew whatever crop he liked, and paid to the State a small amount per plough,—the rate of revenue varying in different places and being fixed arbitrarily, without bearing a definite proportion to the actual yield of the field, because it was not the practice there to inspect fields and estimate the quantity and value of crops.

This utter absence of system and principle in revenue matters laid the peasantry open to the caprice and extortion of the petty collectors. The long wars of Mughal aggression and a succession of rainyless years, completed their ruin. The oppressed ryots fled from their homes, the deserted fields lapsed into the jungle; many once flourishing villages became manless wilder-nesses. Shah Jahan had reduced the revenue of Khandesh to one-half in 1631, but even this amount was never fully realised before Murshid Quli's time.

The new diwan's reform consisted in extending Todar Mal's system to the Deccan. First, he worked hard to gather the scattered ryots together and restore the normal life of the villages by giving them their full population and proper
chain of officers. Everywhere wise amins and honest surveyors were deputed to measure the land, to prepare the record of well marked out holdings (raqba), and to distinguish arable land from rocky soils and water-courses. Where a village had lost its headman (muqaddam), he took care to appoint a new headman from the persons whose character gave the best promise of their readiness to promote cultivation and take sympathetic care of the peasantry. The poorer ryots were granted loans (taqawwi) from the public treasury, for the purchase of cattle, seeds and other needful materials of agriculture, and the advance was recovered at harvest by instalments. In one year he granted loans of forty to fifty thousand rupees to the ryots of Khandesh and Berar for making embankments to impound water for irrigating low-lying lands.

To prevent partiality or corruption "this honest and God-fearing diwan often dragged the measuring chain with his own hands" and checked the survey work of his subordinates. By personal inquiry in the fields and villages he won the confidence of the peasantry; he allotted the holdings with care and attention to detail, so that the ryots prospered at the same time that the revenue increased. He had the wisdom to modify his system according to differences of
local conditions. Where the peasantry were backward and the population scantly, or where the villages were situated in obscure nooks, he left the old usage of a fixed lump payment per plough undisturbed. In many other places he introduced the system of metayership or sharing of the actual produce. For this there were three rates: (i) Where the crop depended on rainfall, the State took one-half of it. (ii) Where agriculture depended on well-irrigation the share of the State was one-third in the case of grain, and from $\frac{1}{3}$ to $\frac{1}{4}$ in the case of grape, sugar-cane, anise, plantain, pea-wort, and other special and high-priced crops requiring laborious watering and length of culture. (iii) Where the field was irrigated from canals (pāt), the proportion of the revenue to the crop varied, being sometimes higher and sometimes lower than in lands irrigated from wells.

His third method of revenue settlement was the elaborate and complex one of Northern India. The standard or maximum Government share was one-fourth of the total produce, whether grain or pot-herb, fruit or seed. The revenue at the fixed *rate of* so many rupees per bigha was assessed and collected after considering the quantity and quality of the crop from seed-time.
to harvest and its market-price, and actually measuring the sown area. Hence, its name of jarib (survey). Under Murshid Quli this became the prevalent system in the subahs of Mughal Deccan and was known for centuries afterwards as "the dhárá of Murshid Quli Khan."

His excellent system, backed by his constant vigilance and personal supervision, led to the improvement of agriculture and increase of the revenue in a few years. In 1658 the accurate observer Bhimsen Burhanpuri saw not a single piece of waste land near Aurangabad; wheat and pulse sold at $2\frac{1}{2}$ maunds a rupee, jawar and bajra at $3\frac{1}{2}$ maunds, molasses at half a maund, and yellow oil (ghee ?) at four seers.*

Immediately on assuming the viceroyalty, Aurangzib sent off his own men to the different sub-divisions to take over charge of the localities. He found that the official staff must be greatly increased before the country could be brought under proper control, and much money must be spent before the administration could be made efficient. And he acted accordingly. First, there was a wholesale redistribution of offices; old and incompetent men were dismissed or removed to minor posts; a number of officers of

* Dilkasha, 25, 26, 38.
proved ability were selected by the Prince, and to them all situations of trust and importance were given.* This change of personnel was naturally accompanied by a reshuffling of *jagirs.* As we have already seen, able officers were left in undisturbed possession of their old *jagirs* if these were good, or given better ones if they were unproductive. The loss of the change fell only on the undeserving or minor officers.

After thus securing for himself and his leading officers the income necessary for maintaining their contingents, he fought and won for them another battle with the Imperial accounts department. In order to reduce expenditure, Shah Jahan ordered that every military officer serving in the Deccan should bring his force to the muster, and the troop horses should be branded, so that commanders who had been keeping less than their proper contingents while drawing full pay, might be asked to refund the sums they had thus taken in excess from the State. Aurangzib pleaded for them by pointing out the real state of affairs in the Deccan: no officer could realise the full amount of his nominal pay from his *jagir*; many had failed even to take possession of the lands

*Adab, 26b, 24a & b, 25b.*
assigned to them; their main support was the cash allowance paid from the Treasury. If, therefore, by reason of the shortage in the regulation number of their retainers, a part of their former salaries was debited against them and the amount recovered by deduction from their pay in future, the officers would be worse off than before. The operation of the order would decrease the strength of the army, which was a dangerous contingency in "a province on the frontier of two rich and armed rulers." Shah Jahan had decreased the stipend of armed followers from Rs. 20 per month to Rs. 17 or even Rs. 15. Aurangzib protested against this order, saying that a horseman and raises the pay of troopers. who got less than Rs. 20 a month could not possibly keep himself in proper fighting trim, especially as, under Murshid Quli Khan's metayership settlement, rent was now paid in kind and the rent-receivers had to undergo heavy expenditure in watching and storing their share of the grain. The price of horses (he added) had greatly risen in the Deccan, and to make up the full complements of all the officers in the terms of Shah Jahan's new order would require the entertainment of 9,000 additional mounted retainers by the officers. As the result of Aurangzib's protest
Shah Jahan raised the stipend of each trooper to Rs. 20 a month, and the order about muster and branding was apparently dropped.*

Keen on securing military efficiency, Aurangzib first of all assured that financial support without which an army cannot be kept up to the mark. About his own immediate followers he wrote to the Emperor, "Your Majesty well knows that I seldom make useless expenditure. What I get from you, I spend in supporting the army. Now, as my men are paid in cash, my contingent will decrease in the same proportion as my cash allowance is reduced."†

The Deccan being far away from the centre of the Empire, the officers posted there used to embezzle the public money and to neglect their duty, without fear of inspection and detection. We have seen how one governor, Islam Khan, used to make money by selling the stores of the forts dear and afterwards buying fresh provisions cheap. Fifty years afterwards the Venetian traveller Manucci noted the utterly decayed and neglected condition of the Mughal forts in these parts. But in 1650 Mir Khalil, a very able and energetic officer, was appointed

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* Adab, 29b, 35a, 97a.
† Adab, 33a, 172a.
Inspector General of Ordnance (darogha-i-topkhanah) for the Deccan, and he soon made a clean sweep of the old abuses. Though a mere inspector, "his achievements surpassed those of provincial viceroys." He visited every fort, inspected everything, great and small, and supplied every place with the requisite store of food and munitions. Everywhere he found evidence of neglect and corruption. Old and useless men were being borne on the establishment of the artillery and swelling the expenditure, without doing any service at all. Mir Khalil made them undergo an examination in musketry. Setting up a target three yards square, he gathered all the artillerymen and gave them the chance of three shots from their matchlocks at a range of forty paces. Those who could not hit the mark even once were dismissed. Old and disabled soldiers were put on pension in consideration of their past services. Thus in a month and a half this "honest, hardworking, and expert officer" effected a saving of Rs. 50,000 a year, while actually improving the efficiency of the arm.* He continued at his post till 18th July, 1653, when he was transferred, on a higher rank and pay, to the responsible post of commandant.

* M. U. i. 166, 786, 787, Waris 39b, 79b, Storia do Mogor, iii. 485.
of Dharur, a fort on the frontier. Aurangzib highly commended his expert knowledge of artillery matters and success as an administrator, saying, "The presence of such an officer in a frontier fort gives me peace of mind." His successor was Hushdar Khan, a capital marksman, who held the Inspectorship of Ordnance for a year only. The next to fill the office was Shamsuddin (the son of Mukhtar Khan), appointed in the middle of 1654,—who, too, greatly pleased Aurangzib by his ability and received many favours from the Prince.*

Aurangzib's second viceroyalty of the Deccan was marked by a series of wrangles with his father, for which, as Aurangzib's version alone is before us, the chief blame seems to fall on Shan Jahan. Either Aurangzib's enemies had got hold of the Emperor's ears, or the latter failed to appreciate the Prince's difficulties in the South. But the result was that Aurangzib was misunderstood, suspected, and unjustly reprimanded from the very beginning of his term of office. And the bitterness of feeling thus roused was one of the reasons why the War of Succession was conducted so heartlessly and

* Adab, 30b, 27b, 39b, Waris, 87a, M. U. iii. 943—946, 620—623.
unscrupulously. So complete was the estrangement that, during this long viceroyalty of more than five years, Aurangzib was not once invited to visit his father in Northern India, and, what is almost incredible, among the presents made to the Emperor on his birthdays and the anniversaries of his coronation none from Aurangzib is mentioned in the official history, though the other princes made costly offerings! While Dara’s sons were basking in the Imperial favour and every year receiving jewels and cash gifts worthy of princes, only once did Aurangzib’s sons get anything from their Imperial grand-father.

At the very time of his appointment to the Deccan Aurangzib objected to it as his jagirs there would yield 17 lakhs of rupees less than the fertile fiefs he was holding in Sindh. “What, I wonder, is the reason of this decrease and of my transfer?” he asked. Before he had reached the Deccan, he was taxed by the Emperor with moving too slowly and taking four months in going from Peshawar to his charge, which had been without a ruler for two months. Aurangzib’s explanation was the difficulty of the roads and the unpreparedness of his troops, who had just returned from the arduous campaign of Qandahar and had got no time to visit their jagirs and collect money for fitting themselves
out for the transfer to the Deccan. Even after reaching Burhanpur Aurangzib had no peace; the Emperor urged him to proceed to Daulatabad, his capital, as soon as possible after the rainy season. The Prince excused himself for lingering ten months at Burhanpur, on the grounds of pressure of work and the heavy rains at the end of the monsoons that year. Then again, his proposal to be given more productive jagirs in exchange of the existing ones, was the cause of a prolonged and acrimonious correspondence with the Emperor, as we have seen.

In some cases the viceroy’s recommendations for postings and promotions among his subordinates were not accepted by the Emperor, and the Prince could only protest his own helplessness in the matter and justify his nominations. In a few instances, such as the Inspectorship of Ordnance, he carried his point after indignantly writing to his father, “I have been a subahdar since the age of 18 years, and I have never recommended a single man who has proved unfit for his post......The Chief of Artillery should be an expert marksman. I recommended such a person. He has not done any dishonest act. But your Majesty has ordered the post to be given to another.”* On many other minor points,

* Adab, 27b, 28a & b, 29a, 129b.
such as elephant catching, sending mangoes to Court, securing skilled weavers for the Imperial cloth factory, the Golkonda tribute, &c., there were differences between father and son.*  

Next, Shah Jahan quickly lost patience and complained of Aurangzib’s failure to restore cultivation and prosperity in the Deccan. Aurangzib rightly answered that it was too early to judge him. “I have always tried to extend tillage and increase the number of houses; but as I am not a vain man I have not reported it to you. A country that has been desolated by various calamities cannot be made flourishing in two or three years!...How can I, in one season or two, bring back to cultivation a parganah which has been unproductive of revenue for twenty years?” But Shah Jahan was not satisfied. He often made caustic remarks in open Court about Aurangzib’s promise of restoring prosperity to the Deccan and the wretched condition of the province. He even contemplated a change of viceroys as likely to mend matters, and asked Shuja if he would accept the subahdari of the Deccan as Aurangzib could not govern the province well.†  

Another cause of friction was the charge of

* Adab, 177a & b, 24b, 31b, 32a, 193b, 191b.
† Adab 28a, 32a & b, Faiyaz-ul-qawanin, 354.
diplomatic relations with Bijapur and Golkonda. Aurangzib justly contended that the Mughal envoys at these Courts should take their orders from the viceroy of the Deccan and the Imperial correspondence with them should pass through his hands, "as a better policy and in order to secure greater obedience to the Imperial wishes."* But this power was conceded to him only towards the close of his administration, and even then not fully.

Later on we find Shah Jahan charging Aurangzib with receiving costly presents from the king of Golkonda without crediting their price against the tribute due. Aurangzib easily showed that these presents were of small value, the precious stones were full of flaws, and they were all a personal gift to himself and his eldest son.† By a Nemesis of fate, a generation afterwards Aurangzib, then Emperor, suspected his son Muazzam of having formed a secret understanding with the king of Golkonda.

In May 1653 we find Aurangzib replying thus to some charge brought against him in one of the Emperor's letters, "What your Majesty has heard against me is false. I consider such conduct

* Adab, 24b.
† Adab, 84b, 85a and b, 192b, 107b.
towards others as very improper."* The nature of the accusation is not known to us. Was it the affair of Zainabadi, which must have happened at this time?

Again, the Emperor took him to task for employing all the best weavers at Burhanpur in his private factory and thereby depriving the Imperial factory of its labour supply. Aurangzib denied the allegation altogether, but the Emperor ordered all cloth factories at Burhanpur to be closed with the exception of the Imperial. This was a public humiliation for the viceroy.†

At one time Aurangzib was so disgusted with being constantly misunderstood, censured, and hampered by the Emperor, that he refused to take a most necessary step on his own initiative. Murshid Quli Khan had recommended an advance of Rs. 50,000 as loan to the peasants of Khandesh and Berar. Aurangzib simply referred the matter to the Emperor, and when he was told that he ought to have advanced the money from the Imperial revenue, he replied with bitterness, "No wonder that I did not take the responsibility of doing it, seeing that I have been taken to task for acts which I never did.

* Adab, 26a.
† Adab, 98b, 176b.
In my first viceroyalty I did not wait for previous sanction in such matters. But now I have grown more cautious!" Indeed, in one of his letters to his sister Jahanara he complains that though he had served his father faithfully for twenty years he was favoured with much less power and confidence than his nephew Sulaiman Shukoh.*

Before turning to the two great wars undertaken by Aurangzib during this period we shall describe his minor expeditions.

In the 16th and 17th centuries much of the modern Central Provinces owned the sway of aboriginal Gond chiefs and was known in history under the name of Gondwana. The great Gond kingdom of Garh-Mandla had been crippled by a Mughal invasion and sack of the capital in Akbar's reign, and, later, by Bundela encroachments from the north. But about the middle of the 17th century another Gond kingdom, with its capital at Deogarh, rose to greatness, and extended its sway over the districts of Betul, Chindwara and Nagpur, and portions of Seoni, Bhandara and Balaghat. In the southern part of Gondwana stood the town of Chanda, the seat of a third Gond dynasty. A king of

* Adab, 41a & b, 177a.
Chanda had visited the Court of Delhi in the 16th century, and his family had ever since been loyally attached to the empire, because this was their only protection from their hereditary foe and rival, the Rajah of Deogarh.*

For a short time the Deogarh Kingdom became so powerful as to over-all relations with the Mughals. Its wealth was vast enough to tempt the cupidity of the Mughals. We have seen how in 1637 Khan-i-Dauran invaded this kingdom, stormed the fort of Nagpur, and forced Rajah Kukia to pay a large contribution down and to promise an annual tribute of 1½ lakhs of rupees. Kesari Singh had succeeded his father Kukia in 1640, after presenting a fee of four lakhs of rupees to the Emperor.† But under him the tribute fell into arrears, and repeated demands for it produced no effect. So, in 1655, Shah Jahan ordered the country to be invaded, especially as the Mughal army in the Deccan had its hands free and the Rajah of Deogarh was said to possess 200 elephants, which would be a rich booty. Aurangzib point-

† Chapter III.
ed out that by deputing an officer to Deogarh he had ascertained that the Rajah was really very poor and had only 14 elephants. He therefore, asked for orders whether Deogarh should be annexed or only the tribute realised, and then added ironically, "Send me the man who has told you of the Rajah having got 200 elephants, and he will guide my troops to the place where these elephants are!" This false information, as may be easily imagined, had come from the envious Rajah of Chanda. Shah Jahan ordered Deogarh to be conquered and annexed. Aurangzib wrote back to say, "It can be easily conquered, but not so easily held or controlled. The annual cost of administration will be very high."*

On 12 October, 1655, the expedition started in two divisions, one under Mirza Khan, the Deputy Governor of Berar, by way of Elichpur, and the other under Hadidad Khan, the Deputy Governor of Telingana, by way of Nagpur,—with orders to converge upon Deogarh. Manji, the Rajah of Chanda, co-operated with the invaders. Kesari Singh was crushed between the two walls of foes. He humbly waited on Mirza Khan, and promised to pay up his arrears

* Adab, 42a and b, Waris, 105a.
and to be more punctual in future. Only twenty elephants were found in his possession, and these were taken away. The Rajah accompanied the victorious troops on their return, and paid his respects to Aurangzib on 8th January, 1656. He promised to pay five lakhs in cash and kind in the course of the year, on account of his tribute, present and past, and to cede certain parganahs, the revenue of which would be set apart for the payment of the tribute in future. Kesari Singh with a good body of armed retainers accompanied Aurangzib to the siege of Golkonda and rendered good service, praying only for some remission of his piled up arrears of tribute in return.*

The later history of Deogarh may be conveniently narrated here. In 1667 Dilir Khan with an Imperial army entered the kingdom, and imposed a contribution of 15 lakhs on the Rajah, while raising the annual tribute to two lakhs. He had realised about half the current year’s tribute, when he was sent to succeed Jai Singh as subahdar of the Deccan,—an officer being left in the Gond kingdom to collect the balance. Towards the close of the century, a new Rajah of

* Adab, 43a, 45a, 46a, 47a, Waris, 105b.
Deogarh was so hard pressed by other claimants to the throne that he went to Aurangzib, accepted Islam as the price of Imperial support against his rivals, and promised to serve in the Emperor's wars with the Marathas. Aurangzib, proud of effecting a conversion, baptised the Rajah as Buland Bakht or Lucky (1686). But afterwards (1699) the Rajah's rival died, he fled to his own country and sided with the Maratha raiders! The Emperor was too busy with his enemies in the South to punish him. He vented his impotent rage by ordering the traitor's name to be changed in the official papers into Nagun Bakht or Luckless! The Deogarh chief extended his kingdom at the expense of Chanda and Mandla, and founded the city of Nagpur, which his son, Chand Sultan, walled round and made his capital.*

The little State of Jawhar stands north of Bombay on a plateau between the Western Ghats and the Arabian Sea. On the north and east it adjoined the Mughal districts of Baglana and Nasik respectively, and on the south it touched the Konkan. Through it one could have access to the rich port of Chaul. Except in some places in the south and west, the country

is elevated, rocky, and forest-clad. Its safety lay in the great difficulty which an invader found in crossing the Ghats and penetrating into the country from the land side. A line of Rajahs of the Koli tribe, founded early in the 14th century, ruled the State, and was at this time engaged in a long but successful struggle with the Portuguese power in Northern Konkan. The Rajah, named Sripat, paid no tribute nor owned the overlordship of the Emperor. So, at Aurangzib’s suggestion, Shah Jahan sanctioned a war against him. Rao Karan, the chief of Bikanir, had long served in the Mughal wars of the Deccan. He now promised to conquer Jawhar with his own men, if it were granted to him as a fief on a tribute of Rs. 50,000. The Rajput general started from Aurangabad on 3rd October, 1655, threaded his way through a difficult pass in the Western Ghats and approached the frontier of Jawhar. At this Sripat offered submission (5th January, 1656), and bought safety by paying an indemnity, promising to alienate a certain portion of his territory for the payment of tribute in future, and sending his son with Rao Karan as a hostage. The expedition returned to Aurangzib on 20th January.*

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CHAPTER X.

Invasion of Golkonda, 1656.

Golkonda was a very fertile and carefully irrigated country, with a large wealth of the industrious population. The capital, Haidarabad, was at this time the centre of the diamond trade, not of Asia alone, but of the whole world. Numbers of foreign traders assembled here and transacted business. The kingdom was famous for several industries. The steel works of Nirmal and Indur (two villages north of the city) supplied the raw materials for the world-famed Damascus blades, and the local out-turn of swords, lances and daggers was distributed in large quantities over all parts of India. The skilled cloth-weavers of Masulipatam were sought after for the Imperial factories of Burhanpur and Delhi, and the chintz woven there had a continental celebrity. The carpet industry of Ellore, conducted entirely by Muhammadans, was
famous for centuries. To its smiling cornfields, tanks teeming with fish, and flourishing handicrafts, must be added the diamond and gold mines which made the name of Golkonda known even in far-off Europe. The kingdom also possessed in Masulipatam the best anchorage in the Bay of Bengal and the only place on the East Coast whence ships sailed for Pegu, Siam, Bengal, Cochin China, the Manillas, and even Mecca and Madagascar. The forests of the kingdom sheltered large herds of highly prized elephants, which added to the wealth of the king. Tobacco and the palm flourished exceedingly, and the excise on tobacco and toddy juice yielded a large revenue.*

Since his return to the Deccan in 1653, Aurangzib had frequent cause to quarrel with the king of Golkonda. The annual tribute of two lakhs of hun was always in arrears, and frequent dunning on the part of the Mughal viceroy only met with excuses and petitions for delay. The Emperor asked the Sultan to pay half his tribute in cash and the other half in elephants, of which he had a vast stable. But even this was not done. At

* This description is based on Tavernier, i. 150—158, 175, 274, Gribble's History of the Deccan, i. 269, Imperial Gazetteer, xii. 23. Adab-i-Alamgiri, 55b, 50a, 46b, 37a, 54b.
last Aurangzib demanded the alienation of a certain part of Golkonda territory, the revenue of which would be collected by Imperial officers and set apart for the payment of the tribute.*

Next, the exchange value of the hun rose from Rs. 4 in 1636 to Rs. 4½ and finally in 1654 to Rs. 5 each. Qutb Shah had been paying his tribute at the old rate of eight lakhs of rupees a year. The Mughals now demanded that the difference due to exchange for all the past years should be paid at once. A new burden of 20 lakhs of rupees was thus thrown on the shoulders of the Sultan who had been tottering under the load of the normal tribute.†

Then he was rebuked for not having taken his over-lord's sanction before conquering the Karnatak. But he was told that the offence could be atoned for by paying a large sum as present to the Emperor! When Aurangzib's agent, Muhammad Mumin, was sent ostensibly to protect Sri Ranga, the Rajah of Karnatak, Qutb Shah was warned not to hinder him, with a clear hint that the proposed intervention could be bought off!‡ Lastly there was the affair of Mir Jumla which precipitated war, and of which a detailed account will be now given.

* Adab, 54a & b, 56b.
† Adab, 56a, Waris, 113a.
‡ Adab, 54b-55b, 44a & b.
The treaties of 1636 has divided the old Ahmadnagar territory between the Emperor of Delhi and the Sultan of Bijapur, made Golkonda a protected tributary State, and clearly marked out the boundary between the Empire and the two Deccani monarchies.* Barred in the north by the strong arm of the Mughals, these two States began to give employment to their troops and a free vent to their ambition by engaging in a career of conquest in other directions. Bijapur took possession of the Nizam Shahi Konkan, which had been ceded to it by the treaty with the Emperor, and even attacked the Portuguese possessions north of Goa with some success. Golkonda was cut off by foreign territory from the west. But it was in the eastern side of Southern India that both the Sultans found free scope for expansion. The whole of the Karnataka, from the river Krishna to Tanjore beyond the Kaveri, was covered with a number of petty Hindu principalities, the jarring fragments of the ruined empire of Vijaynagar. These now rapidly fell a prey to Muslim arms. The Golkonda troops advanced conquering to the Bay of Bengal, and occupied the country from the Chilka lake to the Penner river.

* Chapter III.
Their raiding bands penetrated as far north as Khurda, the seat of the faineant Rajah of Orissa. The Gajapati Rajah of Ganjam was ousted by the Golkonda Sultan in 1571. Chicacole became the seat of a Qutb Shahi faujdar some time before 1641, when a handsome mosque was built there by Shir Muhammad Khan, the first faujdar. In 1652 a Rajput officer of Golkonda seized Vizagapatam and extending his conquest formed a petty Rajahship.*

Bijapur advanced conquering southwards and then turned east till it occupied the coast between Jinji and Tanjore. Hemmed in the north and south by the conquests of the two Sultans, as between the two jaws of a monster, lay the kingdom of Chandragiri, the last remnant of the Vijaynagar empire, with its territory contracted to the region from Nellore to Pondicherry on the east and the Mysore frontier on the west. On the death of Rama Raja, the minister and virtual ruler of Vijaynagar, on the fatal field of Talikota (1564), and the subsequent sack of the capital by the Muslims, his brother had removed the seat of government to Pennakonda.

* Imperial Gazetteer, XII. 23 (Rajmahendri captured, 1572), X. 217 (Chicacole), XII. 145, XXIV. 339. Sewell's Sketch of Dynasties, 48 & 69, (the Palnad country and the country about Kurnool and Nellore were seized and Kondavidu secured by bribery in 1580).
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HISTORY OF AURANGZIB. [CHAP. X.

(1567). This brother’s son transferred the capital to Chandragiri (about 1600). At this time the throne of Chandragiri was occupied by Sri Ranga, who gave the site of Madras city to the English in 1639, and whom the Muhammadan historians style Sri Ranga Rayal, zamindar of Karnatak.* There was now a race between the Golkonda and Bijapur kings for the absorption of his kingdom; the two jaws began rapidly to close from the north and the south upon the doomed Karnatak. In this work of conquest a most conspicuous part was played by Mir Jumla, the wazir of Golkonda.

Muhammad Said, known to history as Mir Jumla,† was a Syed of Ardstan in Persia, and the son of an oil-merchant of Isfahan. Leaving his native country in youth, he like other Shiah adventurers, sought his fortune at the Courts of the Deccani Sultans who belonged to his sect, (1630). As a diamond merchant he


† This account of Mir Jumla is based on Tavernier, i. 170, 259, 273, 284—293 295, Bernier, 16—19. Gribble, i. 269—271, Masir-ul-umara, iii. 530—555 (life of Mir Jumla). For his character see Talish’s Fathiyya-i-ibriyya (Conquest of Assam).
rose to great wealth by his shrewdness and business capacity. His wonderful talents gained him the favour of Abdullah Qutb Shah, who made him his prime minister. Mir Jumla's industry, rapid despatch of business, administrative capacity, military genius, and inborn power of leadership ensured his success in all that he undertook. Great alike in civil government and in war, he soon became the virtual ruler of Golkonda: nothing could reach the Sultan without first securing his approval. Sent by his master to the Karnatak, he soon effected a complete transformation there. Hitherto Kambam*, on the N. E. side of the Cuddapah district, had been the limit of Golkonda advance in that direction. All the attempts of the Sultans had failed to conquer the uplands of the Karnatak, where the Rajah of Chandragiri still held sway. Mir Jumla strengthened himself by securing a number of European gunners and cannon-founders, raised his army to a high state of discipline and efficiency, and soon wrested the Cuddapah district. His crowning feat was the capture of the rock fortress of Gandikota, hitherto deemed impregnable.

* 15° 34' N. 79° 12' E.
Sidhout, east of Cuddapah, was also conquered, and his captains penetrated as far as Chandragiri and Tirupati in the North Arcot district. By looting the rich old temples of the South and hunting out buried treasure, Mir Jumla amassed a vast fortune. The huge Hindu idols of copper were brought away in numbers, to be melted and cast into cannon! By diligently working the diamond mines which he farmed from his sovereign or discovered by his own exertions, he multiplied his wealth, till he came to be known as the richest private man in the South and the owner of twenty maunds of diamonds. On entering Shah Jahan's service he made presents worth 15 lakhs of rupees to the Emperor, besides what he gave to Aurangzib and his eldest son. By his conquests he raised his jagir in the Karnatak into a kingdom 300 miles long and 50 miles broad, yielding a revenue of 40 lakhs a year, and possessing several diamond mines. At his own cost and under his absolute command he maintained an army of 5,000 well-mounted and well-equipped cavalry, besides the 4,000 troops of the Golkonda king's service, whose captains he had won over. His foot numbered 20,000 strong. An excellent park of

* Sidhout is nine miles due east and Gandikota 42 miles N. W. of Cuddapah town. Both are situated on the Penner river.
artillery and a large number of trained elephants completed his war equipage. Thus he had made himself fully independent of his master and the virtual king of the Karnatak. In short, it has been well said by one historian that though Mir Jumla's rank was that of a noble, he possessed the power wealth and grandeur of a ruling prince.*

Mir Jumla's growing power and wealth roused the alarm of his master. Envious courtiers were not wanting to whisper to the Sultan of Golconda that the absent wazir's armed strength was a menace to his own security, and that the servant's wealth overshadowed the grandeur of the master's Court. Qutb Shah, too, naturally wished to have a share of his wazir's gains. In the conquest of the Karnatak the two had acted as partners; Mir Jumla had supplied the brain and leadership, while the Sultan had lent him the necessary men and money and the protection of his name, in the first stage at all events. They now quarrelled about the profits. Qutb Shah tried to treat Mir

* At Haidarabad a tank, a garden, and a mansion bear his name. Some distance outside the city a village (pettah) was founded and named after him. "He has left many memorials of himself in Telingana where he lived long." (M. U., iii. 555) Waris, 102a, 111a and b, 114a, 118a, Adab, 39a, 116a. Tavernier, i. 170n, Bernier, 17.
Jumla as a mere servant and to escheat to the State what he had acquired in its service. Mir Jumla, on the other hand, knowing how weak and worthless his master was, regarded the conquest as entirely his own work and his gains as the fruits of his own exclusive toil. After having tasted regal independence in the Karnatak he was loth to return to the life of a courtier. But he could not long disobey the summons of his master. So, he once went back to Golkonda. The Sultan conspired with other courtiers to seize and blind him, but Mir Jumla learnt of the plot before it was matured, and cleverly managed to escape to the Karnatak, vowing never to visit Golkonda again. The Sultan kept calling him back with increasing persistence, but it only served to confirm Mir Jumla's suspicion. At last the mask was thrown away, and Qutb Shah openly undertook to crush his disobedient servant.*

Mir Jumla now looked around for protection. He offered to enter the service of the Sultan of Bijapur, and to hold the Karnatak of him, and as an earnest presented him with some lockets (paduk) richly set with diamonds and gems, which he had extorted from the Rajah of

* *Adab, 30a, 36b, 72b, Tavernier, i. 165.
Chandragiri.* Adil Shah was overjoyed at the prospect of acquiring such a precious servant, the ablest man in the Deccan since Malik Amber's time. But Bijapur was only one of the many strings to Mir Jumla's bow. He was also intriguing with the Shah of Persia† and asking for an asylum with him. What he evidently wanted to secure was a safe retreat to Persia with all his wealth, if matters came to the worst and he found the Karnatak no longer tenable against a combination of his foes. Nearer home he ably turned enemies into friends. The despoiled Rajah of Chandragiri was conciliated and assured that he would not be further molested, if he stood by Mir the Karnatak. Jumla.‡ Years ago Bijapur and Golkonda had almost come to blows about the partition of the Karnatak. The Muslim conquerors advancing from the north and the south of the province had met near the northern frontier of the South Arcot district and each had wished to push the other back.§ But Mir Jumla now made a peaceful settlement: by mutual consent

* Adab, 195b & 196a, Waris, 119a & b.
† Rugat-i-Shah Abbas Sani, 154—156, gives the reply of the Persian king to Mir Jumla's offer to enter his service.
‡ Adab, 36b, 39a.
§ Adab, 27b.
a line drawn east to west some distance north of Jinji became the boundary between Adil Shahi Karnatak and Qutb Shahi Karnatak. In addition to this, Mir Jumla made friends with Ikhlas Khan,* the Abyssinian governor of Bijapur Karnatak, who probably wished to imitate his disloyal example and make his viceroyalty an independent State. The Golkonda generals and troops posted in the Karnatak were already bound by close ties of self-interest and favours to Mir Jumla's side. The Sultan had no instrument with which he could punish his refractory servant.

Mir Jumla had also begun to coquet with the Mughal power. Indeed, in this case the first solicitation had come from the other side. Aurangzib, secretly nursing his passionate ambition of conquering the rich State of Golkonda, was eager to secure such an able helper and counsellor as the prime minister of that kingdom. Through the Mughal envoy at Golkonda the Prince opened a secret correspondence with Mir Jumla, promising him not only protection for his family and property against his wrathful master, but also boundless favours from the Emperor, if he

* Adab, 39a, 36b.
joined the Mughal service. He also sent an agent, Muhammad Mumin, directly to the prime minister in the Karnatak. But the prudent wazir dallied with the offer and waited to see what turn his affairs would take. So, he sent a secret petition for appointment under the Emperor, in order to ascertain what terms he might expect from that quarter.*

These intrigues with three different Courts could not be kept secret. Qutb Shah, hearing of them, tried to conciliate his too-powerful officer. To his friendly overtures Mir Jumla replied that after two years he would either attend on his master or resign his post and leave India.† All this time Aurangzib kept up a busy but secret correspondence with him, and messengers kept running from one to the other. In his excess of eagerness the Prince even approached Muhammad Amin, the son of Mir Jumla. But Shah Jahan’s hesitation in replying to the Mir’s petition threw the latter into alarm and doubt about the Emperor’s intentions. At last, yielding to Aurangzib’s importunity, the Emperor offered to Mir Jumla his protection and favour if he came to his Court.‡ But evidently the terms were very

* Adab, 30a, 31b, 34b, 36b, 72b; Waris, 102b.
† Adab, 34b, 44a.
‡ Adab, 35a & b, 36a.
vague, and Mir Jumla was in no haste to accept them. He, however, feigned Mir Jumla's duplicity, and begged a year's respite in which to collect his property from the ports, and keep his promise to Qutb Shah. So, he urged the Mughal Court to keep this agreement secret till then, for if the Deccani Sultans discovered his successful intrigue with the Emperor, they would, he feared, kill him.* In fact three kings were now bidding for his services, and he wished to make the most of the circumstance.

Eager as Aurangzib was to secure Mir Jumla, these delays made his heart turn sick, and he discovered Mir Jumla's duplicity. "I think," he wrote to the Emperor, "that Mir Jumla does not really wish to enter the Imperial service, as he now holds a large kingdom with many fortresses, ports, and strongholds, and has disgusted the Sultan of Bijapur by declining to enter his service. His proposal to take the Emperor's pay is only a matter of policy. He will not leave that country so long as he can dexterously avert the hostility of the two Sultans."†

Evidently Aurangzib's solicitations ceased, or his agent at Golkonda blundered and the secret

* Adab, 38a & b.
† Adab, 39a.
of Mir Jumla's understanding with the Emperor leaked out. The two Deccani Sultans, thoroughly angry with the double-dealer, agreed to unite their forces to crush him. It was now Mir Jumla's turn to be as eager as he had been lukewarm before in joining the Mughals. He wrote to the Prince, "I am Shah Jahan's servant and beg to be saved by him." But Aurangzib now hung back. He waited for the attack on Mir Jumla to be actually delivered before sending him the "strong force to escort him" to the Imperial territory which he had promised before.*

Before Qutb Shah could muster either his courage or his forces for the purpose of chastising Mir Jumla, a crisis was precipitated by the conduct of Muhammad Amin, the wazir's son. This youngman, haughty and reckless at all times and known as the most audacious of courtiers even when serving a stern master like Aurangzib,† was acting all these years as Mir Jumla's deputy at the Court of Golkonda. His father's wealth and glory turned his head. He gave himself the airs of a prince, spoke slightlyingly of the Sultan, and treated him with scant courtesy in open Court. Abdullah

* Adab, 40a, 36b.
† Masir-ul-umara, iii. 620, Anecdotes of Aurangzib, § 51.
Qutb Shah bore all this meekly. But at last, one day Muhammad Amin came to Court reeling with drunkenness, fell asleep on the king's own carpet, and soiled it in crop sickness. The long-suffering king could not bear this crowning act of insult. His anger boiled over, and he threw Muhammad Amin and his family into prison and attached their property (21st November, 1655).*

This was the opportunity for which Aurangzib had so long been waiting. Here was a plea for invading and annexing Golkonda, whose wealth had excited his keen longing for years past, though he had had to keep that longing in check in fear of Shah Jahan's sense of justice.

The Prince immediately reported the incident to the Emperor and solicited an urgent sanction of war.† Meantime, on 3rd December, Shah Jahan had despatched a robe of honour and a letter-patent to Mir Jumla, appointing him a Commander of Five Thousand, and his son a Commander of Two Thousand troopers in the Mughal service, together with a letter to Qutb Shah bidding him not to hinder them in coming to

* M. U. iii. 531. Tavernier, i. 166. Adab, 45a.
† Waris, 109a.
the Imperial Court, nor to detain any part of their property.* These letters reached Aurangzib on 18th December, and he at once sent the Emperor's letter on to Golkonda, commanding the king to release the family of Mir Jumla immediately and to send them with all their belongings to the Imperial Court in company with the bearer of the letter. If Qutb Shah delayed or disobeyed the order, Aurangzib threatened to send an army under his son against him.† In the meantime, anticipating the Emperor's sanction, he mobilised his troops on the Golkonda frontier for a campaign. Hadidad Khan was ordered to hasten his return from Deogarh and to move directly on Qandahar (a fort midway between Aurangabad and Golkonda), while Aurangzib's eldest son, Muhammad Sultan, was sent (26th Dec.) with the Van of his father's army to Nander to wait for Hadidad Khan.‡

While the storm was thus brewing against him, Qutb Shah seems to have been seized with infatuation. He either ignored or underrated his danger, and his anger was still unallayed. Both Aurangzib's warning of 18th December and

* Waris, 102b.
† Adab, 56b & 57a, 45a, 77a. Waris, 109b.
‡ Adab, 45a & b. Waris 109b.
Shah Jahan's letter of the third announcing the Imperial protection of Mir Jumla and Muhammad Amin, were disregarded by him.

On hearing (24th December) of Muhammad Amin's captivity, Shah Jahan wrote a letter to Qutb Shah to release Mir Jumla's family. He felt sure that his letter alone would effect the purpose. But "in order to gratify Aurangzib," he rather reluctantly sanctioned threatening war in case of refusal. (29th Dec.) the invasion of Golkonda, in case Muhammad Amin was still detained.* Both these letters reached Aurangzib on 7th January, 1656.† He now employed finesse to ruin Golkonda. Without giving Qutb Shah time to receive and follow Shah Jahan's letter of 24th December, which explicitly ordered the release of the captives, he declared that the king's refusal to set them free in spite of the Emperor's letter of 3rd December amounted to that flat disobedience of Imperial orders which had been laid down as a necessary condition for the invasion of Golkonda.

At once Aurangzib ordered Prince Muhammad Sultan, (who had reached Nander on 7th January), to cross the frontier. The young

* Waris, 109b.

†Adab, 46a.
Prince started (10th January) and made a dash on Haidarabad with his cavalry. Aurangzib waited at Daulatabad with the main army for a fortnight, because there was some fear of Bijapur coming to the aid of Golkonda in answer to the earnest appeals of Qutb Shah. Indeed, the Bijapur army under Afzal Khan had been massed on the Mughal frontier. But Adil Shah held back in fear; the danger blew over, and so, on 20th January Aurangzib himself started and quickly marched to join his son. Shivaji had caused some disturbance on the Mughal frontier near Junnar* But as yet he could be safely neglected. Moreover, his aim was not so much to cause a diversion in favour of Golkonda as to profit by the absence of the Mughal troops.

Meantime, after Muhammad Sultan had entered his territory, Abdullah got Shah Jahan's stern letter of 24th December and at once sent Muhammad Amin with his family and servants to that Prince, together with a humble letter of submission to the Emperor. But Aurangzib had so contrived it that his submission should come too

* Adab, 46a and b, 47a, 49a and b.
late to save him. Muhammad Amin waited on
the Prince, 24 miles from
Raid on Haidarabad: Qutb Shah flees to Golkonda Fort.
Haidarabad (probably on 21st Jan.), but the Prince refused to
stop hostilities and pressed on
to the capital on the plea that Abdullah had not
yet restored the property of the captives. Qutb
Shah's last hope was gone; the Mughal cavalry
had arrived so fast that he had been taken com-
pletely by surprise. Confronted with utter ruin,
he sent off to the stronghold of Golkonda his children and such valuable property as could be
easily removed, and in the night of 22nd January
himself fled from Haidarabad to that fort,—
leaving the defence of the capital to three officers
and some 17,000 soldiers. *

This flight saved his life because Aurangzib's
secret instructions to M. Sultan breathed deadly
hostility:

"Qutb-ul-mulk is a coward and will probably offer no
resistance. Surround his palace with your artillery and also
post a detachment to bar his flight to Golkonda. But before
doing so, send a carefully chosen messenger to him, saying,
'I had so long been expecting that you would meet me and
hospitably ask me to stay with you. But as you have not
done so, I have myself come to you.' Immediately on
delivering this message, attack him impetuously and, if you
can manage it, lighten his neck of the burden of his head.
The best means of achieving this plan are cleverness, prompti-
tude, and lightness of hand." †

* Waris, 109b, Adab, 49a, 80b.
† Adab, 187b.
On 23rd January the invaders arrived at the Husain Sagar tank, two miles north of Haidarabad. Confusion reigned in the counsels of Golconda. The king had never before ruled his servants, and now he was more helpless than a child and more unnerved than a woman. His officers acted without concert, having no common leader and no definite plan of action. While one minister waited on M. Sultan with a casket of gems as a peace-offering, others made a demonstration against the Mughal army, but were soon driven back with loss. Next day the young Prince entered Haidarabad. A strong party was posted in the city under Muhammad Beg to prevent plunder and violence, to reassure the citizens, and to man the city walls. As the palace and most of the houses were built of wood, strict orders were given to guard watchfully against fire; for, some years before this, the screen of the king's Hall had been accidentally set ablaze by a candle, and the fire had spread to the roof and thence to the neighbouring houses, and smouldered for fully a month.*

These arrangements were made none too soon. Haidarabad was one of the richest cities of India. Besides being the capital of a flourishing monar-

* Waris, 109b & 110a. Adab, 49a & b.
chy, it was the centre of the diamond trade of
the world and the seat of many fine arts. A vast
concourse of nobles, officers, traders, and artisans
filled the city and its extensive suburb (named
Aurangabad)* across the Musa river. From the
night of the 22nd to the noon of the 24th, plunder
raged in the city unchecked.

The king had left behind him
all his costly carpets, Chinaware,
furniture, &c., besides elephants and horses.
Muhammad Sultan inspected the royal property,
closed the doors of the palace, and placed a guard
over it. The looting of Haidarabad was the talk
of all India in that age. As Aurangzib's equerry,
Aqil Khan Razi, wrote in his history, "Most of
the stores and property of Qutb-ul-mulk, such as
precious books and other costly things beyond
computation, were plundered by Prince M.
Sultan....Much of Qutb-ul-mulk's property,—am-
ong the rareties of the age,—was confiscated by
Aurangzib. But so rich was the king and so
vast his wealth that, in spite of these several acts
of looting, so much treasure was left behind at
Aurangzib's retreat that nobody could suppose
that the treasury and palace had been looted."

Another historian, Bhimsen, records that the
Mughal army gathered much booty in the city,

* Plunder of the city.

Tavernier, i. 152.
and a vast amount in cash and kind was seized in the king’s palace.*

Abdullah Qutb Shah continued to send almost daily envoys to the Prince offering submission and costly presents in the hope of making peace. He restored Mir Jumla’s property. But the Prince could settle nothing in his father’s absence. Abdullah had, therefore, no help but to solicit aid from Bijapur and to put Golkonda in a state of defence in the meantime.

Aurangzib arrived on the scene on 6th February with the bulk of his army. With the vigour and promptitude that marked all his actions, he first made a reconnaissance of the fort and its environs, before retiring to his tent to refresh himself after the fatigue of a fortnight’s forced march. A large Golkonda force, about 15,000 strong, appeared in the plain and fired at the Mughals from a distance. The fort-guns co-operated with them. Evidently the position of the Imperial army was made untenable, for Aurangzib had to drive his elephant forward and order a general advance of his troops for repelling the enemy. But the struggle was long and severe, and the losses heavy. The fight raged till evening, when the enemy retired.

* Waris, 110a, Adab, 50a, Aqil Khan, 13, Dilkasha, 16.
some going back to the fort, others into the jungle outside it.

Next day the siege* of Golkonda began. The west side was unoccupied, but Mughal officers entrenched on the other three sides. A regular siege was impossible, as Aurangzib had made a quick march with light artillery, while the fort had guns of large calibre. Moreover, Shaista Khan, Shah Nawaz Khan, and other officers in command of reinforcements had not yet arrived, nor had the big guns ordered from the fort of Ausa.† Aurangzib, therefore, contented himself with holding the city and surrounding the fort, to prevent the escape of the king, while he waited for reinforcements and Shah Jahan’s fresh commands. His first expectation of murdering Qutb Shah and capturing his kingdom by a sudden coup had failed, and he had to resort to slower methods for which he was not prepared. The leaguer of Golkonda lasted from 7th February to 30th March, and was conducted very languidly, because, with the materials at his disposal, he could do no injury to such an impregnable fortress. Sometimes the siege-trenches were attacked by

* For the history of the siege, Waris, 110a—112b, Adab, 81a. Tavernier, i. 166—169.

† Shaista Khan arrived on 21st Feb., and two big guns from Ausa on 1st March, 1656. (Waris, 111a & b.)
sorties of the defenders. Battles took place with the Golkonda troops hovering round, on 11th and 12th February in the environs of the fort, and on 13th March at a place 20 miles from it. The Deccanis, as usual, retired after some exchange of fire, being unable or unwilling to stand the charge of the dreaded Mughal cavalry. Their mode of warfare was Parthian, and their aim to wear out the enemy and cut off his supplies.

These skirmishes were varied by the almost daily arrival of presents and offers of peace from the beleaguered king to the invader's camp! But Aurangzib steadily refused to make terms. He coveted the whole kingdom and nothing less. The fertility of Golkonda, the world-wide fame of its diamond mines, the wealth of its kings, the skill of its artisans, had roused his keenest greed. Soon after crossing the frontier, even before he had seen "the rich populous and flourishing city of Haidarabad," he had written to his father, "What shall I write about the beauty of this country—its abundance of water and population, its good air, and its extensive cultivation,—which I saw on the way? At every stage after crossing the frontier I met with many large tanks, springs of sweet water, run-
ning streams, inhabited villages with large patches of cultivated land attached to them. Not a piece of land without tillage. Such a money-yielding country, unmatched by the Imperial dominions, has fallen into this wretch's hands!"* And again, "Golkonda is a spacious kingdom, well-cultivated, rich in mines of diamond, crystal, &c." He plied his father with all sorts of arguments to secure his consent to its annexation: Qutb-ul-mulk urges Shah Jahan to annex it. For Imperial favours, sunk in vices unworthy of a king, a violator of the purity of his subjects' homes, an oppressor against whom the people were invoking the Heavens, a heretic who had perverted all his subjects from the pure Sunni faith, and lastly an ally and financial supporter of the king of Persia.† Not to punish such a heretical ruler would be a failure of duty on the part of an orthodox Islamic emperor! To miss this opportunity of crushing such an enemy would be highly impolitic. "I hope your Majesty will order annexation."‡

* Adab, 50a.
† We have two letters from the Persian king to Qutb-ul-mulk, of a later date than this year, in Ruqat-i-Shah Abbas Sani, 19—23 and 89—93.
‡ Adab, 46b, 50b.
Aurangzib even begged Shah Jahan not to answer Qutb-ul-mulk's submissive letter, nor to listen to the intercessions of Dara and others on his behalf,—because it would result in a great sacrifice of expected gain! When Mir Jumla's son would reach the Court, he would tell the Emperor all about the wealth and weakness of the Golkonda king, and suggest the means of squeezing the utmost out of him. In short, as he wrote, the Emperor "should make the most of this splendid opportunity."

But these grotesquely mixed appeals to orthodoxy and cupidity, humanity and ambition, were wasted on Shah Jahan. The Emperor was loth to ruin a brother king for merely trying to bring his disloyal wazir under discipline. Dara, who had been bribed and implored by the Golkonda envoy at Delhi,—to the intense disgust and anger of Aurangzib,—pleaded hard for Qutb-ul-mulk, and secured peace for him on the payment of an indemnity. The Emperor's letter accepting this settlement reached Aurangzib on 24th February.‡ But meantime his position at Golkonda had greatly improved. The

* Adab, 46b, 49b.
† Adab, 59a, 69b.
‡ Waris, 111b.
siege had been pressed closer; many Golkonda officers were deserting to the Mughals daily; and Abdullah was begging for permission to send his mother to Aurangzib to ask his pardon, to promise the payment of the arrears of tribute and a large indemnity, and to propose the marriage of his second daughter with Aurangzib’s eldest son. So, Aurangzib suppressed the Emperor’s letter of pardon to Qutb-ul-mulk (dated 8th February), lest it should embolden the latter and make him abate his terms. Shah Jahan, on being informed, approved of this device for extortion!*

After long entreaties and through the mediation of Shaista Khan and Muhammad Sultan, the Queen-Mother of Golkonda was allowed to visit Aurangzib’s tent and personally entreat him to spare her son. Aurangzib agreed to restore his kingdom on the payment of one krore of rupees† as indemnity and arrears of tribute, and the marriage of his daughter with the Mughal Prince. But evidently Qutb-ul-mulk objected

* Waris, 111b. Aurangzib wrote to Mir Jumla (early in March) “Qutb-ul-mulk is now craving pardon, sending his son-in-law Mir Ahmad to me, and proposing that his mother would wait on me and that his daughter would be married to my son. But I wish to send him to the wilderness of destruction.” Adab, S1a

† The amount demanded was 1¼ krores (Adab, 138b) but subsequently 25 lakhs were abated.
to the amount as too large, and there was delay in making the final settlement. In this interval no formal truce was concluded, and a shot from the fort-guns killed Mir Asadullah Bukhari, the son of the Paymaster of Aurangzib's forces.* Mir Jumla, whose arrival had been eagerly looked forward to and impatiently hurried by Aurangzib, now reached Haidarabad and waited on the Prince on 20th March, a day chosen by the astrologers as lucky for a first visit.†

In the meantime, Abdullah's agent at the Court of Delhi had bought the intercession of Dara Shukoh and of the Princess Imperial Jahanara. Through them he unfolded to the Emperor the true story of Aurangzib's manœuvreing,—how Abdullah had been tricked and almost slain by treachery, how he had not been given a fair chance of carrying out the Emperor's orders, how the Imperial farmans had been withheld from him, how Shah Jahan's kind intentions towards the suppliant ruler had been thwarted, and how an entirely false version of the whole affair had been given in the despatches of Aurangzib. At this Shah Jahan's righteous indignation boiled over. He wrote a sharp letter of censure to Aurangzib, with orders to raise the

Shah Jahan, angry at Aurangzib's trickery,

* Waris, 111b and 112a, Tavernier, i. 167.
† Adab, 81b, Waris, 112a.
siege and quit Golkonda territory at once. To add to the Prince's disgrace, the contents of this letter were not kept secret, but became the talk of the whole camp.*

So, on 30th March, in obedience to the Emperor's peremptory orders, Aurangzib raised the siege and withdrew from the environs of Golkonda. Four days afterwards Muhammad Sultan was married by proxy to the Golkonda princess, and on 10th April she was brought away from the fort to her husband's camp.

In the presence of Aurangzib's agents Abdullah Qutb Shah swore on the Quran to obey the Emperor in future, and gave them a written undertaking to the same effect under his own hand and seal. On 13th April, Aurangzib sent to Abdullah the Emperor's letter of pardon, dress of honour, and a formal agreement written by Shah Jahan himself and stamped with the impression of his palm dipped in vermilion, promising to protect Qutb Shah. At the entreaty of the Queen-Mother of Golkonda and the ladies of Aurangzib's harem, ten lakhs of rupees were remitted from the instalment of 25 lakhs of indemnity promised for that year.† Two months later Shah Jahan

* Adab, 59a, 69b, 85a. Storia, i. 235.
† Adab, 58a, 57b, 69b. Waris, 112a and b.
made a further reduction of 20 lakhs, being the accumulated difference in the exchange-value of two lakhs of hun since 1636. But the king of Golkonda, besides paying the tribute, had to cede the district of Ramgir (modern Manikdrug and Chinoor.)† The Mughal army set out on its retreat on 21st April. Marching due north from Haidarabad to Indur (now the chief town of a district of the same name in the Nizam's Dominions), Aurangzib turned westwards to Qandahar (a fort in the Nander district), and thence reached Aurangabad on 17th May. A detachment of 3,000 was left on the frontier, to pass the rainy season there and enforce the payment of the promised tribute. The officers who had joined the expedition from other provinces now returned to their own posts.‡

* Waris, 113a.
† He also gave a written promise making Muhammad Sultan his heir. Aurangzib kept it secret; but Shah Jahan afterwards learnt of it. (Adab, 191 b), Tavernier, i. 169.
‡ Waris, 112b & 113a. The route followed by Aurangzib in his retreat was:—21 April, left environs of Golkonda—22 & 23 Apr., halted at Mir Jumla's Pettah—24 Apr., reached Pettah of Qutb-ul-mulk's grandmother (probably Begampett, 17°.38 N. 78°.17 E.) and halted 25—27 Apr.,—30 April, reached the village of Indalwai on the Imperial frontier (evidently Jadalwai, 15 m. s. e. s. of Indur), where a force of 3,000 troopers was left under Shah Beg,—2 May reached Indur, 18°.40 N. 78°.10E.—5 May, reached Qandahar, 17°.55 N. 77°.15 E.—6—8 May, Aurangzib made
Mir Jumla had come to Aurangzib's camp at Golkonda on 20th March more as a prince than as a noble. Six thousand cavalry, 15,000 infantry, 150 elephants, and a very good train of artillery accompanied him.* The presents he made to Aurangzib and his sons were worth several lakhs. Summoned immediately to the Imperial Court, he arrived at Delhi on 7th July and presented the Emperor with articles worth 15 lakhs, including a big diamond weighing 216 ratis. He was at once created a Commander of Six Thousand and appointed Prime Minister in the place of Sadullah Khan lately deceased.†

Aurangzib had returned from the siege of Golkonda with his greed of territory unsated and his heart sore against his father. The expedition renewed his wrangles with the Emperor. An exaggerated account of the looting of Haidarabad had reached Delhi. It was also represented to Shah Jahan, probably by the Golkonda envoy, that Aurangzib and his sons had taken costly

a digression to Udgir, while the army pursued its course under M. Sultan,—9 May, Aurangzib rejoined the army on the bank of the Dudhna river,—17 May, reached Aurangabad.

† Waris, 112b, 114a, 118a.
presents from Qutb Shah, without mentioning the fact in his despatches or setting their price off from the tribute due. Against this charge Aurangzib indignantly protested that the presents he had received were few and too poor to deserve mention to the Emperor.* Further, he complained that Shah Jahan had not kept his promise as to sharing the Golkonda indemnity with him, so that the Viceroy of the Deccan was poorer than before as the result of the war. As a financial speculation, the raid on Haidarabad had proved a failure to Aurangzib. For the last six months his soldiers’ pay had been in arrears and he had besides borrowed large sums to equip his force for the war. “At the outset of this expedition, His Majesty had written to me that out of Qutb-ul-mulk’s indemnity the jewels and elephants should belong to the Government, and the cash to me....But now the entire Golkonda indemnity has been taken by the Emperor and placed in Daulatabad treasury. How can I repay my debt for the war and the arrears of my army, about 20 lakhs of rupees?”† The presents received from Golkonda had, he said, been exaggerated into “chest-loads of jewels” by malicious

* Adab, 84b, 85a, 107a & b, 192b.
† Adab, 84b, 190a & b.
reporters at the Imperial Court. The elephants offered by Abdullah were unsound and of low price, and the diamonds dark and full of flaws. So Aurangzib had, as he explained, at first refused to accept them, and at last taken them at the entreaty of the Qutb Shahi agent and on the distinct understanding that the Imperial tribute should not suffer a deduction to the amount of their price. There was no element of concealment in the transaction; the presents had been received openly and shown to Mir Jumla and other nobles, Aurangzib had even intended that after returning to his headquarters he would send to the Emperor all the presents received by him, with other gems purchased with the indemnity, and more than 100 elephants in one grand collection. But before he could carry out this purpose, which would have necessarily taken time,—nay more, even before his return from Golkonda, the Emperor had ordered him to send all the presents and indemnity of Qutb Shah to Court at once. Such indecent haste implied that he feared lest Aurangzib should retain any thing or that any portion of it would disappear! "Why," the Prince asked indignantly, "should I grudge to give up a few jewels to His Majesty, when my life itself is at his service?" In disgust he sent all that he and his son had received to
the Emperor with a request either to keep them or return them to Qutb Shah. Aurangzib would have nothing to do with them.*

Peace had been made with Golkonda, but one subject of discord remained open. Qutb Shah wanted to keep the Karnatak, and with justice: it had been won by his servant and formed part of his kingdom. But Aurangzib objected, saying that it was Mir Jumla's personal jagir and referred the matter to the Emperor.† He coveted that rich and large province, and had secured the cession of Ramgir (between the Painganga and the Godavari) to bring the Mughal province of Telingana closer to the Northern Karnatak, and to secure a route for the passing of his armies from the one to the other without having to traverse a wide area of Golkonda territory.‡

Qutb Shah intrigued hard to retain the rich province; his agent at Delhi interceded with

* Adab, 84b-85b, 1926, Aurangzib's letters to Shah Jahan stop suddenly during the siege of Golkonda. The last was written shortly after 9th Feb. 1656. In future he corresponds with his father through the wasir. Was this the result of strained feelings? I think this explanation improbable. He, however confesses (in a letter to Mir Jumla, written in July, 1656) that he has plenty of reasons to be mortified and angry. (Adab, 193b).

† Adab, 58 a & b.

‡ Adab, 159b (inference).
Dara; he promised a fresh offering of 15 lakhs as the price of the Karnatak being left to him.*

But Aurangzib counter-intrigued through Mir Jumla; he appealed to the Emperor's cupidity by pointing out the immense richness of the Karnatak,—its diamond mines, its fertile valleys, its hoards of buried treasure of old Hindu dynasties. It was, as he wrote, "equal to the kingdom of Golkonda itself in wealth and extent." Mir Jumla, too, spoke from personal knowledge more fully about the vast resources and wealth of the province.† At last he prevailed; the Emperor decided to hold the Karnatak in his own hands as Mir Jumla's jagir, and Qutb Shah was ordered to recall his officers from that province.‡ Mughal armies under Shah Beg Khan, Qazi Muhammad Hashim and Krishna Rao, entered the Karnatak, but the Golkonda officers (especially Abdul Jabbar) were loth to yield the rich prey. They lingered there and threw every difficulty in the path of the

* Adab, 59a, 61a.
† Adab, 46b, 59a.
‡ Adab, 59b, 60a, 87a. As Aurangzib wrote with unconscious cynicism to Abdullah, "I had urged you to present all your costly jewels and precious things to the Emperor in order to gain his entire favour. But you did not follow my advice. Mir Jumla, on the other hand, on reaching the Court gave him valuable gems and so carried his point. You cannot now recall the lost opportunity!" (Adab-i-Alamgiri, 61a).
Mughals in occupying and settling the country. They even incited Sri Ranga Rayal and other zamindars to recover their lost possessions. During the next two years we frequently read of Aurangzib rebuking Qutb Shah for this disloyalty and double-dealing.*

Qutb Shah took advantage of the confusion caused by the Bijapur War and Shah Jahan's illness, to keep hold of some forts and districts of the Karnatak in opposition to Mir Jumla's agents. Aurangzib had to threaten him severely, "The Karnatak belongs to Mir Jumla, and is a part of the empire. Banish from your mind all thought of keeping it. You donot listen to me yet!... Why are you trying in vain to keep it? Recall your officers and troops from the province, or... I shall send Mir Jumla with a vast army to chastise you and annex your kingdom."† During the War of Succession, Qutb-ul-mulk made further progress and wrested Gandikota and Sidhout from Mir Jumla's men.‡ It was only after he had firmly seated himself on the throne of Delhi that Aurangzib could enforce the complete surrender of the Karnatak.

* Adab, 90a, 196a, 61b, 62b, 63b, 69a, 87b, 161a.
† Adab, 67a, 89a.
‡ Adab, 67a.
Sri Ranga Rayal, the last nominal king of the Vijaynagar line, saw his dominions slipping out of his grasp as the Bijapuris advanced conquering the Karnataka from the south and the Golkonda generals from the north. He lost Jinji to the former and Chandragiri to the latter, and was practically driven out of both the Arcot districts. As early as 1653 he had sent an agent named Rama Rao to Aurangzib, to seek the Imperial protection against the Deccani Sultans. But the Viceroy of the Deccan did not interfere, possibly because the Karnataka was too far off, and matters were not yet ripe for putting pressure on Golkonda. In the course of the next two years the Rajah was driven to extremities. In a short time he would be utterly dispossessed of his lands. He sent another confidential agent, a Brahman named Srinivas, to Aurangzib, desperately crying for the protection of his dominions on any terms: he would deliver 2½ krores of rupees, two hundred elephants, and all his hoarded jewels, to the Emperor, he would promise an annual tribute, he would agree to his kingdom being annexed to the empire and then given back to him as a mere jagir. Nay more, "if Shah Jahan's grace should be reluctant to fall on him on account of his being a misbe-
liever,"* the Rajah promised to turn Muslim with all his relatives and dependents! Only he must be saved from the two Deccani Sultans; his territory should no longer be seized by them.†

The action taken on this petition throws a lurid light on the character of Mughal rule in India. Aurangzib proposed to send an officer of his to the Karnatak to enquire into the Rajah's capacity to keep his profuse promises. Shah Jahan disallowed the deputation, but ordered Aurangzib, "after frightening the two Sultans of the Deccan, to get from them a good sum" as the price of refusing protection to Sri Ranga. That is, the lion agreed to look on with indifference, if only the two wolves gave him a big slice of their prey. Hearing of

*Aurangzib's plan of securing a share of the Karnatak booty from Bijapur and Golkonda by pretending to protect the Rajah.

* Shah Jahan was a bigot. His early hatred of Christians had been noticed by Sir Thomas Roe (Kerr, ix. 262). After his accession he grew averse to giving high posts to Rajputs. (Adab, 29a). The demolition of Hindu temples and desecration of idols mark his reign only to a less extent than his son's. He refused to release Rajah Indradyumna of Dhamdhera (Malwa) from prison for a ransom of Rs. 50,000, and insisted on his turning Muslim as the price of his liberation, though Aurangzib himself pleaded for the abatement of this last condition lest it should hinder his taking possession of his estate and collecting the promised tribute. (Adab, 99b, 37a, M. U. ii. 265 et seq.). In Kashmir Shah Jahan forcibly suppressed the old custom of marriage between Hindus and Muhammadans. (Abdul Hamid, I. B. 57.)

† Adab, 33b, 34b.
these negotiations with the Mughal viceroy, the Bijapuri generals pressed their attack, captured the fort of Vellore, "the best in the Karnatak," and tried to seize the Rajah's elephants. The helpless Sri Ranga importuned the Mughals for help before all was over with him. But Aurangzib played with the miserable suppliant as an angler does with a fish. Outwardly he appointed one of his officers, Muhammad Mumin, to go to the Karnatak, but wrote to Shah Jahan, "My real object in doing so is to secure a handsome present from Bijapur at this opportunity." Both the Deccani Sultans, he exultingly adds, "are alarmed at the appointment of Muhammad Mumin. We shall use this posting as a screw to get out of them what they looted from the Karnatak and kept concealed. Please do not write to the Bijapur king before this business (of exacting a present) is brought to completion."

He had already instructed his envoy at Bijapur to give the Sultan to understand that if he offered a satisfactory present to the Emperor, Muhammad Mumin would be recalled, and Imperial help refused to the Rajah of the Karnatak.*

Sri Ranga Rayal was thus left to his fate. Crushed between Bijapur and Golkonda, he lost

* Adab, 44a & b, 34b, 54b—55b.
his all and clung only to some petty estates which were too poor to tempt Muslim cupidity or too difficult of access to his aggressors. We hear of him again in 1657 and 1658 as trying to recover some of his former lands,* when Aurangzib's attention was diverted from the Karnataka by the invasion of Bijapur and the War of Succession. His last appearance on the stage of history was about 1661, when he lent the prestige of his name to his vassal, the chief of Bednur, in a fruitless invasion of Mysore.†

Aurangzib's treatment of the Rajah of the Karnataka and his cynical avowal of his utterly sordid motives throughout the transaction, has a deep political significance. To the historian whose eyes are not dazzled by the Peacock Throne, the Taj Mahal, and other examples of outward glitter, this episode (with many others of the same kind) proves that the Mughal empire was only a thinly veiled system of brigandage. If explains why the Indian princes, no less than the Indian people, so readily accepted England's suzerainty.

* Adab, 63a, 90a (not definite).
† S. Krishnaswami Aiyangar's Ancient India, 297, Sewell, 54.
APPENDIX I.

Did Aurangzib capture Haidarabad by treachery?

Aqil Khan Razi (12 & 13) tells the following story of Aurangzib having falsely thrown Qutb-ul-mulk off his guard just before the raid on his capital, "Aurangzib wrote to Qutb-ul-mulk, 'As my son Sultan Muhammad is going to Bengal [to marry Shuja's daughter], he wishes to march there by way of Orissa. I hope you will give him assistance and let him pass through your territory.' That simpleton at once consented, and made preparations for showing hospitality to the Prince....When the Prince, with military equipment and war material, arrived near Haidarabad, the king's eyes were opened, and he fled for refuge to the fort of Golkonda." Bernier (p. 20) and Manucci (Storia, i. 234) but not Tavernier, tell a similar tale. But the authentic records quoted in this chapter disprove the story. Qutb-ul-mulk could have been under no misapprehension as to Muhammad Sultan's hostile intentions after receiving Aurangzib's letter of 18th December, (Adab, 57a); and the fact of his releasing Muhammad Amin some days before Sultan reached Haidarabad shows that he knew why the Prince was coming.

Aurangzib, as his instructions to his son clearly prove, wished the young Prince to murder the Golkonda king during an interview, in the manner described in this chapter. Therein lay his treachery.
CHAPTER XI.

War with Bijapur, 1657.

The treaty of 1636 had turned the king of Bijapur into a friendly ally of the Emperor of Delhi, but left his sovereignty unimpaired. He had not become a vassal prince, nor bound himself to pay an annual tribute. On the other hand, he had been formally confirmed in the possession of a large portion of the territory of the extinct royal house of Ahmadnagar, the whole of which the Mughals had once claimed.* Secure from his mighty neighbour on the north, the Bijapur Sultan began to extend his dominions westwards into the Konkan, southwards into Mysore, and eastwards into the Karnatak. The principality of Ikkeri (or Bednur, in N. W. Mysore), had been raided in 1635 at the invitation of a local faction, and a heavy fine of 30 lakhs of hun imposed on its

* Chapter III.
Rajah, Virabhadra Nayak. Two years later the invasion was renewed and the Nayak deposed.* Shortly afterwards, a vast Bijapuri army, numbering 40,000 and led by the famous general Randaulah Khan, took Sira, Bangalore, and the country north of the Kaveri (1639), and then, advancing eastwards into the Karnatak, went on capturing forts and cities for many years. In 1647, the entire Bijapur army under Mustafa Khan, the foremost noble of the State, repeated the invasion, but met with stubborn opposition at first. In a great battle fought east of Bangalore,† the impetuous valour of an Abyssinian general, Malik Raihan, saved from destruction the lives of the Bijapur troops and the honour of their king: the famous Hindu general Vailuar was routed and his master's cause ruined. Finally starvation opened the impregnable fortress of Jinji to Bijapur arms (17th December 1649), and the whole Southern Karnatak lay open to the Muslims. The prize thus secured was most splendid; besides the


† In the Persian manuscripts of the Basatin-i-salatin, the place of this encounter is indistinctly written like "Antur, between Bangalore and Masti." There is a Wantur, n. e. of Bangalore. Both Attur and Vellore are too far off.
vast rich and fertile territory annexed, the treasure captured was valued at four *krores* of *hun.* Westwards, a Bijapur force invaded the Portuguese territory of Goa and Salsette (August 1654) with some success.† In short, in the reign of Muhammad Adil Shah (1626—56) the kingdom of Bijapur attained to its highest extent, power, and magnificence. His dominion stretched from the Arabian Sea to the Bay of Bengal, across the entire Indian Peninsula.

Ever since 1636, Muhammad Adil Shah had lived at peace with the Emperor of Delhi, and we read of friendly exchanges of presents between the two Courts.‡ This Sultan’s good name for piety, love of justice, and care for his subjects,—which was heightened by a certain simplicity of understanding and ignorance of the world,—greatly pleased Shah Jahan. The Emperor recognised the merits of the king and the increased power of the kingdom by addressing him as *Shah* or King

* Basatin-i-salatin, 305—308, 311.
† D'Anvers’s *Portuguese in India*, ii. 308 and 309.
‡ Abdul Hamid. *Waris*, 90 a, 98b, 101a, 113b, 117b, (in these passages the word *peshkash* is used, but evidently in the sense of ‘present’ and not in that of ‘tribute’).
(1648),—whereas the former sovereigns of Delhi, in their pride of suzerainty, had styled the rulers of Bijapur as mere Khans or Lords. Some years afterwards, differences had arisen between the two.† Adil Shah displeased Shah Jahan by departing from the practice of his ancestors in as much as he held Court in a lofty palace outside his citadel and witnessed elephant-combats in an open plain beyond the fort instead of within it, and lastly by conferring the title of Khan-i-khanan on his premier noble. These acts were taken to imply a presumptuous assumption of the prerogatives of the Emperor and rivalry with the Court of Delhi. Shah Jahan wrote him a letter of rebuke, sharply telling him to return to the ways of his forefathers, or a Delhi army would visit his dominion. The letter was discussed in full Court. The captains of Bijapur rattled their sabres and cried out, "Let them come on! We too are ready and eager for such a day. We shall be glad to measure our swords with the blades of

* Basatin-i-salatin, 324 and 325. Aurangzib refers to the granting of this title in a letter written to Shah Jahan in September 1654 (Adab, 44a.)

† In October 1652, also, Shah Jahan was angry with the Bijapur king for some reason unknown to us. (Adab, 22a.)
Hindustan.” A haughty reply was delivered to the Delhi envoy.

With the night came a change. A charming story is told,* how the king was amusing himself with his chiefs and favourites on the lofty terraced roof of his palace, under the moonlit sky. Hours rolled on in delight. At midnight, when all other hearts were sunk in pleasure, the pensive king turned his ears to the City of Bijapur and heard only sounds of revelry coming from it on the night wind. “What does the City say, Afzal Khan Ji?” he asked of his favourite general. “It is only singing the praise of your Majesty’s love of justice and care for your subjects and praying for your long life, so that the people may continue to enjoy the same peace, plenty and happiness.” The pleased king asked again, “What will be the result if we encounter the forces of Delhi?” The reply was, “Only lamentation and grief will be heard in the place of these joyous sounds. Whichever side may win, every house will mourn some Adil Shah yields. * Basatin-i-salatin, 324–326. For another quarrel connected with the Imperial dignity, Adab, 406b.
reply back and sent in its stead a letter of apology and submission to Delhi. This long and prosperous reign of 30 years ended with his death at the age of 47 (on 4th Nov. 1656),* and the danger he had successfully averted fell on his kingdom.

But before we can proceed to the troubled history of his successor, it is necessary to take up the thread of our narrative where we dropped it at the end of the last chapter.

When returning from the Golkonda expedition Aurangzib had sent Mir Jumla off to the Imperial Court (7th May), to fill the high post of prime minister. In the meantime he had completely won Mir Jumla over to his interests, and the Mir’s arrival at Delhi (7th July, 1656) secured the triumph of Aurangzib’s policy of aggression in the Emperor’s council.† Mir Jumla’s presents, matchless diamonds, rubies and topazes, dazzled the eyes of the Emperor and brought about the downfall of the peace party under Dara Shukoh. The land whence these jewels came was worth annexing!

* The glories of the reign are described in detail in the Basatin-i-salatin, 304—345, especially 329—331.
† Waris, 113a (Mir Jumla took leave of Aurangzib at Indur on 3 May, and left that place for Delhi four days afterwards), 114 a. Adab, 83a, 205b. Storia, i. 239.
The late wazir of Golkonda knew all the secrets of the Deccani Courts, the ins and outs of the land, and the exact prices of all the chief officers of Qutb Shah and Adil Shah.* Therefore, as an authority on Deccan questions he was unapproached by any other courtier of Shah Jahan. His expert knowledge was now utilised in intriguing at the Deccani Courts and seducing their officers. With Mir Jumla dominating the Emperor's counsels, Aurangzib confidently matured the plan of invading Bijapur on the expected death of its reigning king who was lingering on the bed of illness. The Mir, as one fully conversant with the country, was urged by Aurangzib to return to him as quickly as possible, "in order that this opportunity might not slip away."

On 4th November, 1656, Muhammad Adil Shah, the seventh of the royal line of Bijapur, died. Through the efforts of his chief minister, Khan Muhammad, and the Queen, Bari Sahiba,

* Adab, 49b.

† Adab, 88a and b, 91a and b, 191a (Aurangzib thanks Mir Jumla for having supported him against Dara). (Aurangzib planned the invasion of Bijapur even before the death of its king, Adab, 88a). Aqil Khan, 15, and Manucci (i. 239) assert that Mir Jumla induced Shah Jahan to sanction the invasion of Bijapur.
a sister of the Golconda king, the crown was placed on the head of Ali Adil Shah II, a youth of 18 years, and the only son of the late king. The news reached Aurangzib on 10th November, and he immediately wrote to Shah Jahan, urging an invasion on the plea that Ali was not really a son of the deceased Sultan, but a boy of obscure parentage whom Muhammad Adil Shah had brought up in the harem. In anticipation of the Emperor's orders, he massed his troops on the Bijapur frontier, and proposed to go himself to Ahmadnagar to be nearer to the point of attack.*

The death of Muhammad Adil Shah was followed by disorder in the Rebellion and disorder in the Karnatak he had conquered. The zamindars recovered much of their former lands, and the Bijapuri officers were driven to the shelter of the forts. Shahji Bhonsla disobeyed his new master, and set up for himself. At the capital things were even worse. Bijapuri nobles had never been kept under proper control by their king, and had been wont to regard themselves as their own masters.

* Adab, 88b, 60b, 145a, 132b. (Aurangzib writes to Khwajah Abdul Ghaffar that he invaded Bijapur for the good of the people, as the late king had left no heir!) Basatin-i-salatin, 326, 347. Waris, 118a. There was even a talk of Shah Jahan going to the Deccan to direct the operations. (Adab, 89b).
They now quarrelled with one another and with the prime minister Khan Muhammad for the division of power.* To aggravate the evil, Aurangzib intrigued with them, and succeeded in corrupting most of them. "I am trying my utmost," he writes to Mir Jumla, "to win the Bijapur army over, for then the chiefs of that country will join us of their own accord." Randaulah Khan's son and several other leading men of the Court promised their adhesion and prepared to desert to the Mughal territory with their troops. After they had reached him Aurangzib hoped to seduce the others with the aid of Mir Jumla. So, he sent Rs. 20,000 to Multafat Khan, the governor of Ahmadnagar, the nearest point on the Mughal frontier towards Bijapur, with instructions to distribute it among the deserters: every Bijapuri captain who brought a hundred men to the muster was to get Rs. 2,000 out of the local treasury, (evidently after the above sum had been spent). The governor was ordered to welcome and conciliate every arrival from Bijapur, even when he was not a captain of known position and importance.† An envoy from Shivaji waited on Aurangzib proposing the

* Adab, 89b, 91a.
† Adab, 91a, 145a & b, 146b.
terms on which the Maratha chieftain was willing to co-operate with the Mughals by making a diversion in the Bijapuri Konkan. He received in reply a letter of vague promises.*

On 26th November Shah Jahan sanctioned the invasion and gave Aurangzib a free hand to “settle the affair of Bijapur in any way he thought fit.”† At the same time orders were sent to Shaista Khan, the Governor of Malwa, to hasten to Aurangabad and hold it during Aurangzib’s absence in the war. A force of 20,000 troopers, partly from the Court and partly from the jagirs, with a large staff of officers, was despatched to reinforce the army of the Deccan. Lastly Mir Jumla himself, with most of the officers and a portion of the troops ordered, was sent (1st December) to join Aurangzib.‡

The Emperor’s instructions to his son were, first to march with Mir Jumla to the Bijapur frontier and conquer the whole of the kingdom, if possible; otherwise, to annex that portion of the old Ahmadnagar kingdom which had

* Adab, 144b (about July 1656), 146a (about February or March 1657).
† Waris, 118a, Adab, 90a.
‡ Waris, 118a and b, (list of officers sent to the Deccan.) Adab, 118a (Mir Jumla takes leave of the Emperor on 26th November, but actually starts from Delhi on 1st December).
been ceded to Bijapur by the treaty of 1636, and to spare the territory of Bijapur proper on the payment of an indemnity of \( r_\frac{1}{2} krores \) of rupees and the recognition of the Emperor's suzerainty,—viz., the issuing of coins in his name and the public reading of his titles from the pulpit at Bijapur. If the latter alternative was carried out, Aurangzib was to employ the vast army assembled under his banner in the conquest of Golkonda. The Prince, however, was keen upon conquering Bijapur first; "I want to put off the conquest of Golkonda, which can be seized at any time we like."*

The war thus sanctioned was wholly unrighteous. Bijapur was not a vassal State, but an independent and equal ally of the Mughal Emperor, and the latter had no lawful right to confirm or question the succession at Bijapur. The true reason of the Mughal interference was the helplessness of its boy-king and the discord among his officers, which presented a fine "opportunity" for annexation, as Aurangzib expressed it.†

* Adab, 90a, 196b.
† Adab, 88a, 91b. Grant Duff, i. 155. The Bijapur historian thus points out the wickedness of the Mughals, "After the death of Muhammad Adil Shah, Aurangzib invaded Bijapur, in violation of the treaty and solemn agreement between the Mughals and Bijapur, and though Shah Jahan [the maker of the treaty] was alive." Basatin-i-salatin, 348.
Aurangzib impatiently waited for Mir Jumla's coming and pressed him to hasten his movements. "Let not such an opportunity (viz., the revolt and dissension among the Bijapur officers) slip away. Come quickly, so that we may both start together." It was of no use waiting for the rest of the reinforcements ordered from Northern India. Several officers were slow to leave their jagirs, in spite of strong letters from the Emperor urging them on; and Aurangzib could not expect to get the whole additional force of 20,000 men before 19th February 1657.*

Mir Jumla arrived at Aurangabad on 18th January, and that very day at the auspicious hour chosen by the astrologers, the Prince set out with him to invade Bijapur.†

As he was encumbered with heavy artillery and siege materials, his movement was very slow; 240 miles were covered in 43 days. On 28th February, he reached the environs of Bidar, and laid siege to the fort on 2nd March.‡

A short distance south of the Mughal frontier fort of Udgir and across the Manjira river lies

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* Adab, 90b—92a, 195b.
† Adab, 92a, 109b, 145b, 118a, 196b. Kambu, 2b.
‡ Kambu, 2b, (both MSS. wrongly give 14 days instead of one month and 14 days, as the time taken by the march.) Adab, 109b, 146a, 118b.
the city of Bidar. It is large and well peopled, and the remains of fine buildings speak of its ancient grandeur. Tradition connects it with the father of Damayanti, the devoted wife of Rajah Nala, who flourished in the mythical age of the Mahabharat. Coming down to historic times, we find that Bidar* was captured by Muhammad Tughlaq in the 14th century, and became successively the capital of the Bahmani Sultans and of the short-lived Barid Shahi dynasty, both of whom adorned it with fine palaces, tombs and mosques, as memorials of their greatness. The glory of the city is the magnificent college, built by Mahmud Gawan, the famous minister of the Bahmanis (1478). On the extinction of the Barid Shahi kings, Bidar passed into the hands of Bijapur.

The city stands on a high plateau, 2330 feet above sea-level. A wall with a dry ditch and glacis surrounds the city itself, and bastions rising at various points of the wall add to its defensive power. The fort or citadel, finished in 1432 and occupying the eastern face of the city,

* This account of Bidar is based on Kambu, 26 and 3a, Adab, 146a, Dilkasha, 14, Burgess's Bidar and Aurangabad Districts, 42—44, and Imp. Gaz. viii. 170.
is of immense strength. Its wall is 4500 yards in circuit and 12 yards in height. Three separate ditches each 25 yards wide and 15 yards deep, cut in the solid rock, surround the citadel, which contains many palaces, mosques, Turkish baths, a mint, arsenal, magazine, and other public edifices built of trap but now in ruin. The only entrance is a zigzag passage from the southwest, protected by three gateways. On the bastions stood several guns, one of them being 23 feet long with a 19 inch bore. In the age before modern artillery, Bidar was rightly held to be impregnable to assault.

Aurangzib's opponent at the siege* was Siddi Marjan, an Abyssinian who had held the fort for Bijapur for thirty years, and had collected abundance of materials of defence and a garrison of 1000 horse, and 4000 foot, including musketeers, gunners, and rocket-men. Inspite of a fierce fire from the fort walls, the Mughal sappers worked hard in the inspiring presence of their chief, and in two days carried the trenches to the edge of the moat. Then they began to fill up the ditch. Siddi Marjan offered a stout defence: he made several sorties, and falling on the trenches tried to arrest

* For the history of the siege, Kambu, 2b—3a, Dilkasha, 15, Adab, 109b—110a, 119b, 122a, 127a, 146a.
the progress of the siege. But the superior numbers of the Mughals told in the end, and Mir Jumla's fine train of artillery did great damage to the fort walls; two towers were demolished, and the battlements of the lower-most wall as well as the outer breast-works were levelled to the ground.

The ditch having been filled up, the assault was delivered on 29th March.

Muhammad Murad, at the head of a select party, sallied out of his trenches, rushed to the foot of the tower opposite Mir Jumla's post, and planting ladders scaled the wall. An accident favoured the assailants. Siddi Marjan, with his sons and troops, was standing close to the tower ready to repel the attack. But a spark from a rocket thrown by the Mughals fell into a chamber of gunpowder and grenades behind the tower. There was a terrific explosion. Marjan was mortally wounded with two of his sons and many of his followers. The garrison, appalled by the disaster, carried their dying chief to the citadel, while the exulting Mughals swarmed out of all their trenches and rushed into the city, driving the remnant of the defenders back with fearful slaughter. Behind them came Aurangzib himself, with his banners waving and his drums beating a victorious note,
and took possession of the city. The Mughals closely followed the retreating garrison and took possession of the gate of the citadel. But the fall of their leader had taken the heart out of the defenders. In response to the Mughal call to surrender and promise of quarter, Siddi Marjan from his deathbed sent his seven sons to Aurangzib with the keys of the fort.

Thus, the stronghold of Bidar, hitherto reputed impregnable throughout India, fell into the hands of Aurangzib after a siege of 27 days only. Among the spoils of victory were 12 lakhs of rupees in cash, 8 lakhs worth of powder, shot, grain and other stores, besides 230 pieces of cannon. Well might Aurangzib exult over such a victory. Well might he boast to Shivaji, "The fort of Bidar, which was accounted impregnable, and which is the key to the conquest of the Deccan and Karnatak, has been captured by me in one day, both fort and town, which was scarcely to have been expected without one year's fighting."*

* Quoted in Grant Duff, i. 157n. This passage is referred to in a letter of Shivaji to the Mughal officers in 1665 (Khatut-i-Shivaji, 2). There is a similar boast in Aurangzib's letters to Nasiri Khan and Abdul Ghaffar, (Adab, 132b, 130b).
On Wednesday, 1st April, Siddi Marjan succumbed to his burns. Aurangzib again visited the city and fort, and had the Emperor's titles publicly read out from the pulpit of the grand mosque built by the Bahmani Sultans two centuries earlier.

Meanwhile the Bijapuris had made some feeble attempts to relieve Bidar. A force under Khan Muhammad, their prime minister, had been advancing towards it during the siege; but it had evidently retreated without striking a blow.* After the fall of the fort, Aurangzib learnt that a large Bijapuri army was being mobilised near Kulbarga. Their light troopers arrived within six miles of the Mughal camp and carried off some of the transport oxen that were grazing there. So, Aurangzib sent a force of 15,000 well mounted and experienced troopers under Mahabat Khan, to punish the assembled enemy and ravage the Bijapur territory up to Kaliani in the west and Kulbarga in the south, "leaving no vestige of cultivation in that tract." In his march southwards from Kaliani, the Mughal general encountered the enemy on 12th April. The Bijapuris, numbering some 20,000, under their famous

* Adab, 146a.
chiefs Khan Muhammad, Afzal Khan, and the sons of Randaulah and Raihan,

Battle of 12th April.

began the attack. Mahabat Khan, leaving his baggage and camp behind, advanced with the Van. The fiercest onslaught was delivered on the Mughal Right under Dilir Khan. The Bijapuris kept up a hot fire of rockets and muskets from all sides, but, as was their wont, did not engage at close quarters. A counter-charge on the enemy's Centre produced no lasting effect on the illusive Deccanis. Mahabat Khan like a good general kept his men well in hand, amidst the ring of his enemies and their distracting mode of attack. Finding his Right Wing hard pressed, he charged the enemy with his own followers; the Bijapuris fled without standing the shock, and the Mughal general chased them for four miles; but evidently he found his position insecure, as on the 14th he fell back on Bhalki, without waiting for the reinforcements sent under Najabat Khan.*

* Kambu, 3a and b, (for the battle of 12th April).

Adab, 125a and b, (Aurangzib's instructions of 13th April to Mahabat Khan), 120a (Najabat Khan sent on 5th April to reinforce Mahabat). Najabat Khan's force is given as 10,000 on 125a and as 2,000 on 120a; the latter is more likely. Aurangzib's instruction was that the two generals should unite south of Kaliani and advance to attack Chidgupa. But on Mahabat Khan's retreating northwards to Bhalki, he ordered them to meet near fort Nilanga and try to capture it by corrupting the qiladar through his
Forty miles west of Bidar, on the old road from the holy shrine of Tuljapur to Golkonda, stands the city of KALIANI, the ancient capital of the Chalukya kings and of the Kanarese country. With the fall of the Kalachuris in the twelfth century, it ceased to be a capital, and afterwards passed into the hands of the Deccani Muslim powers as a mere dependency of Bidar. But the large mounds surrounding the town indicate its greater extent in days of yore.

Mahabat Khan having cleared the road of hovering bands of the enemy, Aurangzib on 27th April set out with light kit and arrived before Kaliani in a week's time. The place was immediately invested, and through Mir Jumla's exertions and supervision the siege trenches were pushed on to the edge of the ditch by 11th May. Day and night the garrison kept up a ceaseless fire from the walls; they made fierce onsloughts on Mir Jumla's trenches, but to no purpose. The bands of the enemy roving outside gave greater trouble and retarded the siege. They established

brother Mamaji (or Nanaji) Deshmukh, who had made overtures to the Mughals. The attempt failed. (Adab, 125b, 126b-127a).

* Burgess, 23, 37, 38.
† For the siege of Kaliani, Kambu, 3b—5a. Adab (very meagre, no detail) 113a, 139a, 149b, 156b.
themselves four miles from the besiegers' camp and molested them at night by the discharge of rockets, the favourite fire-arm of the Deccanis and especially of the Marathas. Expert in partisan warfare, they effectually closed the path for the coming of provisions and couriers. The Mughal army could not be fed unless its food supply was sent under strong escort. Once Mahabat Khan himself on escort duty was hemmed round by the enemy at a place 10 miles north-east of Kaliani. The small Mughal detachment of 2,000 was outnumbered as ten to one, but stood its ground heroically. The battle raged long and fiercely. "The field was obscured by the smoke of artillery and muskets, and the dust raised by horses' hoofs. Fathers could not look after their sons," as the Mughal annalist writes. The brunt of the battle fell on the Rajputs. The horsemen of Khan Muhammad burst in vain upon the granite wall of Rao Chhatra Sal and his Hada clansmen. Rajah Rai Singh Sisodia, assaulted by the sons of Bahlol Khan of Bijapur, was wounded and unhorsed in the press of the enemy. Sivaram, the captain of the Maharana's contingent, was slain with many followers of Rai Singh. Barhamdeo and others, as is the wont of Rajputs in desperate straits, dismounted, drew
their swords, and flung themselves in reckless fury on the enemy, vowed to slay and be slain. Just then relief arrived: a charge by Mahabat Khan broke the enemy’s ranks and they fled. Sujan Singh Sisodia and others of his party, though severely wounded, had not quit the field. Ikhlas Khan, the leader of the Mughal Van, had been wounded during the Mughal victory; heavy loss of onset, but inspite of it he had held his ground and even driven back Afzal Khan’s division which was opposed to him. The obstinate struggle raged till an hour after nightfall, when the enemy withdrew,* and the hard-pressed Mughals at last got the respite they sorely needed.

Aurangzib concentrated his efforts on pressing the siege hard and capturing Kaliani as quickly as he had done Bidar. He, therefore, at first paid no attention to the Bijapuri army assembled only four miles from his camp. This emboldened them to acts of greater audacity. A force of 30,000 enemies posted only an hour’s journey from his camp could no longer be neglected. So, he cunningly announced that his army would proceed to Bhalki in the north-east to bring in provisions; but on 28th May, leav-

* Kambu, 4a.
ing a screen of tents round the fort, he marched with the main body of his troops upon the enemy's position.

The sons of Bahlol Khan attacked the Mughal Van under Mir Jumla and Dilir Khan and fought with valour and obstinacy for some time. Dilir Khan received some sword-cuts, but his armour saved him from harm. The battle soon became general. All divisions of the two armies were engaged with their respective opponents. The fight raged for six hours. The Deccanis kept up a running fight, in their customary manner: four times in succession were they broken and as often did they form again and face the advancing Mughals, regardless of their thinned ranks. But at last the repeated charges of the northern horse prevailed in the close fight; the Mughal army crowded upon them from left and right, and scattered them finally: their whole army fled in confusion; the Imperialists pursued them pell-mell to their camp, slaying and capturing all that they could. Everything found in the Bijapuri camp,—arms, slave-girls, horses, transport-cattle, and all kinds of property,—was plundered; and the tents were burnt down. In the evening Aurangzib returned
to his trenches before Kaliani, his brows adorned with victory.*

The siege was pressed with vigour, but the defence by the Abyssinian Progress of the Dilawwar was equally heroic.

The sap had reached the moat on 11th May, and by the 23rd of the month three-fourths of the ditch had been filled up, under the guidance of Mir Jumla, with thorny plants. The garrison, by hurling down lighted gunpowder and burning naphtha and grass, reduced these plants to ashes; the work of bridging the ditch had to be begun anew; the assault was delayed. Stones and earth were now thrown into the ditch, but progress in this task was necessarily slow. During this period of enforced idleness detachments from the besieging army were usefully employed in capturing the forts of Nilanga and Chincholy.†—

Since their defeat in the great battle of 28th May, the Bijapuris had not interfered with the siege for nearly two months. At the end of

* For the battle of 28th May, Kambu, 4b, Adab, 112a, 147b, 154b. In his letters Aurangzib speaks of the Bijapuris generally as Zangis or Negroes. The context shows that the term is merely used by way of abuse, and does not mean any Negro corps in the service of Bijapur.

† Kambu, 5a.
this interval, having repaired their losses they began to assemble in order to oppose the Mughals. So, on 22nd July, Aurangzib sent a large division under his eldest son and Mir Jumla to break up their forces before they could gain formidable strength. This Mughal corps advanced forty-eight miles, and then, sighting the enemy’s camp at a distance, charged and broke their formation, and pursued them for four miles. The victors proceeded, laying the Bijapuri villages waste with fire and sword, and leaving no vestige of habitation or tillage in their path. They reached the unprotected hamlet near the fort of Kulbarga, the old Bahmani capital, where they reverently spared the tomb of Syed Gisu Daraz, a famous saint of Southern India.*

At last the end of the siege came in sight; the ditch was filled up with stone and mud, the parapets were demolished by artillery fire, and on 29th July the Imperialists scaled a

* Kambu, 5a. Aqil Khan states that after taking Kaliani, Aurangzib himself besieged Kulbarga (pp. 16, 38). Grant Duff (i. 157) makes him besiege Bijapur! But neither the official history of Kambu nor Aurangzib’s letters support the assertion. Aurangzib did not advance further south than Kaliani and his son, who had penetrated to Kulbarga, did not besiege that fort.
tower on the other side of the moat. But the garrison had built a wall across this tower, and under shelter of it fought the Mughals hard with rockets, bows, and matchlocks. The struggle here was most obstinate. While the Mughals were checked by the unexpected obstacle of the wall and had to demolish it, the Bijapuris flung on their heads lighted bombs, blazing sheets steeped in naphtha, and bundles of burning grass. But regardless of all these, the assailants swarmed into the fort and held this portion of the defences. Two days afterwards, the commandant Dilawwar offered to capitulate on condition of a free passage out for the garrison and their families. Aurangzib readily consented to grant them quarter, as the place sheltered many Muhammadans, especially Syeds.* On 1st August the keys of the fort were delivered to him by Dilawwar, who was given a robe of honour with permission to go to Bijapur.

Bidar and Kaliani, the guardian fortresses of Adil Shah's north-eastern frontier, had fallen, and the way now seemed open for an advance on Bijapur itself. But a cruel disappointment was in store for Aurangzib; his victorious career was to be suddenly checked. The Bijapur agents had intrigued hard at Court; Dara’s

* Kambu, 5a.
jealousy was rising in proportion to the success of his younger brother, and he at last persuaded the Emperor to put an end to the war.* Even in the midst of the siege of Kaliani Shah Jahan had repeatedly written to the Prince to patch up a peace with Bijapur as soon as possible, because the rainy season was approaching when the Mughal army must retire to cantonments at Bidar, and Shaista Khan, who had been guarding Aurangabad during the Prince’s absence, must return to his own charge of Malwa without further delay. Aurangzib knew that to raise the siege of Kaliani and retire to Bidar, would only embolden the Bijapuris and take away from them their only motive for offering terms of peace.† So, he had sat down before Kaliani a month longer, and brought the siege to a successful issue. Negotiations for peace were now opened.

The Bijapur envoy, Ibrahim Bichittar Khan, agreed to pay an indemnity of \(1{\frac{1}{2}}\) krores of rupees and to cede not only Bidar and Kaliani, but also the fort of Parenda with its dependent

* Adab, 177a (Aurangzib complains of Dara corresponding with Bijapur behind his back, but two years before this time). Aqil Khan, 16. Kambu, 10a (probably two months later). Alamgirnamah, 29, 83.

† Adab, 112b (dated early in July).
territory, all the forts in the Nizam Shahi Konkan, and the district of Wangi. The king of Bijapur accepted these terms and sent letters to his officers to deliver the forts in question to the Mughals. Shah Jahan ratified the treaty, remitting half a krore from the indemnity, and sending a gracious letter to Adil Shah. He at the same time ordered Aurangzib to return with his army to Bidar; the officers and men sent to the Deccan from Malwa and Hindustan were recalled to their former posts. Mir Jumla was directed to take possession of the newly ceded forts in the west and then return to the Imperial Court.*

Thus Aurangzib received a sharp check in the hour of his triumph. He had gained only the northern fringe of the vast Bijapur kingdom when his father cried halt to him. Small as his acquisitions by the treaty were, he had no power to hold the Bijapur king to his promises. At the Imperial order dictating peace, the Mughal officers slackened their efforts and many of them set out for the Court

* Kambu, 5b, (rewards for the capture of Kaliani, and settlement of peace). Adab, 113a, 157a. Aurangzib was commanded to return to Bidar (according to Adab, 112b, 198b), or to Aurangabad (on the authority of Kambu, 5b), which latter is very unlikely.
in spite of Aurangzib's entreaty to stay a little longer.* The Bijapuris profited by his distraction and weakened power, and delayed fulfilling the terms of a peace that had no armed strength behind it. Their commandants refused to surrender the forts ceded by the treaty.

To complete the misfortunes of the Mughal cause in the Deccan, Shah Jahan fell ill on 6th September and for one week lay at death's door. Rumours of his death spread through the Empire, and gave rise to confusion and disorder in every province. Aurangzib, harassed by anxiety and distracted by conflicting plans, at last decided to be content with what could be easily secured from Bijapur. On 30th September he sent Mir Jumla towards Parenda to take delivery of it, and on 4th October he himself began his retreat from Kaliani to the Imperial dominion.†

Only one episode of the war still remains to be recorded. While Aurangzib was busy conquering the north-eastern angle of the Bijapur kingdom, stirring events were occurring in its north-western corner, where the boundary of the Mughal district of Ahmadnagar adjoined the Northern Konkan. Here a young and obscure

† Kambu, 6b. Adab, 157a, 169a.
local chief of very small means and no high family influence, was just beginning to peep above the horizon of history and to start on that career of greatness whose noontide splendour was destined to dazzle the Indian world and to leave his name a byword for posterity. Shivaji, the son of Shahji Bhonsla, a Maratha captain in Bijapur service, had taken forcible possession of his father’s western jagirs and seized hill-fort after hill-fort in the Ghats from the agents of Bijapur. When the Mughals were about to invade Adil Shah’s territory, he had sent an envoy to Aurangzib’s deputy at Ahmadnagar, offering to co-operate on condition of being guaranteed by the Mughals in the possession of the Adil Shahi Konkan. He had received in return vague promises of favour and protection. Even a less astute man than he must have known that such promises would amount to nothing in practice when the need of the Imperialists would be over. So, on the outbreak of the war, he seized his opportunity, and in concert with the Bijapuri officers in the neighbourhood, he raided the Mughal territory from the west. One

* Grant Duff, i. 161-162. *Adab*, 144b (Shiva sends agent, July 1656), 146a (Shiva sends agent, February 1657).
night he silently scaled the walls of Junnar with rope-ladders, and after slaughtering the defenders carried off 11,000 hun, 200 horses, and much costly clothing and jewels.* Bands of Maratha light horsemen spread in all directions, cutting off provision trains and foraging parties, plundering the smaller towns and flourishing villages, rendering the roads unsafe, and carrying devastation and alarm to the very gates of Ahmadnagar, the seat of the Mughal administration in that region. An attack on the town (pettah) which nestled under shelter of the fort of Ahmadnagar was frustrated by a timely sortie of the garrison. But so great was the alarm it caused that the Mughal governor made the citizens remove their property to within the fort as a precaution. Two other Marathas, Minaji Bhonsla and Kashi, where notably successful in their raids.

Aurangzib learnt of these disturbances and hurried reinforcements up to Ahmadnagar, with strict orders to punish Shiva. He chastised with his pen those officers who were slow in marching to the scene. His letters to his officers

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* The history of the contest with Shiva is given in Grant Duff, i. 162—164, Kambu 3b, and Adab, 110b—112a (Aurangzib's letters to Shaista Khan), 147a—149a (to Multafat Khan), 153a—157a (to Nasiri Khan).
breathe fury and revenge: the Mughal captains must beat the raiders back from the Imperial dominions and make reprisals by entering Shiva's land from all sides, "wasting the villages, slaying the people without pity, and plundering them to the extreme";—Shivaji's possessions, Poona and Chakna, must be utterly ruined and not the least remissness shown in slaying and enslaving the people;—the village headmen and peasants of the Imperial territory who had secretly abetted the enemy, must be slain without compunction.

Aurangzib's new dispositions for guarding and effectually protects Mughal territory. This tract showed excellent combination and judgment. Kartalab Khan was posted near Junnar, Abdul Munim at Garh Namuna, Hushdar Khan at Chamargunda and Raisin, and Nasiri Khan and some others at Bir and Dharur. These officers stood facing the frontier and barring every path of the enemy's advance, so that the Imperial ryots behind them might enjoy peace and safety. The officers were further bidden to make a dash forward across the frontier, whenever they got an opportunity, ravage as much of the enemy's territory in front of them as they could, and then quickly return to the defence of their respective posts. At last
in May, 1657, Nasiri Khan, so often rebuked for his slow movements and failure to catch Shivaji up, made a forced march, for once, to the neighbourhood of Ahmadnagar and fell upon Shiva, who escaped with heavy loss. Orders were sent to the victor to pursue Shiva into his own territory and wrest all his lands which had been given up to the Mughals by the Bijapur king in the new treaty.* But a campaign in the Tal Konkan in the rainy season was impossible, and Poona escaped an invasion. When his liege-lord, the king of Bijapur, made peace, Shivaji found it useless and even ruinous to himself to continue the war with the Mughal empire single-handed. He must try to save his patrimony. So, he sent an agent, named Raghunath Panth, to Nasiri Khan, with a letter offering submission and promising loyal behaviour in future. To this a conciliatory reply was given. Then Shiva despatched another ambassador, Krishnaji Bhaskar, to Aurangzib himself, begging forgiveness for his raids and offering to send a contingent of 500 horse to the Prince's assistance.†

* Adab, 153a and b, 154b (rebuke for slowness), 156a (news of defeat of Shiva, in May, 1657), Kambu, 4b.
† Adab, 156b-157a. Grant Duff, i. 163-164.
Aurangzib was then about to leave the Deccan to contest the throne of Delhi. He received Shivaji’s submission with outward pleasure; but his mind was not really composed about the Konkan; he omitted no precaution to maintain peace in that quarter by force, for he felt convinced that the young Maratha chief was a raider whose daring was only equalled by his cunning, and an ambitious adventurer who would place self-interest above fidelity to his plighted word or gratitude for favours received.*

The invasion of Bijapur now ends, and the great War of Mughal Succession begins.

APPENDICES.

II.—Parentage of Ali II.

The parentage of Ali Adil Shah II is not altogether free from doubt. The Mughals declared him to be a stranger of unknown origin whom the late Sultan had brought up like a son, pisar-i-khanda. (Waris, 118a, and Adab, 88b). The Bijapur side stated that Ali was born to Muhammad Adil Shah on 27th August, 1638, and that at the fond request of the Queen, Bari Sahiba, the sister of the Golkonda king, the baby was handed over to her to be brought up under her eyes in her apartments, known as the Anand Mahal.

* Adab, 157a, 163a. “Take care of Ahmadnagar. Keep your troops ready, lest when Nasiri Khan goes away to Hindustan, Shiva, finding the field vacant, should begin to plunder” (To Multâfat Khan. Adab, 149b). “Don’t leave your charge at the call of Shah Jahan, lest Shiva should sally out.” (To Nasiri Khan, Adab, 157b). “At Nasiri Khan’s departure that district has been left vacant. Attend to it, as the son of a dog is waiting for an opportunity” (To Mir Jumla, Adab, 92a). Dilkasha, 20 and 21.
The boy's birth, initiation into Islam, and commencement of education, were all celebrated with the pomp and ceremony worthy of a prince of the blood, and he publicly rode through the capital in the style of the heir to the throne. His right to ascend the throne was apparently not questioned by the Bijapur nobility and officers of the army, though they soon afterwards began to quarrel about the division of power and influence. But such internal discords were the usual case at Bijapur and in every other country where the king is weak and his officers strong and selfish. Against Aurangzib's theory that Ali was a lowborn lad smuggled into the harem, stands the fact that at the time of his birth (August 1638), Muhammad Adil Shah was only 29 years old. Are we to believe that at this early age he and his queen had given up all hope of having any issue, and had contrived the fraud of proclaiming a stranger's child as their son? Some scandalous tale about the private life of Muhammad Adil Shah was told after his death by a Bijapur officer who had deserted to Aurangzib, (Adab 91a), but we do not know of its precise nature. Aurangzib himself utters a pious cry of disbelief in it! Who Ali's mother was is not explicitly stated in the Bijapur history. In the record of an event a few years after his accession, the chief Dowager Queen, Bari Sahiba, is spoken of as his walida, but the term may mean nothing more than adoptive mother, because in the account of Ali's birth even this lady is never once described as his mother. Possibly he was the son of a slave-girl of the harem. But under Islamic law children of such birth are not debarred from inheritance.

[The history of Ali Adil Shah II from his birth to accession is given in the Basatin-i-salatin, 345—347. Tavernier, i. 183, repeats the prevalent story that Ali was merely an adopted child. Also Bernier, 197.]

III.—Corruption of the Bijapur Wazir by Aurangzib.

The Bijapur history asserts that the prime minister, Khan Muhammad, surnamed Khan-i-khanan, was corrupted by Aurangzib, and gives the following account of his treachery and its punishment:—

"Adil Shah had appointed Khan Muhammad, with a large army to guard the kingdom. He took post on the frontier. Spies brought him news that the Delhi army was crossing a pass only two or three days' march off. Khan Muhammad by a forced march at night barred the road. Famine
raged in the Mughal camp, but the troops had no way open for escape. Aurangzib then wrote to the prime minister: 'If you let me off now, there will be perpetual friendship between the Bijapuris and us, and so long as you or your descendants hold the wazirship of the country, we shall never covet any of its territory.' The letter reached Khan Muhammad when he was sitting down with some learned men after his evening prayer, and, he remarked, 'This letter will be the death of me.' After long reflection, he replied on the back of the epistle, 'Early next morning, getting your men ready as for a night-attack, make a forced march and escape.' Aurangzib with his men fell on the Khan's troops who left a path open for them, and so he escaped. At the news of the night-attack Khan Muhammad's officers hastened to him, found Aurangzib already fled, and urged him to chase the Mughals as there was yet time. The Khan replied, 'We shall thus secure peace. But if we slay Aurangzib an ocean of troubles will surge up and [Mughal] armies will drown the Deccan land. Good, that he has escaped.' So, he forbade pursuit. Afzal Khan after using hot words left with his troops, went to Bijapur, and reported the matter to the Sultan,......... who recalled Khan Muhammad and his army to the capital. The Khan, knowing that his death was certain marched very slowly, with frequent halts. On the day he entered the city, two Mughals, armed with many sharp weapons, stood on the two sides of the Mecca gate. As the Khan's palki entered, they fell on him and despatched him with blows. The date was the year 1668 A. H. [early in November, 1657 A. D. ]...It is said that Aurangzib ordered that the annual tribute from Bijapur to the Emperor should not that year be paid to him, but spent in building a tomb for Khan Muhammad.” (Basatin-i-salatin, 349-351).

Now, this story of Khan Muhammad having caught Aurangzib in a trap in a mountain pass near the frontier, is clearly false. The detailed official history of the Mughals and Aurangzib's letters show that he only marched from his own frontier to Bidar (a short distance), and then from Bidar to Kaliani, and lastly (28 May) he made a four miles' advance from Kaliani in order to disperse the enemy assembled in the neighbourhood. There is no formidable mountain-pass in this route, and at every one of these steps Aurangzib had a strong base close behind him, viz., the Mughal fort of Udgir when he first marched to Bidar, the
conquered fort of Bidar when he proceeded to Kaliani, and lastly the part of his army left to invest Kaliani when he advanced four miles from that fort. Further more, the road between Bidar and Kaliani had been cleared of the enemy by Mahabat Khan, before Aurangzib traversed it.

Khan Muhammad might possibly have hemmed round some small Mughal detachment escorting provisions, or even Mahabat Khan's division in its march towards Kulbarga, (12th April) but then Aurangzib himself was too far off to write to the Bijapur wasir the letter of temptation described above. I think it most likely that the charge on which he was condemned of treason and murdered was that, having been already corrupted by Aurangzib, he had made a sham fight in the battle of 28th May, when he might have easily annihilated Aurangzib's force.

From the description in the Basatin-i-salatin it appears that Khan Muhammad had an opportunity of crushing Aurangzib during the latter's retreat from Kaliani or Bidar. This theory receives some support from Aqil Khan Razi, who writes (p. 17), "Aurangzib's army was distracted, but he remained firm, without being at all shaken by the departure of such high officers [as Mahabat Khan and Rao Chhatra Sal.] With boldness and prudence he returned, unhurt and without loss, from the place, through that ring of enemies."

In a letter written a few days after 8th October, Secretary Qabil Khan reports a rumour that Afzal Khan with the Bijapuri army had crossed the Benathora with a view to invade the mahals on "this side", evidently meaning the newly annexed districts of Bidar and Kaliani (Adab, 1974). We read (Adab, 646), that the Bijapuri territory north of the river had been previously occupied and administered by Aurangzib's officers. Therefore, his return march from Kaliani to Bidar, 4th—9th October, could not have been molested by Khan Muhammad.

Did the Bijapur prime minister, then, get and throw away, with fatal consequences to himself, the chance of capturing the Prince, during his retreat from Bidar to the Mughal frontier? The idea is plausible. The Bijapuris were certainly emboldened by the distraction of the Mughals; Aurangzib's army was weakened by the deputation of Mir Jumla and the departure of several other officers for Delhi; and the report of his intended retreat to the Mughal frontier had totally destroyed the Imperial prestige in that region;
the Bijapuris were openly insulting isolated Mughal detach-
ments and officers. But against this theory must be urged
that (1) Bidar was only 28 miles by road from the Mughal
frontier (viz., the ferry over the Manjira river); (2) Kaliani
and Bidar were both held by Mughal garrisons, which might
have assisted Aurangzib by falling on the rear of any Bijapu-
ri army surrounding him; (3) Aurangzib left Bidar on
18th October, and Khan Muhammad was murdered early
in November, as the news of his death reached Aurangzib
at Aurangabad in the middle of the month. \textit{(Adab, 92b.)}
There was not sufficient interval between these two events
for the return of Afzal Khan to Bijapur, the summoning of
Khan Muhammad by Adil Shah, and the minister's slow
march from Bidar to Bijapur, as described in the \textit{Basatin-
i-salatin}.

However, from Aurangzib's letters it is clear that Khan
Muhammad was friendly to the Mughals, and advocated a
policy of peace with them, while Mulla Ahmad was at that
time bitterly hostile to them. \textit{(During the war Khan
Muhammad openly sent an agent to Shah Jahan, evidently
to propose terms on behalf of his master. \textit{Adab, 125a.}) But\nthis need not have meant that Khan Muhammad had been
bribed to advocate the peace policy or that he shirked his
duty in the field of battle. Before Aurangzib's invasion
Mulla Ahmad himself had visited the Mughal ambassador
at Bijapur and professed friendliness, though Aurangzib
distrusted him. \textit{(Adab, 91b).}

Aurangzib's own remarks on hearing of Khan Muham-
mad's murder are given in a letter from Secretary Qabil
Khan to Mir Jumla, written in November, 1657. The
Prince only says that Khan Muhammad fell a victim to the
treachery of his false friend, Mulla [Ahmad] Natia, and that he almost threw away his life by neglecting to take proper steps to counteract his rival's designs, though
repeatedly cautioned by Aurangzib. \textit{(Adab, 92b, 204b). The\nother references to his death are in Adab, 93b and 179a.\n"Khan Muhammad" is a most unusual name; "Jan
Muhammad" is more likely.
CHAPTER XII.

The Illness of Shah Jahan, 1657.

In December, 1656, the public health of Delhi became so bad that Shah Jahan with his Court proceeded to the bank of the Ganges at Garh Mukteshwar, a place noted for its game. In less than a month he returned to the capital; but as the epidemic continued, he again left it (February, 1657), and went to Mukhlispur on the Jumna, nearly a hundred miles north of Delhi. The cool climate of this place, at the foot of the Sirmur hills and yet within easy reach of the capital by boat, had led him to choose it as his summer retreat, and he had adorned it with fine palaces for himself and his eldest son, and given it the glorious name of Faizabad.*

Here a grand Court ceremony was held.† He just completed three decades of his reign and began the 31st year on 7th March. In the

* Waris. 118b, 119a, 121a and b, (Mukhlispur described); 122a (palaces described).
† Kambu, 1b.
official annals of the Mughal Emperors written by their command, every period of ten years (called *dawwar*) was taken together and a volume devoted to it. Three such decades formed an epoch (*qarn*),* which was regarded as a sort of perfect and auspicious number. Shah Jahan had completed one such epoch and begun another. The occasion was, therefore, one of peculiar importance and solemnity.

The reign had been as prosperous as it had been long. The 'wealth of Ind'...
"protected empire" had been stretched further than in any preceding reign. Within the country itself a profound peace reigned. The peasantry were carefully cherished; harsh and exacting governors were in many cases dismissed on the complaint of the people. Wealth and prosperity increased on all hands. As a panegyrist sang:—

"The people are light of heart as the Emperor bears the heavy burden (of looking after them); Disorder has fallen into a deep sleep through his wakefulness."

A kind and yet wise master, Shah Jahan had gathered round himself a band of very able officers, and made his Court the centre of the wit and wisdom of the land.

But some ominous shadows had already been cast on this bright prospect, and with the passage of time they were deepening. One by one the great ministers and generals who had contributed to the glory of the reign were being removed by the pitiless hand of Death. The three best known officers and dearest personal friends of Shah Jahan died within the last five years: Said Khan Bahadur Zafar Jang on 4th January, 1652, Sadullah Khan, the Abul Fazl of his age,
on 7th April, 1656, and Ali Mardan Khan, the premier peer, on 16th April, 1657.* And, as the giants of old passed away, the Emperor found no worthy successors to them among the new faces and younger men about him.† He had already completed 67 lunar years;‡ and the life of warfare and hardship that he had gone through in his father's latter years, followed by the long ease of his own tranquil reign, had undermined his body, and he already felt the hand of age. What would happen after him?

The question of succession was present in all minds. Often and often had he talked with his confidants about the future,§ and that future was most gloomy.

Shah Jahan had four sons. All of them were past youth, and all had gained experience as governors of provinces and commanders of armies. But there was no brotherly love among them, though the three younger princes,—Shuja, Aurangzib and Murad Bakhsh, were usually drawn together by a common jealousy of the

* Waris, 57b, 108a; Kambu, 1b; M. U. ii. 436.
† Ruqat-i-Alamgiri, No. 48.
‡ 25th January, 1657, was his 68th lunar birth-day, (Waris, 120b), while his 66th solar year began 15 days earlier (Waris, 119b).
§ Ruqat-i-Alamgiri, No. 54.
eldest, Dara Shukoh, their father's favourite and intended heir. The ill-feeling between Dara and Aurangzib in particular was so bitter and had continued growing bitterer for so many years past, that it was the talk of the whole empire, and peace had been maintained between them only by keeping Aurangzib far away from the Court and his eldest brother.* Everyone foreboded that the succession to Shah Jahan's throne would be disputed, and that a universal and complicated civil war would deluge all parts of India with blood, as soon as he would close his eyes or even earlier.

Shah Jahan had given clear indications that he wished to leave the crown to Dara. As this prince was the eldest of four brothers by the same mother, the choice was not an act of unjust partiality, but simply followed the law of nature which gives to the eldest-born authority and precedence above the younger ones. In order to train him in the administration of the empire and to smooth the transfer of the supreme authority to him, the Emperor had kept Dara by his side for many years past. The viceroyalty of rich and long-settled provinces like Allahabad, the

* Anecdotes of Aurangzib § 2 and 5, Masum, 6b, Kambu, 8b, Adab, 171b, 174b, Aqil Khan, 10.
Panjab, and Multan, had been conferred on him, but he was allowed to stay at his father’s Court and govern them by deputies. At the same time the Emperor bestowed on him rank and privileges which raised him to an almost royal position, midway between the Emperor and the other princes. Dara now enjoyed the high title of Shah-i-buland- iqbal, (King of Lofty Fortune), the unprecedented rank of a Commander of Forty Thousand Horse, and an income which many a king might have envied. When he attended Court he was allowed to sit near the Emperor on a gold chair only a little lower than the throne.* Dara’s sons got military ranks as high as those of the Emperor’s younger sons, and his officers were frequently ennobled by the Emperor.† Dependent kings, tributary princes, offenders under the Imperial wrath, aspirants to office or title, all bought or begged Dara’s mediation before they could approach the Emperor. Government officials and new recipients

* Waris, 96a, (golden chair and title of Shah given to Dara, 3rd February, 1655), 97a, §120a, (Dara’s pay was 1½ krores of rupees, January, 1657), 123b, (mansabs of all the princes). Kambu, 6a (Dara promoted to a command of 50,000 horse, 14th September), 7b (Dara promoted to a command of 60,000 horse, with a pay of above 2 krores, 20th December), 8b, Masum, 6b.

† Waris, 96a, 116a.
of titles, after having had audience of the Emperor were sent by him to pay their respects to the Crown Prince.* Much of the administration was latterly conducted at Dara’s direction in the Emperor’s presence, or even by Dara alone with permission to use the Emperor’s name and seal. In short, everything was done to make the public familiar with the idea that he was their future sovereign and to render the transfer of the crown to him on Shah Jahan’s death easy.

Dara was just turned of forty-two years. He had taken after his great-grandfather Akbar. In his thirst for pantheistic philosophy he had studied† the Talmud and the New Testament, the writings of the Muslim Sufis, and the Hindu

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* Waris, 85a, (Ismail Hut presents a remarkable horse to Dara), 91b, 116a (Srinagar Rajah makes Dara his mediator), 87b, 97b (Dara procures pardons).

† This account of Dara’s philosophical studies is based on the extracts from the prefaces of his works given by Rieu in his British Museum Catalogue. Dara wrote in Persian (1) Sirr-ul-asrar, a translation of 50 of the Upanishads, completed on 1 July, 1657. (2) Majmua-ul-Baharain, a treatise on the technical terms of Hindu pantheism and their equivalents in Sufi phraseology. (3) Dialogue with Baba Lal (really recorded by Chandrabhan). (4) Safinat-ul-awliya or lives of Muslim saints, completed 11 Jan., 1640. (5) Sakinat-ul-awliya or the life of Mian Mir, completed 1052 A. H. The 2nd, 3rd, and 4th are in the Khuda Bakhsh Library. See also Faiyaz-ul-qawanin, 377—388, for Dara’s correspondence with Shaikhs Muhibullah and Dilruba.
Vedanta. The easy government of Allahabad had assisted his natural inclination, and with the help of a band of pandits he had made a Persian version of the Upanishads. The title of Majmua-ul-Baharain ("the Mingling of Two Oceans") which he gave to another of his works, as well as his prefatory remarks,* proves that his aim was to find a meeting-point for Hinduism and Islam in those universal truths which form the common basis of all true religions and which fanatics are too apt to ignore in their zeal for the mere externals of faith. Alike from the Hindu yogi Lál-dás and the Muslim faqir Sarmad, he had imbibed his eclectic philosophy, and at the feet of both he had sat as an attentive pupil. But he was no apostate from Islam. He had compiled a biography of Muslim saints, and he had been initiated as a disciple of the Muslim

* He writes that although he had perused the Pentateuch, the Gospels, the Psalms and other sacred books, he had nowhere found the doctrine of Tauhid or Pantheism explicitly taught but in the Vedas, and more especially in the Upanishads, which contain their essence. As Benares, the great seat of Hindu learning, was under his rule, he called together the most learned pandits of that place, and with their assistance wrote himself the translation of the Upanishads (Rieu, i. 54, quoting preface to Sirr-ul-asrar). Elsewhere he states that he had embraced the doctrine of the Sufis, and having ascertained in his intercourse with Hindu Fakirs that their divergence from the former was merely verbal, he had written the Majmua-ul-Baharain with the object of reconciling the two systems. (Rieu, ii. 828, quoting Dara's preface).
saint Mian Mir, which no kafir could have been.*

The saintly Jahanara also speaks of Dara as her spiritual preceptor. The manifesto in which Aurangzib as the champion of Islamic orthodoxy denounces Dara for heresy, ascribes to him no idolatrous practice or denial of Muhammad's prophetic mission, but only the following faults: (i) Consorting with Brahmans, yogis and sanyasis,—considering them as perfect spiritual guides and 'knowers of God',—regarding the Veda as a divine book, and spending his days in translating and studying it.

(ii) Wearing rings and jewels inscribed with the word Prabhu ("Lord") in Hindi letters.†

(iii) Discarding prayers, the fast during the month of Ramzan, and other canonical cere-

* During his stay in Kashmir, 1050 A. H., Dara had become a disciple of the great Sufi, Mulla Shah (who died in 1072).....Dara received the initiation to the Qadiri order in 1049 from an eminent master, Muhammad Shah Lisanullah, one of the disciples of Mian Mir. He erected a sumptuous dome over Mian Mir's tomb outside Lahore. Jahanara wrote the Munis-ul-arwah, a life of Shaikh Muinuddin Chishti, into whose order she was initiated as a disciple or murida. (Rieu, i. 54, 358 & 357). Dara used to add to his signature the titles Qadiri and Hanifi, which is not consistent with a profession of heresy.

† Prabhu is simply a Sanskrit word meaning "one able to punish and to bless", "the supreme lord". It is not the name of any idol, but an epithet of the Deity, as innocent of any connection with polytheism as the Arabic term Rabb-ul-alamin ("Lord of the Universe") applied to God in the Quran.
monies of Islam, as necessary only in the case of the spiritually undeveloped,—while he believed himself to be a man possessed of a perfect knowledge of God.*

Dara's own words in introducing to the reader his theological works, clearly prove that he never discarded the essential dogmas of Islam; he only displayed the eclecticism of the Sufis, a recognised school of Islamic believers. If he showed contempt for the external rites of religion, he only shared the standpoint of many noble thinkers of all churches, such as John Milton. However, his coquetry with Hindu philosophy made it impossible for him, even if he had the inclination, to pose as the champion of orthodox and exclusive Islam, or to summon all Muslims to his banners by proclaiming a holy war against the people beyond the fold of the faith.

Then, again, his father's excessive love did him a distinct harm. He was always kept at Court and never, except at the third siege of Qandahar, sent to conduct campaigns or administer provinces. Thus he never acquired experience in the arts of war and government;

* Alamgirnamah, 34 and 35. Some other charges of heresy, such as the drinking of beer made from sugar, were brought against Dara by Aurangzib, if we can believe Masum (71a).
he never learnt to judge men by the crucial test of danger and difficulty; and he lost touch with the active army. Hence he was rendered unfit for that war of succession which among the Mughals served as a practical test for the survival of the fittest. Basking in the sunshine of his father's favour and flattered by an entire empire, Dara had acquired some vices unworthy of a philosopher and fatal to an aspirant to the throne. Aurangzib in later life spoke of Dara as proud, insolent to the nobles, and ungovernable in temper and speech.* But while rejecting this testimony of his mortal enemy, we may at least believe that his unrivalled wealth and influence were not likely to develop moderation, self-restraint, or foresight in him; while the fulsome flattery which he received from all must have aggravated the natural pride and arrogance of an heir to the throne of Delhi. The detailed account of his siege of Qandahar, written by an admirer, shows him in the odious light of an incompetent braggart, almost insane with conceit, capricious and childish in the manage-

* Ruqat-i-Alamgiri, Nos. 5, 47, 53. Anecdotes of Aurangzib, § 3 and 4. In the Adab (260b) Aurangzib writes to Shah Jahan that Dara's only qualifications for winning his father's favour were "flattery, smoothness of tongue, and much laughing, while in carrying out any business entrusted by his father his heart was not in conformity with his tongue."
ment of affairs. His history during the war of succession clearly proves that, with all the wealth and influence he had enjoyed for years, he could secure very few devoted followers or efficient lieutenants. Evidently he was no judge of character. Men of ability and self-respect must have kept away from such a vain and injudicious master, while the mercenary self-seekers of the army and Court must have recognised that in following him against the astute and experienced Aurangzib they would be only backing the losing side. Dara was a loving husband, a doting father, and a devoted son; but as a ruler of men in troubled times he must have been a failure. Long continued prosperity had unnerved his character and made him incapable of planning wisely, daring boldly, and achieving strenuously,—or, if need were, of wresting victory from the jaws of defeat by desperate effort or heroic endurance. The darling of the Court was utterly out of his element in the Camp. The centre of a circle of flattering nobles and ministers knew not how to make a number of generals obey one masterly will and act in harmony and concert. Military organisation and tactical combination were beyond his power. And he had never learnt by practice how to guide the varying tides of a battle with the coolness and judgment of a true
general. This novice in the art of war was destined to meet a practised veteran as his rival for the throne.*

However dark the future might look, for the present things were going on well with Shah Jahan. The usual Court festivals were celebrated as they came round. The victory over Bijapur led to the playing of joyous music, and the granting of rewards and titles.† Marriages took place among his grand-children. He held darbars with his usual magnificence, and received or sent off generals and viceroy, ambassadors and scholars.

From Mukhlispur Shah Jahan had returned to Delhi at the end of April, 1657. Here, on 6th September, he suddenly fell ill of stranguary and constipation.‡ For one week the royal physicians toiled in vain. The malady went on increasing; his lower limbs swelled, his palate and tongue grew very dry, and at times symptoms of fever appeared. During all this period the patient took no food or nourishment, and the medicines produced no effect on him. His

† Kambu, 5b,
‡ For the history of the illness, Kambu, 6a, 7a; Alamgirnarnah, 27, 80—81; Masum, 29b—30b; Isardas, 7b—9a.
weakness was extreme and his pain intense, though borne with heroic fortitude.

The daily darbar was stopped; the Emperor even ceased to show his face to the public from the balcony as was his wont every morning; the courtiers were denied access to his sick-bed, which only Dara and a few trusted officers watched. Immediately the wildest rumours spread through the empire: Shah Jahan was dead, and Dara was keeping the fact a secret till he had ensured his own succession!

After a week the doctors at last got control over the malady. Soup of mint and manna did him great good, and he felt some relief. But the needs of empire are imperative. So, on 14th September the patient dragged himself to the window of his bed-room (khwabgah) and showed his face to the anxious public standing outside, to prove that he was still alive! Large sums were given away in charity, prisoners were released, and Dara was covered with rewards and honours for his filial care.

But the improvement in the Emperor's condition had been slight; he had still to be carefully treated and nursed; and his weakness continued. It was more than a month (15th October) before he again appeared at the window in view of the public, though papers were taken to his chamber
ostensibly to be read out for his order, and royal letters were still issued in his name and stamped with his seal. The acute stage of the disease had passed, no doubt. But his death was now regarded as only a question of time. He knew it, and in the presence of the nobles appointed Dara as his successor. Then, with his mind freed from earthly cares, he went to Agra to die there quietly in sight of the tomb of the wife he had loved so well. A change of air had also been advised by the doctors. On 18th October Shah Jahan left Delhi and moved by easy stages to Agra. Sami Ghat, on the Jumna, six miles above Agra Fort, was reached on 5th November, and here he waited for an auspicious day. The journey had restored him to health and he now discarded drugs as unnecessary. On the 26th, the day chosen by the astrologers, he made a royal progress from Bahadur-pura, down the Jumna, in a State barge, the people thronging both banks for miles and miles to gaze on their beloved and long-lost ruler. Shouts of prayer and blessings for him filled the air. In this way he entered Agra city and put up in Dara's mansion on the river-bank. After nine days he entered his sumptuous palace in the Fort and there held a darbar. At Agra he lived for

* Kambu, 86.
the next five months. To Agra he returned after a short and futile effort to go back to Delhi (April), and from Agra Fort he was destined never again to issue in life.

During Shah Jahan’s illness Dara constantly watched by his bed-side; but he also stopped the visit of others to the sick-chamber. Only three or four officers of the highest trust and the Court physicians had access to the Emperor. "Dara tended and nursed his father beyond the utmost limit of possibility." But he showed no indecent haste to seize the crown. All urgent orders were issued by him, but in the Emperor’s name.* He exercised supreme authority and transacted public affairs at his own will, but merely as his father’s agent. The transfer of power to his own hands, he hoped, would be easy, and he might wait for his father’s death without any harm to the work of the State. He had so long occupied in the public eye the place at the right hand of the Emperor that he naturally expected that his exercise of authority on behalf of his invalid father would be accepted without question.

When Shah Jahan’s illness first took a favourable turn (14th September), he heaped on Dara

* Kambu, 76.
promotion and rewards worth $2\frac{1}{2}$ lakhs of rupees, and again on 20th December presented him with one krore of rupees besides jewellery valued at 34 lakhs, in recognition of his filial piety and tender nursing during the Emperor’s illness. Dara’s rank was raised to that of a Commander of Sixty Thousand Horse, and his eldest two sons were promoted Commanders of 15,000 and 10,000 troopers respectively.*

After the first week of illness Shah Jahan, as we have already seen, felt some relief, but no hope of recovery. So he piously set himself to prepare for the next world. Calling to his presence some confidential courtiers and the chief officers of the State, he made his last will before them, and ordered them to obey Dara henceforth as their sovereign in everything, at all times, and in every place. To his successor he gave the advice to seek to please God, to treat the public well, and to care for the peasantry and the army.† Dara now had the supreme power in his hand, though he did not assume the crown but continued to issue orders in his father’s name. The history of the next eight months is

* Kambu, 6a, 7b.
† Kambu, 8b.
the history of his attempt to strengthen his position,—an attempt often thwarted by the necessity of taking Shah Jahan's consent in important matters, and also by his own faults of judgment. His policy lacked that strength and singleness of purpose which it might have gained if he had been the absolute master of the realm, or if Shah Jahan, in full possession of his physical powers, had dictated every step himself.

First of all, Mir Jumla, the confidant and partisan of his rival Aurangzib, could no longer be retained as Prime Minister of the Empire. Towards the end of September he was removed from the wazirship, and his son Muhammad Amin, who had been acting as his vicar at Delhi, was forbidden entrance to the office. Orders were also sent to Mir Jumla, Mahabat Khan, and other Imperial officers to return from the Deccan* to the Court with the reinforcements that they had led to Aurangzib's army for the Bijapur war.

In the case of Mir Jumla the order of recall was not peremptory: he was first of all to secure the surrender of Parenda Fort from the Bijapuris. But Mahabat Khan and Rao Chhatra Sal were

* Kambu, 6b, 10a. Alamgirnamah, 29.
commanded to come away immediately with the Muhammadan and Rajput troops respectively of the supplementary force; and this they did without waiting to take leave of Aurangzib. They returned to Agra and had audience of the Emperor on 20th December.*

Meantime Dara's partisans and followers received from the Emperor promotions and high administrative offices, and even the province of Bihar was given to him in addition to the Panjáb and Multan. Dara also set about acquiring new friends: Khalilullah Khan was promoted and appointed Subahdar of Delhi; Qasim Khan was tempted with the viceroyalty of Guzerat from which it was decided to remove Murad.†

By the middle of November Shah Jahan was completely recovered, and important matters which had hitherto been kept from him, could no longer be withheld. Dara, therefore, told him how Shuja had crowned himself and was advancing from Bengal. Shah Jahan consented to an army being sent against him, under the leadership of Rajah Jai Singh. But as only a prince could cope with a

* Kambu, 5b, 6b, 10b, 8a. Aqil Khan, 16.
† Kambu, 6b, 11a. Faiyas-ul-qawainin, 413, 414.
prince, Dara’s eldest son Sulaiman Shukoh was joined in the command. This force, 22,000 strong, left Agra on 30th November and encountered Shuja near Benares on 14th February, 1658, as we shall see. Dara’s most trusted friends and best generals were sent to support his son, and thus he greatly weakened himself at Agra. *

Meantime equally alarming news had arrived from Guzerat. There Murad had murdered his diwan Ali Naqi (early in October), looted Surat city (early in November), and finally crowned himself (5th December). At first Dara sent him a letter purporting to proceed from the Emperor, transferring him from Guzerat to Berar. Dara thereby hoped to set one foe against another, as Berar was included in Aurangzib’s viceroyalty. Murad saw through the plan, laughed the order to scorn, and neither moved from Guzerat nor acted against Aurangzib. † As yet Aurangzib had done no overt act of disloyalty or preparation for war. But “Dara feared him most.” He learnt that Aurangzib had allied himself with Murad and Shuja, and at the same time was secretly intriguing with the nobles of the Court

* Kambu, 9a and b. Alamgirnamah, 31. Khafi Khan, ii. 5; Masum, 32b—40b.
† Kambu, 10a and b, 11a. Faiyaz-ul-qawanin, 414, 420.
and the officers of the army. Strong letters were, therefore, sent out in the Emperor’s name recalling Mir Jumla and the remaining generals from the Deccan (early in December), and on 18th and 26th December two armies were despatched to Malwa, the first to oppose the advance of Aurangzib from the South and the second to march into Guzerat and oust Murad from the province, or, if necessary, to stay in Malwa and co-operate with the first force.*

The leadership of these two armies had gone abegging. Noble after noble had been offered the posts, but had declined, saying that they were ready to fight to the last drop of their blood under the Emperor or Dara in person, but could not of themselves presume to resist to the bitter end a prince of the Imperial blood. The rash Rathor chief Jaswant alone had consented to fight Aurangzib and even promised to bring him back a prisoner.† So, he was sent (18 Dec.) to Ujjain as governor of Malwa, vice Shaista Khan, whose presence so near Aurangzib gave Dara ground for fear. Such a great noble and near kinsman of the Emperor could not be safely left close to the rebel frontier, as his

† Isar-das, 18b.
adhesion to the two younger princes would have greatly increased their strength and influence. Shaista Khan had served with Aurangzib in the Golkonda and Bijapur wars and there was a brisk and friendly correspondence between the two. Murad had even planned to dash into Malwa, seize Shaista Khan, and force him to join his side! So Shaista Khan was recalled to the capital, where he secretly served Aurangzib's cause.* Qasim Khan was induced to accept the command of the second army by being created governor of Guzerat in the place of Murad.

While giving leave to the three armies sent from Agra, Shah Jahan had besought their generals to spare the lives of his younger sons, to try at first to send them back to their provinces by fair words if possible, otherwise by a demonstration of force, and not, except in extreme need, to resort to a deadly battle.†

In January 1658, the news of further developments reached Agra. Aurangzib openly defies the Imperial authority.

artillery. The Prince, no doubt, wrote a lying letter to the Emperor, saying that he had arrested Mir Jumla for treasonable intrigue with Bijapur and neglect of the Imperial business;* but Dara knew the true reason. Murad had captured Surat Fort, and the preparations of the two brothers to advance into Hindustan could not be kept concealed any longer. Aurangzib's Vanguard began its northward march from Aurangabad on 25th January. At last all the three younger princes had rebelled; they had dropped the mask, or, in the language of the Persian annalists, "the curtain had been removed from the face of the affair."

At Dara's instigation the Emperor threw into prison Isa Beg, the Court agent of Aurangzib, and attached his property. But after a time he felt ashamed of such persecution, released the innocent man, and let him go to his master, whom he joined at Burhanpur early in March.†

Shah Jahan's severe illness and withdrawal from the public gaze had at once cut off news of Shah Jahan. Dara tried to create a popular belief that he was dead. Dara guarded the sick-bed day and night; none but one or two

* Alamgirnamah, 84. Khafi Khan, ii. 9. Adab, 95a, 67b. Aqil Khan 19, 20, 22.
† Alamgirnamah, 35 and 39. Aqil Khan, 18 and 23.
ministers in his confidence had access to the Emperor. Even the people of Delhi, therefore, had reason to suspect that Shah Jahan was no more. The rumour spread to the farthest provinces with the proverbial speed of ill news. The evil was aggravated by Dara’s injudicious action. To smooth the path of his own accession, he set men to watch the ferries and stop all letters and messengers going to his brothers in Bengal, Guzerat, and the Deccan. He also kept their Court agents under watch lest they should send any report to their masters.*

But this only wrought greater mischief. Ignorance and uncertainty are more dangerous than the knowledge of truth. The princes and people in the distant provinces, with their regular news-letters from the Court suddenly stopped, naturally concluded that the worst had already come to pass. What letters they got indirectly only confirmed the belief. While their official news-writers and Court-agents at the capital were being guarded by Dara, other people of the city contrived to smuggle letters out to the princes, offering their devotion and reporting the gossip of the market-place about the condition

of Shah Jahan, which was a compound of truth and falsehood.* It was clearly the interest of such men, who from their low position had no access to the inner circle of the Court, to send misrepresentations likely to fan the ambition of the younger princes. Above all, the princess Raushanara intrigued vigorously for Aurangzib from within the harem and guarded his interests† as against Dara’s.

Shah Jahan being given up as dead, all the confusion and disorder of a Mughal succession broke out, and the evil was intensified by the expectation of a four-sided duel between his sons, each with the army and resources of a province at his back. Everywhere lawless men caused tumults, the ryots refused to pay the revenue, the zamindars disobeyed the local governors or tried to rob and conquer their rivals; foreign powers, especially in the north-east, violated the frontiers and made inroads into the Imperial territory. Wicked men of every class took advantage of the political trouble to raise their heads, and thereby added to the disorder. The local authorities were paralysed by uncertainty and anxiety about the future, and law

* Kambu, 8b.

† Alamgirnamah, 368.
and order suddenly disappeared in many places.*
Such is the curse of autocracy: when the one central authority, from which all have been accustomed to receive their orders and to which they have ever taught themselves to look up for guidance, ceases to exist, all the officers become bewildered and helpless like children.

The younger princes in their provinces got ready to contest the throne. Shuja and Murad crowned themselves, themselves. Aurangzib played a cool and waiting game, while carefully increasing his resources and army. Even when Shah Jahan began to show his face to the public again, the mischief did not cease. It was openly said all over the empire that Shah Jahan was really dead, and that a slave who bore some resemblance to him, disguised in the Imperial robes, personated him on the high palace-balcony, and received the salams of the public standing below.† Letters in Shah Jahan's hand and seal were issued to the princes and the nobles, but they did not remove the suspicion.

* Alamgirnamah, 27 and 28. Kambu, 86. Masum, 306. The Rajah of Kuch Bihar raided Northern Bengal and Kamrup, while an Assamese army occupied Kamrup including Gauhati. (Fathiyya-i-ibriyya, 6 and 7). Adab, 94a. The official history Alamgirnamah and Aurangzib's letters to Shah Jahan in the Adab speak of the disorder in the country caused by "Dara's usurpation."
† Masum, 32a and b.
echoed the sentiments of others when he asserted that these letters were really written by Dara, an expert imitator of Shah Jahan's hand, and that the late Emperor's seal was necessarily in the possession of his successor.* Even those who did not go so far, thought with Aurangzib that Shah Jahan was either dead or a helpless invalid entirely under Dara's control, so that he had practically vacated the throne. Some even asserted that Dara had wickedly flung his helpless father into prison and was doing him to death.† The three younger brothers, therefore, very plausibly asserted in their letters to the Emperor that their loving minds had been unsettled by these alarming rumours, and they were marching on Agra to see their father with their own eyes and satisfy themselves as to his real condition. Thereafter (they promised) they would return peacefully to their provinces or loyally do whatever their father would personally command them. Their marching on Agra was no sign of rebellion. Had they not hastened thither from their head quarters without waiting

* Faiyas-ul-qawinan, 418, 425, 429. As a matter of fact both Shah Jahan and Dara wrote in the same style of hand, as the signatures of the two in some Persian MSS. of the Khuda Bakhsh Library show.

† Isardas, ga. Adab, 200b.
for permission, when they heard of Jahanara being burnt? And was not Shah Jahan’s present illness a more serious affair and a greater cause of anxiety to them? Thus argued Murad in one of his letters.*

When the agents of Aurangzib and Murad at the Imperial Court wrote to their masters that the Emperor had fully recovered, Murad frankly refused to accept such letters as genuine. For, Dara had previously imprisoned these agents, and their houses were still watched by his men; they could not communicate the truth, but had to write to the dictation of Dara’s secretary. Hence their letters contained only what Dara wished his brothers to believe. Nothing (Murad argued) would disclose the truth except a march on Agra and an interview with the Emperor himself.† Seeing is believing.

Events moved apace. On 20th March, 1658, Aurangzib set out from Burhanpur, crossed the Narmada on 3rd April, joined Murad on the 14th, and attacked the Imperial army the next day. The period of intrigue and diplomacy now ends, and the appeal to the arbitrament of the sword begins.

* Faiyaz-ul-qawanin, 425.
† Faiyaz-ul-qawanin, 418; Masum, 44a and b.
Muhammad Murad Bakhsh, the youngest son of Shah Jahan, was the black sheep of the Imperial family. He had been tried in Balkh, the Deccan, and Guzerat, and he had failed everywhere. A foolish, pleasure-loving and impetuous prince, his character had not improved with age. Though too old now to plead the excuse of youth and inexperience, he had not learnt to apply himself to business or to bridle his passions. Worse still, he had not the gift of choosing capable agents, or even of treating them with the necessary confidence and honour when he happened to get any such men. * Unscrupul-

* He quarrelled with his guardian, Shah Nawaz Khan, during his viceroyalty of the Deccan, and was consequently removed from the province. (Waris, 38a. Khafi Khan, i. 701).
ous flatterers swayed his counsels, and made his Court no fit place for honest and self-respecting men. But Murad had also the virtues of his defects. Careless of every thing else, he was indifferent to money, and his outbursts of violence or sensuality alternated with fits of liberality. Such irregular and indiscriminate gifts from a capricious master could not, however, win lasting devotion or true gratitude. Secondly, he had the reckless valour of soldier. Place him in the field of combat, let him face the enemy’s array, and the former pleasure-seeker would assume an entirely new character; the martial spirit of Timur would fire his blood, he would resistlessly force his way to close grips with the enemy, and, amidst the carnage raging round him, forget every other feeling save the fierce delight of slaughter. Waverers, no doubt, took heart from the example of such a leader, and a charge when pressed home by a prince of the blood often scattered the enemy’s ranks. But his personal valour was a poor compensation for his lack of generalship. The doughty fighter did only the work of a lieutenant, and failed to afford his troops the far-sighted disposition, cool guidance, and timely support which we expect from the supreme commander.
Knowing the prince's incapacity, Shah Jahan had tried to remedy the mischief by sending to him Ali Naqi as his revenue minister and chief counsellor. This officer, \( \text{His wasir, Ali Naqi,} \) conscious of his own ability and honesty, and proud of enjoying the Emperor's confidence, looked down with scorn on the flatterers and boon companions who formed Murad's Court. He was strict even to harshness in conducting the government, and his honesty and vigilant care of the public revenue raised against him a host of enemies among those who wished to profit by the prince's ignorance and extravagance. As the whole administration was under Ali Naqi's control, he was also envied by the other nobles posted in Guzerat. His draconic punishments left him without a single friend in the province.

And soon his enemies got their chance. The news of Shah Jahan's severe illness and retirement to impenetrable privacy, as well as of Dara's virtual usurpation of the Imperial authority, reached Murad towards the close of

* My account of Ali Naqi and his murder is based upon Khafi Khan, ii. 7—9, Isardas, 10a and b, Kambu, 9a. The date of the murder was most probably some day in the first week of October, as confirmation of the news reached Aurangzib (returning from Bidar) on 29th October, and the first rumours had come some days earlier (Adab, 201b). Alamgirnamah, 135.
September, and he immediately set about raising troops and calling up his officers from the districts to take counsel with them. Among these arrivals was Qutbuddin Khan Kheshgi, faujdar of Pattan, and the mortal enemy of Ali Naqi. A conspiracy was soon formed between him and Murad's favourite eunuch against the hated minister. A letter in Ali Naqi's hand and seal, professing adhesion to the cause of Dara, was forged and given to a courier, who contrived to get himself arrested by Murad's road patrol, without betraying its real authorship. Murad was revelling in his pleasure-garden when the intercepted letter was brought to him a little before dawn. The prince, who had not slept off his night's debauch, was in no fit mood to reflect wisely or to detect a plot of a type most familiar in Muslim history. He burst into wrath and ordered Ali Naqi to be dragged to his presence. The minister was reading the holy book when he got the summons, and hurriedly put on his Court dress as he went. Murad sat on a chair, spear in hand. Bridling his anger for a moment he asked Ali Naqi, "If a man plans treason against his master, what should his punishment be?" "Death," replied Ali Naqi promptly and boldly. Then Murad flung the letter to him as
proof of his treason. The minister read it, and, fearless through consciousness of his own innocence and good service, he scoffed at his rivals who had forged such a clumsy instrument, and taxed his master with lack of wisdom in not being able to see through the forgery and to know his true friends from his foes.

This was too much for Murad, who had been so long quivering with pent-up wrath. Starting up he ran Ali Naqi through with his spear, shouting, "Wretch! in spite of all my favours you have turned such a traitor!" The eunuchs present fell on the unhappy victim and completed their master's work.* The reign which began with this tragedy was to end in one equally horrible. For the murder of Ali Naqi, Murad had to atone with his own life-blood, four years later, in a dismal prison, before the pitiless eyes of enemies,

* If we can trust Khafi Khan's gossip, Ali Naqi fell a victim to a faqir's curse. "Ali Naqi was so strict in administration and chastisement that for a trivial fault he would order the offender's bile to be squeezed out. One day they brought to him a faqir arrested on suspicion of theft, and the minister, without making any investigation, ordered his bile to be pressed out. The faqir under torture turned his face to the heavens and cried out, 'You are slaying me unjustly. I pray that you too may meet with a similar fate under suspicion.'" But we must remember that a faqir's garb is the commonest of all disguises in India and the one first adopted by criminals trying to escape the officers of justice.
without a single friend or sympathiser by his side.

The honest minister having been removed from the path, the reign of lying flatterers and eunuchs began. Murad was enlisting troops in large numbers and needed money badly. So he sent an eunuch named Shahbaz Khan with 6,000 troopers and war material to levy contribution from the rich port of Surat.

Army sent to plunder Surat. The detachment easily occupied the town which had no wall around it at this time, and began to plunder the citizens (early in November).* But the Imperial treasury, enriched with the custom duties of the greatest Indian port of the age, was situated within the fort, where the chief merchants had also deposited their wealth for safety. As the sea flanked the fort of Surat on three sides and its walls bristled with guns and swivels at every yard’s interval,† its capture was no easy task.

* Isardas, 106 and 11a. In Adab, 205a, Qabil Khan writes that Aurangzib’s courier returned from Murad and reached his master, north of Bidar, on 23rd Nov. with the news that Murad’s army after capturing the city and district of Surat was engaged in besieging the fort.

† Description of the fort of Surat in Isardas, 11a; Faiyaz-ul-qawanan, 421. William Finch in 1609 thus describes it, “The castle of Surat is on the south side of the river,...well walled, and surrounded by a ditch. The ramparts are provided with many good cannons, some of which are of
Shahbaz Khan first tried to corrupt the commandant of the fort, Syed Tayyib, through his friend Mirza Kamran, by saying that the astrologers had predicted the throne for Murad, and therefore to resist him was two court one's own ruin. The honest qiladar held firmly to his duty, and when Shahbaz advanced with his force to attempt an assault, he drove him back by a smart discharge of artillery. So Shahbaz had to encamp at a safe distance and begin the slow and tedious work of cannonading. But his guns being light pieces, no harm was done to the fort walls, and the siege* dragged on for weeks. Four or five big guns sent from Junagarh were too long in arriving. Success could be secured only by other means. Under the guidance of some Dutch artificers, he ran mines. The vast size. In front of the castle is the maidan [or esplanade]."

* For the siege of Surat Fort, Isardas, 11a and b; Tavernier, i. 328-329; Faiyaz-ul-qawanin, 421, 422 (mine fired on 20 Dec.), 423, 459, 461, 462; Khafi Khan, ii. 7; Alamgirnamah, 134 (meagre). In a letter to Shaista Khan, Murad pretends that he had merely sent his men (-six thousand troopers with guns!)—to draw his salary assigned on the Surat treasury as usual, when the qiladar, acting in Dara's interest, shut the fort gate in their face and opened fire on them; and that at the same time a letter from the qiladar's son at Court was intercepted reporting the death of Shah Jahan. Murad claims to have acted merely in self-defence. (Faiyaz, 454).
garrison tried to discover and destroy them, but without success. One of the mines crossed the wet ditch a yard below its bed, and reached the base of the outer earth-work technically called the Shir Haji. The chamber was filled with 50 maunds of powder and the charge fired (20th December). The explosion was terrible. Forty yards of the wall, with 40 swivel guns, 600 artillery-men and some kinsmen of the qiladar, were blown up. Syed Tayyib retired to the citadel, but disheartened by his losses and hopeless of being relieved, he surrendered on condition of a free passage to Delhi. The fort with its treasures and guns passed into the hands of Murad, whose exultation at it knew no bounds. Shahbaz Khan assembled the merchants and demanded from them a forced loan of ten lakhs of rupees. After much haggling the amount was reduced to one-half, and this sum was advanced to Murad's agents by the two richest merchants of the city, Haji Muhammad Zahid (the headman of the traders) and Pirji Borah, on behalf of the entire mercantile community of Surat. A bond for the amount, stamped with Murad's seal and endorsed by Shahbaz as security for repayment, was delivered to these two.*

* Khafi Khan, ii. 7, 250-251. According to Adab (205a)
The despatches of victory and the keys of the fort were presented to Murad at Ahmadabad on 26th December. But money was a more acceptable present, and he pressed his officers at Surat to send him all that they could, loaded on fast camels;* for, in the meantime he had crowned himself and begun to bestow offices and rewards and to enlist new troops on a scale that soon exhausted his treasury.

When the news of Shah Jahan's illness was followed by no tidings of his recovery, but letters from Delhi came fitfully and then stopped altogether, Murad's suspicions deepened into certainty. He concluded that Shah Jahan was already dead, and so got ready to contest the throne. It was necessary to look around for allies, and none was nearer to him than Aurangzib, his immediately elder brother, governing a neighbouring province and united to him by a common hatred of Dara. On 23rd December, 1652, he had met Aurangzib,† then journeying to the Deccan across his province of Malwa,

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* Faiyaz-ul-qawanin, 461, 465.
† Faiyaz, 412. Adab, 23b.
and the two had evidently formed a vague friendly understanding against Dara. But their plans now took definite shape in the shadow of the Emperor's approaching death. Curiously enough, on almost the same date (middle of October) both brothers suddenly remembered that they had not corresponded with each other for a long time past; their brotherly love welled out; and each wrote to the other a letter mentioning in a neutral tone the news of Shah Jahan's illness. But each letter was carried by a confidential messenger who was charged with certain oral communications which it was unsafe to put down on paper. The two letters crossed each other on the way.

Murad also wrote (19th October) a letter to Shuja proposing an alliance, and it was sent through Aurangzib's province, who helped the courier to proceed to Bengal and entrusted to him a letter of his own to the same purport.*

The correspondence thus began and went on briskly. To hasten the carriage of letters, relays of postal runners were established between Guzerat and the Deccan. Murad stationed two men every ten miles all the way from Ahmadabad to the Deccan frontier, (end

of November). Aurangzib continued the system eastwards to his own seat of government, and also proposed to Shuja a similar regular and joint service for the prompt conveyance of letters,—his men supplying the relays of runners from Aurangabad to the frontier of Orissa, and Shuja's servants taking charge of it from there to Rajmahal. Each prince also sent confidential agents to the Courts of the other two. Where hearts are set on one purpose, an agreement is soon arrived at. Correspondence with Shuja was slow and interrupted owing to the immense distance and lack of roads, and hence only a general agreement was formed with him. But between Aurangzib and Murad letters passed quickly, and the two soon matured a plan of concerted action. For secrecy of correspondence Aurangzib sent to Murad as early as 23rd October the key to a cypher to be used in future.† From the very beginning Murad places himself helplessly under Aurangzib's guidance. In letter after letter he asks for his brother's advice as to his own future steps, and writes, "I am ready to advance. Inform me of your wishes and I shall act accordingly." Indeed so wholly did Murad enter into Aurangzib's policy of throwing

* Adab, 171a, 205a and b; Faiyaz-ul-qawanin, 421, 422.
† Adab, 169b. Faiyaz, 424.
a religious cloak on their war of personal ambition, that his letters assume a sanctimonious tone calculated to raise a smile in those who knew of his private character. Taking the hint from Aurangzib, the gay reveller of Ahmadabad poses as the champion of Islam; he threatens Dara with extirpation as the enemy of the holy faith; he refers to his eldest brother as the Mulhid (Idolator),—the very term adopted by Aurangzib and his Court-historians; and he professes confidence about his future success in “reliance on the strong religion of Muhammad.”* In short, he was familiarising himself with the phraseology of one who would soon become a Padishah Ghazi, or “Emperor waging war on infidels.”

While his diplomacy was thus making happy progress and Shahbaz had sent him the first fruits of the loot of Surat city, Murad felt that further delay was a mere waste of opportunity. His action was also hastened by the astrologers who declared with one voice that at 4 hours 24 minutes after the sunrise of 20th November there was such a conjunction of auspicious planets as would not happen again for many years to come. The moment was too precious

* Faiyaz-ul-qawani, 427, 432.
to be lost. In all hurry and secrecy, at the time indicated Murad mounted a throne in his Hall of Private Audience, with only a few trusted officers as witnesses. Then he appeared at the public darbar and conferred titles, posts, and rewards,—the last being as yet in the form of promises only! The news was imparted in absolute confidence to his general Shahbaz in the besiegers' camp before Surat, with instructions to communicate it to one other high officer only.* The public coronation took place on 5th December with as much pomp and rejoicing as the low state of his finances would permit. The new Emperor took the title of Maruwwajuddin; his name was publicly read from the pulpits, he issued coins of his own, and conferred on his officers high-sounding titles like Murshidparast Khan Fatih Jang, Sultan Niaz Khan, and Tahawwur Khan. In the district towns, too, the new Emperor's titles were proclaimed from the pulpit, and the band played joyous notes. An envoy with gifts was sent to Persia to announce the glorious accession. The zamindars hastened to Court to pay their respects to the newly risen Sun.† Murad

* Faiyaz-ul-qawanin, 473-474.
thenceforth affected the royal style in his letters. On 19th January, 1658, his victorious troops from Surat joined him* at Ahmadabad; he was now quite ready to start for Agra, and waited impatiently for Aurangzib’s signal.

Before Murad could leave his province and embark on the perilous contest for the throne, there was one matter of supreme importance to be settled. Where was he to leave his wives and children in safety? No man could foresee the distant end of the struggle. He might wade through his brothers’ blood to the throne, and then all would be well. Or he might fail; and then would come a day of unspeakable misery for him and his family: the luckless claimant would be done to death in a gloomy prison; his head would be severed by the rude hands of slaves, critically examined by his victorious rival, and finally exposed to the public gaze; his widows would be dragged to the loathsome bed of their husband’s murderer; his tender children would be consigned to dungeon and either drugged with opium into imbecility or strangled to death when they came of age.

Murad, therefore, looked about for some stronghold where his family and those of his chief

* Faiyaz-ul-qawāmin, 464, 426.
adherents might reside in safety during his absence and even tide over any temporary reverse to his arms, some refuge to which he himself might gallop for shelter after the wreck of his army on an adverse field. Junagarh, at first contemplated, was rejected as too far off; Champanir was finally chosen.*

From the very outset Murad was for drawing the sword and throwing the scabbard away, while Aurangzib urged on him a cautious and temporising policy. Murad proposed that the brothers should march at once from the South and attack Dara before he had time to consolidate his power and win over the captains of the Imperial army posted far and near. Aurangzib pressed him not to take any compromising step or set up the banner of revolt openly, but to wait, to dissimulate, and to send hollow friendly letters to Dara, till they should know for certain that Shah Jahan was dead. He, therefore, condemned Murad's siege of Surat and public coronation as acts of too precipitate and open a character. But to such remonstrances Murad replied that Shah Jahan was already dead and that Dara's cunning hand had forged their father's style of writing and affixed the Imperial

* Faiyas-ul-qawanin, 420, 478.
seal to the letters issued in Shah Jahan's name. He rightly pointed out that no reliance could be placed on the letters from their agents at the capital reporting the old Emperor's recovery, because the houses of these agents were watched by Dara's men and they were compelled to write to their distant masters false news at the dictation of Mir Salih, the brother of Dara's secretary, Raushan-qalam.* In letter after letter, up to the actual starting for Northern India, we see Murad all fire and haste, while Aurangzib is cold and hesitating. Murad urges passionately but in vain, "To wait for true news from the Court is to lose time and assist our enemy;"—"The sooner you advance from Aurangabad to Burhanpur, the better for our work and truer to our agreement;"—"We are losing time and letting our business suffer, by waiting for certain news of Shah Jahan. Our enemy is growing stronger (in the meantime)";—"Let us start together for Agra. It only remains for you to give the order."†

Aurangzib had suggested to Murad that a diversion should be made against Persia with Dara by instigating the Persians and Uzbaks, to invade Afghanistan, which was then a province of the Mughal

* Adab, 170a and b, 205a. Faiyaz-ul-qawanin, 418, 429.
† Faiyaz-ul-qawanin, 418, 421, 422, 425, 427. Adab, 205a.
empire. This infamous counsel to bring a foreign enemy in to settle a domestic quarrel, was at first rejected by Murad as unnecessary; "As I know that the Persians, even without any prompting on our part, will make a move to wreak vengeance for the past, it does not seem proper for us to show eagerness and to direct them (to an invasion of India)." A little later Murad changed his mind, and, reporting the rumour of the death of Shah Jahan, begged armed aid from the Persian king. The latter replied that he had massed 30,000 men in Qandahar besides another force in Khurasan, in readiness to intervene in India, but in the meantime he was sending a high officer with some presents as envoy to Murad, in order to learn the real state to affairs in Hindustan. After his coronation (December) Murad sent a letter to Shah Abbas II. by the hand of Taqarrub Khan, to announce his accession and press for military assistance. The Shah in reply assured Murad of his friendship, and stated that he had already warned the Persian generals and nobles to be in readiness and had ordered provisions to be collected for a four or five years' campaign in India, and horses to be sent to Farah, Bist, and Qandahar, and would despatch a force of musketeers by sea to Surat to aid Murad, while the rest of the
Persian army would march inland through Qandahar to Kabul.* These promises either the Shah did not mean to keep, or they were rendered unnecessary by Aurangzib’s rapid and decisive success.

From the first Aurangzib had volunteered to help Murad, but on what terms? Evidently the understanding was that after their common enemy had been vanquished, the brothers would divide the empire among themselves. Yielding to Murad’s request, Aurangzib sent him the following definite and solemn written agreement† just before the march into Northern India:

“Whereas the design of acquiring the throne has now been set on foot, the standards of the Prophet have turned their faces to their goal, and all (my) pious aim is to uproot the bramble of idolatry and infidelity from the realm of Islam and to overwhelm and crush the idolatrous chief

* This account of the negotiations with Persia is based on Faiyaz-ul-qawanin, 422, 427, 430, 464, and Ruqat-i-Shah Abbas Sani, 13—16, 23—28 (to Murad). The Shah also intrigued with the Deccani Sultans and received from Dara a petition for aid and a request to conquer Bhakkar. Ruqat-i-Shah Abbas Sani, to Adil Shah (16—19, 93—100), to Qutb Shah (19—23, 89—93), to Dara (7—10), to the Governor of Multan (210—214).

† Adab-i-Alamgiri, 78b-79a. It is also quoted in the Tazkirah-i-salatin-i-Chaghtaia.
with his followers and strongholds, so that the
dust of disturbance may be allayed in Hindustan,
—and whereas my brother, dear as my own
heart, has joined me in this holy enterprise, has
confirmed anew with strong (professions of) faith
the terms of co-operation (between us previously)
built on promises and oaths, and has agreed that
after the extirpation of the enemy of Church and
State and the settlement of public affairs he will
stay firmly in the station of alliance and help,
and in this very manner, at all times and places,
and in all works, he will be my companion
and partner, the friend of my friends, the
foe of my foes, and will not ask for any land
besides the portion of Imperial dominions that
will be left to him at his request,—therefore,
I write that, so long as this brother does
not display any (conduct) opposed to one-
ess of aim, oneness of heart, and truthfulness,
my love and favour to him will daily increase;
I shall consider our losses and gains as alike, and
at all times and under all conditions I shall help
him; I shall favour him even more than now,
after my object has been gained and the God-
forsaken Idolator has been overthrown. I shall
keep my promise, and, as previously settled, I
shall leave to him the Panjab, Afghanistan, Kash-
mir, and Sindh (Bhakkar and Tatta),—the whole
of that region to the Arabian Sea, and I shall make no objection to it. As soon as the Idolator has been rooted out and the bramble of his tumult has been weeded out of the garden of the empire,—in which work your help and comradeship is necessary,—I shall without the least delay give you leave to go to this territory. As to the truth of this desire I take God and the Prophet as witnesses!"

Aurangzib’s confidential officer, Aqil Khan Razi, tells us a few details of the terms of the alliance.* "Aurangzib, deeming it politic to be united with Murad, sent him a loving letter begging him to come to him, and making this solemn promise and agreement: (1) One-third of the booty would belong to Murad Bakhsh and two-thirds to Aurangzib. (2) After the conquest of the whole empire, the Panjab, Afghanistan, Kashmir, and Sindh would belong to Murad, who would set up the standard of kingship there, issue coins, and proclaim his own name (khutba) as king."

At last Murad’s period of impatient and irksome waiting ended. Early in February, 1658, Aurangzib, then starting from Aurangabad, wrote to him to march out of his province about the time when he himself might be expected to reach

* Aqil Khan, 25.
the Narmada.* For a long time Murad had been uncertain as to which route the Imperial army would take in approaching Guzerat,—whether by way of Ajmir in his north or from Malwa in his east. At the end of January his spies brought him news that Jaswant had arrived near Ujjain with only three or four thousand troopers. So, Murad made light of the enemy and set out from Ahmadabad (25th February) north-eastwards by Modasa, crossed the frontier of his province on 13th March, and reached Mandesor on the 14th, occupying the villages of Malwa on the way.† We next hear of him a good deal southwards at Dohad, on 4th April. In the meanwhile he had learnt that Jaswant's force was many times stronger than his own, and so he had hurriedly retreated towards his own territory to wait for news of Aurangzib, of whom he had not heard anything during the entire month of March.‡

Jaswant had issued from Ujjain westwards by the Banswara road, and taken post six miles from Kachraud, to wait for Murad. That prince was then 36 miles away, and on learning of the ene-

* Alamgirnammah, 43; Faiyaz, 430.
‡ Faiyaz, 445; Kambu, 11a.
my's strength and position, he prudently made a detour to avoid Kachraud and arrive nearer to Aurangzib's line of advance. In pursuance of this plan Murad marched south-east from Dohad, crossed the pass of Jhabua, and encamped at Mandalpur (probably Barmandal.) Here, on 13th April, he received a confidential messenger from Aurangzib and the news of the latter having arrived in the neighbourhood. Then Murad resumed his march, and next day he joined Aurangzib on the way, a few miles north-east of Dipalpur. The armies of the two brothers were now united, because the enemy was at hand and a battle was imminent.

CHAPTER XIV.

AURANGZIB ADVANCES FROM THE DECCAN, 1658.

From 4th October 1657, when Aurangzib retired from the war with Bijapur, to 25th January 1658, when he began his march towards Hindustan as a claimant to the throne, he passed through a most anxious and critical time. Events which he could not possibly control were moving fast, and he was bound to move also if he was not to perish. And yet the future was so dark and the danger of every possible course of action so great, that a wise decision was extremely difficult to make. His present position was daily growing more untenable, while the future was ominous. But the difficulties, great and complex, which he overcame raise to the highest pitch our admiration for his coolness, sagacity, power of managing men, and diplomatic skill. If it be urged that these do not
completely account for his success and that he was also beholden to Fortune, then the impartial historian of the period must admit that Aurangzib had done everything to deserve Fortune's help.

Whichever way Aurangzib turned, he was faced with danger. The exulting Deccanis interpreted his retreat from Bidar as a confession of defeat. The Bijapuris boasted that they had rolled the tide of Mughal invasion back; their armies tried to hem the Imperialists round; and their local officers drove out isolated Mughal outposts. Even the Sultan of Golkonda seized the opportunity of the retirement of Mughal troops: he renewed his efforts to retain a hold on the Karnatak and tried to seize some villages near the frontier fort of Udgir.*

Yet Aurangzib could not remain where he was. The news had got out that the Emperor had ordered peace to be made and recalled the additional troops sent to the Deccan. It was impossible for Aurangzib to punish the Bijapuris by arms, or to overawe them by a display of superior force. He could not even safely stay

* The Bijapur historian asserts that Aurangzib escaped with his army from the Bijapur territory only by bribing the wazir Khan Muhammad (Basatin-i-salatin, 349.) Adab, 70b, 197a.
in their territory. A cruel fate threatened to snatch away from his grasp the fruits of his long and costly war with Bijapur, just when he was about to taste them. True, Adil Shah had agreed by solemn treaty to pay a huge indemnity and to cede the fort of Parenda and a large tract of land. But how could he be held to his promise now? Concessions wrung by force could be maintained by force alone.

Aurangzib, therefore, determined to play a game of boldness in order to realise the terms of the treaty before the Bijapuris could recover from their recent defeats or learn of the full extent of the weakness and distraction of the Imperial Government. He at first gave it out that he would stay at Bidar in readiness to punish the Bijapuris if they broke their word. Later on he announced a wish to march in person to Ahmadnagar, and actually sent his army under his son there, in order to overawe the refractory qiladar of Parenda, who was not yielding up his charge. In his letters to Bijapur he frequently invoked his father's authority in demanding the quick payment of the promised indemnity and threatened war in case of default. But this policy of facing round to Bijapur and
making military demonstrations in the South had its drawbacks too. The affairs of Hindustan had necessarily to be neglected. The longer Aurangzib delayed in maturing his plans for contesting the throne, proclaiming himself a claimant, and marching on Hindustan, the greater was the time that would Dara gain for recalling the chief captains from the Deccan, winning over officers and men far and near, consolidating his own power, and effectually counteracting Aurangzib's possible designs. Moreover, during this period of suspense all ambitious and selfish men were likely to go over to Dara in the belief that the timid and slow Aurangzib would never make himself Emperor.*

If, on the other hand, Aurangzib concentrated his forces, made a public claim to the throne, marched northwards and openly broke with the Imperial government by enlisting troops and forcibly detaining with himself the officers ordered back to the Court,—then he would, no doubt, check Dara in time, he would secure the adhesion of ambitious adventurers. But at the same time the helpless condition of Shah Jahan, the civil war among the princes, and the temporary collapse of the Imperial authority would become

* Adab, 94a.
patent to Bijapur, and all hope of getting Paren-
da or the promised indemnity would be gone. And at the same time his other enemies in the South would raise their heads: Golkonda would recover the reluctantly ceded and eagerly coveted province of Karnatak; Shivaji would raid the Junnar and Ahmadnagar districts. In short, the fruits of the last two years’ warfare in the South would be totally lost to him.

The whole history of Aurangzib’s changing anxieties and hopes, plans and devices, and the variations of his policy with every fresh development during this eventful period, is clearly and fully unfolded in his numerous confidential letters to Mir Jumla preserved in the Adab-i-Alamgiri.* Briefly put, his first plan was to realise the terms of the Bijapur treaty as quickly as possible and then, secure about the Deccan, to embark on the struggle for the throne. The success of this plan, depended on the Bijapuris promptly keeping their promises, before the secret of Shah Jahan’s helpless illness leaked out. The letters tell the story of how the hope of a speedy settlement with Bijapur daily grew fainter

* Adab, 92a—95a (Aurangzib to Mir Jumla), 197a—206a (Qabil Khan, by order of Aurangzib, to Mir Jumla), 178b (Qabil Khan to Aurangzib).
and fainter, how he tried diverse means to get
the promised territory and money, how he
conceded to Bijapur one by one the hard terms
wrung out of it by the treaty,—till at last, in
despair of getting anything from Bijapur, he
gave up all thought of the South, and turned his
undivided attention and resources to the pursuit
of his schemes in Northern India.

Compelled to give up for the present the
idea of further conquests from
Bijapur, Aurangzib, on 28th
September, sent Mir Jumla
towards Parenda to take delivery
of the Fort in terms of the treaty. Qazi
Nizama, who accompanied the Mir, was
soon afterwards deputed to Bijapur to realise
the promised indemnity. But before the Mir's
departure, Aurangzib had held long and secret
consultations with him and taken his advice on
every possible contingency in anticipation.
Even after Mir Jumla had gone towards Parenda,
Aurangzib wrote to him almost every day, and
important oral messages were delivered and
consultations held with him by means of
confidential officers like Shaikh Mir and Abul
Fath, who made repeated trips between the
Prince and the minister. Not a step was taken
without first seeking Mir Jumla's advice. "I
have no friend or confidant but you," as Aurangzib told him.

The Prince set out on his return from Kaliani on 4th October and reached Bidar in five days. A Mughal garrison under Ali Beg was left to hold Kaliani. At Bidar, according to the Emperor's last orders, Aurangzib was to halt and keep hold of the conquered territory. But untoward events rendered his stay here useless and even dangerous. High officers like Mahabat Khan and Rao Chhatra Sal had left for Delhi at the Imperial summons. Another great general, Nasiri Khan, though entreated by Aurangzib to stay till he was relieved, had abandoned his post at Bir to return to his charge of Raisin in Malwa. The retreat of the army from Kaliani was taken to mean an abandonment of the new conquest. The Bijapuris grew bolder and attacked detached Mughal parties wherever they could find them. Their general Afzal Khan with a large army crossed the Binathora river and advanced to recover the Kaliani and Bidar districts. Worst of all, the Bijapuris intercepted near Naldrug Aurangzib's despatch to Mir Jumla together with the deciphered copy of a secret letter he had received from his agent at Delhi, and thus
they learnt the truth about Shah Jahan's critical condition and the hostility between Dara and his brothers.* Aurangzib himself was growing more and more anxious at having got no fresh letter from Delhi for several days past. Was his father dead? If so, he must make an attempt for the throne without further loss of time.

So, he provided for the future with his usual foresight and wisdom. Bidar Fort was repaired, the ravages of the late siege restored, its artillery properly arranged, and the necessary provisions and munitions stored. A garrison of 5,500 under Mir Jafar was left here. At this time Aurangzib wrote to Murad a letter which merely said, "You have not written to me for a long time past....I shall soon return to Aurangabad. You must have heard the news about the Imperial Court." But his real message, proposing an offensive and defensive alliance between the two brothers against Dara, was orally entrusted to Allah Yar, the confidential messenger who carried the letter to Murad. He also wrote similar letters to Shuja in Bengal. A communication received from Delhi on the 17th, after a

long silence, only confirmed his suspicion that Shah Jahan had lost his control and that affairs at Court had taken a new turn. Therefore, he made up his mind, and started from Bidar on 18th October, 1657."

Immediately there was the greatest rejoicing in the Deccani kingdoms. Here were the Mughals abandoning their late conquests as untenable! In vain did Aurangzib try to put a bold face on the matter; in vain did he write to Qutb Shah: "The retreat of my army was due to a wish to reassure the people of Bijapur who were frightened by its presence and had abandoned the cultivation of their lands, and also because I had got news that my Begam's illness had increased." The plea was too palpably false to be believed. While his vanquished enemies were raising their heads in the South, and a storm was brewing against him in the North, Aurangzib received one of the severest domestic shocks: the day after leaving Bidar he learnt that his principal wife

Death of his wife Dilras Banu.

* Adab, 92b, 169a and b, 199a. Kambu, 6b.
† Adab, 71a.
‡ Adab, 198a, asserts that Aurangzib learnt the news on 19th October one march out of Bidar, but 190a states that the news reached Aurangzib's Court at Bidar in the night preceding the 18th.
and the mother of three of his sons had died at Aurangabad on the 8th of the month.

Shah Jahan had ordered Aurangzib to stay at Bidar; but the prince now got a plausible excuse for marching to Aurangabad, viz., to console his children newly bereaved of their mother. For some weeks after leaving Bidar he did not write any letter to the Emperor, nor give any reason for his return to Aurangabad.* But he corresponded frequently with Shuja and Murad, especially the latter, who was nearest to him, and thus built up an alliance against Dara. Murad's first letter, sent with a confidential servant named Muhammad Raza on 19th October, had crossed Aurangzib's letter to him (written about the 15th). And now, assured of his support, Aurangzib sent him the key to a cypher in which their future correspondence was to be conducted, as: "prudence is needful, and writing in the ordinary alphabet is not proper."†

On leaving Bidar, Aurangzib's plan at first was to go to Pathri, some 120 miles north, where the road for Burhanpur and Hindustan branches off from that leading to Aurangabad. If he heard of Shah Jahan's death on the

* Adab, 198a and b.
† Aurangzib to Murad (Adab, 169a-170a), to Shuja (Adab, 170a—171a). Murad to Aurangzib (Faiyaz, 413—435).
way he would follow the former route and march into Northern India; otherwise he would set his face westwards and return to Aurangabad, the seat of his viceroyalty.* But the period of uncertainty was only prolonged; no decisive information came from Delhi, and for weeks after leaving Bidar, Aurangzib passed his time in the greatest anxiety and vacillation.

On 18th October he learnt from a letter of his agent at Delhi that Shah Jahan had become helpless; on the 21st came another letter, saying that the Emperor’s illness was decreasing. A third letter, received on the 22nd, brought news of an opposite tenour: Dara had become supreme at Court and was daily strengthening his position. A secret message from the Collector of Agra, evidently professing devotion, reached Aurangzib at this time. It only confirmed his worst suspicions: the very fact of such a letter being written meant that a demise of royalty had taken place or was very imminent; “one of these two alternatives must have happened,—Shah Jahan is either dead or a helpless invalid.”†

In view of these facts Aurangzib proposed to send his son Muhammad Sultan with an army to Burhanpur, to close the ferry over the Tapti river,

* Adab, 198a.
† Adab 199a—200b, 169b.
to detain in the Deccan nobles like Nasiri Khan then returning north at the Imperial summons, and also to assemble the local landholders in the Prince's service and enlist new troops. But to do so would have been to commit himself openly; it would have been an overt act of rebellion, which he could not have explained away if Shah Jahan recovered. Aurangzib, therefore, hesitated and asked Mir Jumla's opinion, who condemned the proposal and requested that Muhammad Sultan should be sent towards Parenda instead.*

In fact, while days and weeks wore on without the expected event taking place at Delhi, Aurangzib and Mir Parenda Fort, Jumla were wistfully looking towards Parenda. Every letter of Aurangzib to the Mir contained an urgent order "to settle the affair of Parenda as quickly as possible, in order that the most important business of all may be undertaken before it is too late." The minister still flattered himself that the fort could be secured by threat or bribe, and both these means were employed in turn. But Aurangzib made a more correct estimate of the character of the Bijapuris and their future line of action than Mir Jumla did. He frankly wrote, "No trust in the words of the Bijapuris....They used to lie

* Adab, 200a, 201b.
even in the life-time of Khan Muhammad (who was in our interest). There is no hope that the affair (of peace) will be accomplished....No good waiting in vain near the fort of Parenda.”*

Mir Jumla, however, persisted in his own view. At his request Aurangzib sent him solemn written promises of high favours addressed to the qiladar of Parenda to induce him to give up the fort. But the attempt failed. Then Mir Jumla tried a show of force. To please him, Aurangzib reluctantly sent Muhammad Sultan with a part of the army from his side at Pathri (4th Nov.) to join the Mir near Parenda. The young prince was told to place himself under Mir Jumla’s orders, and “to be guided entirely by his judgment.”†

Mir Jumla had hoped that the force accompanying Sultan would be exaggerated by popular report and this would cow down the Bijapuri qiladar. Aurangzib even made a public declaration that he was himself going to Ahmadnagar to coerce the Bijapuris, and ordered the palace there to be got ready for his use.‡ But all these tricks failed. The news of Shah Jahan’s

* Adab, 200b, 93a and b.
† Adab 201b, 203a and b.
‡ Adab, 71a, 150b.
illness became public. The Bijapuris shrewdly guessed the situation. They knew that Aurangzib, with his depleted force and distraction about the succession, was not prepared to renew the war with them, and so they delayed yielding their forts and paying the promised indemnity. Mir Jumla, still hoping against hope, lingered near Parenda, trusting that his envoy at the Bijapur Court would influence the Sultan and his Ministers and secure the peaceful surrender of Parenda. Though every moment was precious for "the most important business of all" and Aurangzib was impatient to get Mir Jumla back at his side to make the necessary preparations for war with Dara, yet he permitted the Mir to continue in that quarter with M. Sultan for weeks longer, if by so doing he expected to get Parenda. About 6th December Sultan was recalled to his father's side and Prince Muazzam was sent in his place to Mir Jumla's camp near Bir.*

But the hope of getting Parenda and the war-indemnity grew fainter and fainter, and, as the complexion of affairs at Delhi grew more and

* Adab, 93b-94a, 94b.
more ominous, Aurangzib relaxed and finally abandoned all his claims on Bijapur and tried to make friends with Adil Shah in a fashion amusing to those who know not the crooked ways of diplomacy. As early as the end of October he had instructed Mir Jumla to terminate the affair of Bijapur by giving up all claims to Parenda and tribute, and remaining content with Adil Shah's promises and oaths to maintain peace on the withdrawal of the Mughal army. But evidently Mir Jumla still hoped to get the cessions, and so he did not then adopt the policy here recommended. He spent three months in the Bir district, within easy reach of Parenda, in the vain hope of inducing the Bijapuris to keep their promises. At last even he was undeceived; he confessed that there was no good in staying there any longer. His return to Aurangabad was hastened by a peremptory order of recall received from Shah Jahan about 22nd December. Leaving Bir about the 27th of the month, he reached Aurangabad about the first of January, 1658.*

* Adab, 202b, 94b.
Aurangzib had arrived at Aurangabad on 11th November, 1657, and set himself to the task of preparing the way for his own succession to the throne. He had one eye turned on Mir Jumla at Bir and another on Shah Jahan at Agra. The idea of his marching to Ahmadnagar to overawe the Bijapuri officers was definitely abandoned. On 28th October he had taken a very necessary precaution by sending a force under Malik Husain to Handia to seize all the ferries of the Narmada and prevent correspondence between Dara and the Mughal officers in the Deccan. He also wrote friendly letters to the Gond Rajahs of Deogarh and Chanda, through whose territories his road to Agra lay. A few men in his camp who had tried to send news to Agra were punished and carefully watched, and a secret courier was expelled. At the same time he urged his friends to collect news: "We should be on the watch to get news from all sides." His alliance with Murad was made strong and its terms clearly defined. Letters were frequently sent to Shuja, both by way of Agra—which route was unsafe, being in his enemy's hands,—and also through Orissa. But distance forbade any useful
league or concerted action between these two brothers. So, they were content to vow mutual friendship and a common hostility to Dara.*

But what line of action was Aurangzib to adopt now? His followers were looking up to him to declare his policy. A prompt decision was required from him; but a decision at this stage was most difficult to make, and beset with dangers. The news from the Imperial Court was conflicting. The first intimation of Shah Jahan's illness was followed by a long silence; from about 8th October to the 18th he received no tidings of his father's condition. Then (on 18th October) he learnt from his agent at Delhi that Shah Jahan had lost all control and that the state of affairs at the capital had taken a new character. Three days afterwards came a letter (written on the 5th) saying that Shah Jahan's illness was decreasing and that he was conducting business without difficulty. The next day brought another letter (dated the 10th) from his agent at Court, which stated that Dara had virtually usurped the government and was doing everything at his own will,—changing officers, taking away jagirs, and collecting men and money, though the orders were issued in Shah

* Adab, 93a, 201b, 170b, 203a.
Jahan’s name. Other communications from Agra only increased his distraction and uncertainty about Shah Jahan’s real condition.

His followers were equally distracted. As he wrote to Mir Jumla, “The army of this province, after a year’s hard campaigning, has lost heart on hearing of the Emperor’s illness, and has been unsettled in various ways. They are in greater trouble than can be described. Many (of my) officers want to return to the Emperor.”* How harassing Aurangzib’s anxieties were and how open to objection every possible line of action before him was, will be seen from the following letter which he wrote to Mir Jumla in cypher:

“The desires of my well-wishers can be realised only when the occurrence of Shah Jahan’s death is verified, and the news of it arrives. Otherwise, what probability is there that in the Emperor’s lifetime and before the divulgence of the heart’s secret desire of my other comrades (allies) such a work will be undertaken, and the project of advancing and crossing the (frontier) river carried out? But I gather from my Court agent’s letter that it is impossible for the Emperor to recover from this disease; he has not strength enough left to pull him back to life. Most probably the affair has (already) become past remedy.

If in such circumstances, I delay in equipping my army and publishing my claim (to the throne), in what hope will men consent to keep my company? If the officers here, seeing my negligence and indifference, return to the Court, and Dara becomes aware of my condition, it will be impossible

* Adab, 93b.
for me to attract other worldlings and seekers of rank. So, I have determined on this:—if we can quickly conclude the affair of Bijapur, it will be good, because then I can reach Burhanpur before the screen is withdrawn, Shaista Khan recalled to Court, somebody else appointed in his place (as Governor of Malwa), and Dara wins over the zamindars (of that province) and seizes the forts of Raisin, Mandu, etc. The fort of Raisin, which is under Nasiri Khan, can be got (by us) now without effort, and the army of this province can be led by hope to accompany me, and fresh troops may be carefully enlisted.

But if the Bijapur affair is delayed, and my scattered forces cannot be concentrated, and, in the meantime, the true news (of Shah Jahan's death) arrives, the time for most of the above works will have already slipped away. That is the reason why I have been hurrying you.*

When, in the 4th week of December, Mir Jumla received a strict order of recall from Shah Jahan, Aurangzib's depression reached its lowest point. He wrote to his confidant: "Friend, God assist you! What shall I write about my own troubled state or describe how the days pass over me? I have no remedy save patience."†

Murad, too, was urging him in letter after letter, to be immediately up and doing, and not to give Dara and watch. Aurangzib wishes to wait and not to give further time to strengthen his own position and cripple his brothers' power beyond repair. But Aurangzib refused to raise the banner of rebellion before knowing for certain that Shah Jahan was dead. His own army was

* Adab, 94a.
† Adab, 95a.
small, and he was making desperate efforts to collect the sinews of war by securing the payment of at least one portion of the Bijapur indemnity. Possibly also, he waited to let Dara show his hand and divide his strength by attacking one of the brothers first.*

But the quick march of events forced Aurangzib’s hand. He learnt by 24th November that Dara had decided to send an Imperial army against Shuja who was advancing from Bengal. Shah Jahan’s policy (he inferred) was clearly this: ‘So long as a few days of his life remain and out of regard for him no unfilial movement is undertaken from any quarter, he will make such arrangements that after (his death) no injury may be done by any (of the other three princes) to Dara.’†

Dara’s plan with regard to the South was now fully unfolded. He wanted to weaken each of his two brothers there and set one against the other. For this he made the helpless Shah Jahan transfer Berar from Aurangzib to Murad and remove the latter from the viceroyalty of Guzerat. But Murad had discussed with Aurangzib and pre-

* Anecdotes of Aurangzib, § 6. Adab, 205a.
† Adab, 205b.
pared himself beforehand for such a contingency; he refused either to take Berar or to give up Guzerat.* Dara then sent two Imperial armies under Jaswant Singh and Qasim Khan, the governors-designate of Malwa and Guzerat, to bar the path of Aurangzib and expel Murad from Guzerat. These two forces left Agra on 18th and 26th December. Murad's *jagirs* in Malwa were taken away, and Shaista Khan removed from that province as friendly to Aurangzib. In December, Murad crowned himself and took Surat Fort by force; and such overt rebellion could not be left unpunished by the Imperial government. Lastly, Mir Jumla received a formal Imperial letter of recall which it would have been flat rebellion to disregard. Similar letters reached Aurangzib's officers.†

The time for action had at last arrived. Further inactivity under these circumstances was impossible if Aurangzib hoped ever to be king or even to live in freedom. His mind was made up. He sent a most flattering letter to Mir Jumla, highly extolling his wisdom, thank-

* Faiyaz, 413-414.
† Adab, 94b, 202b. Kambu, 10a.
ing him for his entire devotion to his interests, and placing him above all his other followers:—

"I know you are faithful to your word. Your intention in going to Hindustan was and is no other than to increase my power and grandeur and to make me succeed in my heart's desire. You have often said within my hearing, 'I wish for life only that I may see the master of mankind (=Aurangzib) on the throne; and in realising this aim I value not my life or property.' Now is the time to display your devotion. I do not need others in making the necessary equipment for this business, while you are alive. I care not for those (officers) who have been estranged from me by reason of my partiality to you. Come to me, so that with your advice I may engage in preparations for the work of gaining the crown."*

Mir Jumla returned to Aurangabad about 1st January, 1658, avowing that he was going to Agra to wait on the Emperor. But a plot had been already contrived between him and Aurangzib, and a little play was acted to save the Mir's family at the capital from Dara's vengeance. Mir Jumla feigned fear of Aurangzib's intentions and refused to see him, saying, "As I have been ordered by the Emperor to go to him, I have no choice but to obey." Aurangzib sent him a friendly message through his son Muhammad Sultan, "to drive all suspicion out of his mind" and to

* Adab, 205b, (a report of Aurangzib's words that Qabil Khan wrote to Mir Jumla).
persuade him to visit the Prince in order to receive an important oral message for the Emperor. As soon as Mir Jumla entered the chamber of Aurangzib, he was arrested at a preconcerted signal,* and all his property and artillery seized by Aurangzib in the name of the State. But the mask had not yet been thrown off, and so Aurangzib gave an ostensible reason for this act: he publicly announced that Mir Jumla was thus punished because he had not sufficiently exerted himself against Bijapur and was in secret collusion with the two Deccani sultans! But his real motive comes out in the letter which he wrote to the Mir after defeating Dara, when he set him free and said, "You insisted on going back to the Court at an inconvenient time in spite of my urging you to the contrary."† The captive wazir was lodged in the prison-fort of Daulatabad, to be released, restored to his property, and promoted to the highest rank of the nobility with the honoured titles of Premier

* Kambu, 10b. Aqil Khan 20. Alamgirnamah, 83 and 84.
† Aqil Khan, 20. Adab, 67b, 95a (Aurangzib writes, "That I imprisoned you was not due to any disloyalty on your part. Only you showed remissness in exertion and insisted on going back, &c.") Khafi Khan writes "Aurangzib imprisoned Mir Jumla at Daulatabad as a stroke of policy to prevent his ill repute." (ii. 9). The official history, Alamgirnamah also admits that Mir Jumla was arrested "for political reasons" (84).
Peer (Khan-i-khanan) and Faithful Friend (Yar-i-wafadar), as soon as Aurangzib made himself Emperor.*

Even at this stage Aurangzib was not prepared to break openly with the Imperial Court by taking an irrevocable step. He urged Murad to abate his ardour and practise subterfuge. For himself he announced that his loving heart had been distracted by hearing sad rumours about Shah Jahan, and that like a dutiful son he was going to Agra to see his father in his illness, release him from Dara’s control, and thereby save the empire from alarm, confusion and tumult. As his pious journey to his father was likely to be resisted by Dara’s creatures, he was taking his army with himself; but his mission was entirely pacific. So he wrote to Shah Jahan and the new wazir Jafar Khan.†

In the meantime, from the beginning of January he had been pushing his military preparations most vigorously on. First, he wanted to settle the problems of the Deccan and secure the sinews of war. Letters were written to Qutb Shah press-

* Adab, 96a. Alamgirnamah 191, 563.
ing him to pay up the balance of his indemnity. Since his return from Haidar-ar
dealings with bad Aurangzib’s tone towards the Golkonda king had been harsh and chiding. He was particularly displeased at Abdullah having intrigued with Dara and poisoned the Emperor’s ears against him. He frequently duns him for the arrears of tribute and the balance of the promised indemnity, urges him to banish from his mind the vain dream of keeping hold of the Karnatak, and warns him to withdraw from that province his officers (especially Abdul Jabbar), who were obstructing Mir Jumla’s agents there. Further the Golkonda king is commanded to restore the relays of postmen established by Mir Jumla from Mughal Deccan to the Karnatak across the Golkonda territory. When Qutb Shah prayed for the remission of a part of his indemnity, Aurangzib tauntingly replied, “What can I do? You better appeal to Jahanara and Dara, and through their mediation submit a petition to the Emperor.” And again, “You do not keep your promises but are listening to wicked and ruinous advice. I cannot save you!”

During the invasion of Bijapur, Qutb Shah is asked to send a contingent of auxiliaries. “You

* Adab, 59a–63b, 69a-70a (Aurangzib to Qutb Shah).
have kept 12,000 horsemen inspite of your (pretended) poverty. Send me 5,000 of them quickly, as you promised. Do not delay in providing the arrears of tribute. Recall your men from Mir Jumla's estates in the Karnatak." A harsh and rude officer, Mir Ahmad Said, was sent as Mughal envoy to Golkonda to hustle the defaulting king and exact the arrears of tribute. When Aurangzib retreated from Bidar, he thus rebuked Qutb Shah: "I learn that on hearing of the march of the Imperial army from Bidar and the circulation of some false rumours (about Shah Jahan's death) among the vulgar, you have changed your attitude of fidelity, and your silly ministers have given you improper counsels,—so that you are making delay in sending escort and despatching the collected arrears of tribute; you are trusting to a fox-like policy and are passing your time idly under a false hope......Relying on false news, you have ceased to keep your former promises!"*

But soon afterwards his own needs forced Aurangzib to assume a gentler tone. First, he instructed Mir Ahmad not to pain the king's mind in realising the tribute due. Later on, the objectionable envoy was recalled and one more acceptable to the king was sent in his place, with

* Adab, 69a, 70a-71a.
instructions to behave gently to him. When his Vanguard was being sent to Burhanpur, Aurangzib urged Qutb Shah thus: "Now is the time for you to show your friendship and exert yourself that nothing unfriendly may be done." A little later, when Aurangzib himself marched northwards to contest the throne, he sent a most conciliatory letter to Qutb Shah, urging him to guard the frontiers of Mughal Karnatak from mischievous persons and not to encroach on the Imperial territory.*

Aurangzib also sent friendly epistles and presents to the Queen Mother of Bijapur, urging her to expedite the payment of the indemnity, and next despatched a secret oral message to her. Just before marching to Burhanpur he wrote again to her: "I hope the Deccani sultans will remain quiet (during my absence) and you will keep your promise (about sending the indemnity money), so that I may reward you when I have become Emperor."†

We have seen how as early as October Aurangzib had proposed to Mir Jumla a friendly settlement with Bijapur by abandoning all claims to the territory and indemnity promised by that

* Adab, 64, 71b, 65a and b, 72a.  
† Adab, 51b-52b.
State in the recent treaty.* This policy, held in reserve at that time, was now put in practice. Adil Shah was informed by the Prince, "At Mir Jumla's wicked advice I had attacked your kingdom as well as Golkonda. Guard your people well. Let there be peace and happiness. Remain loyal and keep your promises....I agree that (1) the fort of Parenda and its dependent territory, the Konkan, and the mahal of Wangi, which have been annexed to the empire, together with that portion of the Karnatak which had been granted to the late Adil Shah,—should be left to you as before, and (2) out of your promised indemnity of one krore of rupees, thirty lakhs are remitted.

Protect this country; improve its administration. Expel Shiva who has sneaked into possession of some forts of the land. If you wish to entertain his services, give him jagirs in the Karnatak, far from the Imperial dominions, so that he may not disturb them. Send the reduced indemnity. Be loyal, and you will be amply rewarded.—I am going to Hindustan with my army. Now is the time to show your loyalty and friendliness. The late Adil Shah had promised to send a contingent to me, should an

* Adab, 202a and b.
occasion for it arise. Do you send me at least 10,000 cavalry. I shall grant you the territory up to the bank of the Banganga. I promise not to accept the offer of Shahji or of the sons of Bahlol and other officers of yours to enter my service. So long as you remain faithful, no officer of this Court will molest your dominion. Should any one come from Hindustan to invade your country, I shall defend it.”*

The concessions here made were ample beyond Adil Shah’s fondest dreams, and he knew that they would be withdrawn as soon as Aurangzib’s need was over. Indeed the above offer contained conditions liable to great latitude of interpretation; and afterwards, in his hour of victory over his rivals, Aurangzib seized this loophole to repudiate his promises and to demand more than all that Bijapur had agreed to yield by the treaty of August, 1657.†

But some money realised from the Deccani sultans now fell into Aurangzib’s hands and helped to equip him for the arduous struggle for the throne.‡ Mir Jumla’s wealth and excellent

* Adab, 162a-163b.
† Adab, 167b.
‡ The public money in the Deccan just before the invasion of Bijapur was 64 lakhs of rupees,—viz., Reserves of 20 lakhs at Daulatabad and Asir, and of 30 lakhs in the other public treasuries, Golkonda indemnity of 2 lakhs of hun
park of artillery, served by European gunners, were of inestimable use to Aurangzib, who had attached them early in January. These "supplied the much-needed means of Aurangzib's progress towards his object, at this critical time," as the historian Aqil Khan Razi points out.

All this time Aurangzib was intriguing actively but in secret with the courtiers at the capital and the high officers in the provinces (especially Malwa). Some anecdotes have come down to us which prove that Aurangzib was regarded by the ministers and even by Shah Jahan himself, as the ablest of the princes. I find it impossible to reject them entirely as prophecies made after the event. Of all the four sons of Shah Jahan he had the best reputation for capacity and experience; the known record of his actual performances was most varied and distinguished. Evidently all self-seeking nobles and officers recognised (=10 lakhs of rupees) realised by Ahmad Said about Dec. 1656 (Adab, 195b, Waris, 121b.), Bijapur present of four lakhs of rupees in cash and kind brought to Aurangabad by Abul Hasan, in the 3rd quarter of 1656 (Adab, 191a). From this total must be deducted the cost of the war with Bijapur and bribes to Bijapuri deserters, against which the 12 lakhs worth of booty taken at Bidar was a partial set off. What wealth, if any, Aurangzib and Muhammad Sultan secretly took from Qutb Shah we know not; but popular report greatly magnified it.
him as the coming man, and hastened to secure their future by doing him friendly turns or at least by sending him secret assurances of their support. As Dara reported to Shah Jahan, "Aurangzib is winning over the nobles and the pillars of the State. He is doing his work by means of secret epistles."*

The enlisting of new soldiers had been going on apace. A bounty of one month's pay was advanced to all recruits. Muhammad Beg in Khandesh was ordered to select and engage as many Bundela infantry and Buxari artillery-men of reputation as he could get. Two officers were sent to bring 2,000 maunds of saltpetre from Balapur and to buy sulphur and arsenic at Surat and convey these materials to Burhanpur for manufacturing gunpowder. Lead for making shot in sufficient quantity was stored at Burhanpur and Handia. A quantity of gunpowder and fuses, evidently taken from the Deccan forts, accompanied the Vanguard led by Muhammad Sultan. A thousand soldiers were enlisted by Sultan Beg in the sarkar of Bijaygarh. Many Maratha chiefs also joined Aurangzib with their contingents. In this way

* Ruqat-i-Alamgiri, Nos. 54 and 5, India Office Pers. MS. 370, f. 81a, Kambu, 8b, 10a, Aqil Khan, 23.
his army was swollen to 30,000 picked troopers, besides Mir Jumla’s excellent train of cannon served by English and French gunners.\* Aurangzib was even stronger in officers than in men and material. During his rule of the Deccan he had gathered round himself a band of very able servants, all attached to him by gratitude and some by personal affection. They did him signal service during the contest for the throne, often giving up their lives in stemming the enemy’s onset in the hard fights of the War of Succession. Those who survived naturally rose to the highest offices, and were at once the pillars of his throne and ornaments of his Court during the early years of his reign. Such were Murshid Quli Khan the diwan, Shaikh Mir the warrior and confidential adviser, Aqil Khan Razi the equery and personal attendant, Qabil Khan the facile and trusty secretary, Khan-i-Zaman the energetic Inspector of Ordnance, Muhammad Tahir, a veteran captain raised to the peerage as Wazir Khan, the faithful envoy Isa Beg (created Mukhlis Khan), the highborn and experienced Shamsuddin Mukhtar Khan,

\* Adab, 93b, 168b-169a, Isar-das (16a) and Aqil Khan (25) both estimate Aurangzib’s army at 30,000 strong. Also Kambu, 11b. A. N. 42.
and above all that jewel of a servant, Mir Jumla, great in war, greater still in counsel. Of the Imperial officers who had served in the Deccan, besides Multafat Khan, his able son Hushdar Khan, Najabat Khan, Qazi Nizama and some others, Aurangzib secured the adhesion of Nasiri Khan, recently transferred from the Deccan to Malwa. Lastly, he released from prison and took with himself Rajah Indradyumna of Dhamdhera, a valiant Rajput of Malwa. Two other of the most devoted Hindu followers of Aurangzib were Rao Karan the Rajah of Bikanir and Subh-Karan the Bundela chieftain of Datia and father of the more renowned general Dalpat Rao.

Before leaving the Deccan he took steps to maintain his hold on the country during his absence. Shah Beg Khan was recalled from the Karnatak with his detachment, and ordered to guard the province. Prince Muazzam was left at Aurangabad with two high officers and a strong force to carry on the government and to prevent the public peace from being broken by Shivaji. Aurangzib did not lose his fear lest that "son of a dog," as he called the youthful Maratha leader, should

* Adab, 99, M. U. ii. 265.
seize the opportunity of his absence. His newborn son Muhammad Akbar was left in Fort Daulatabad with his harem, but two other sons, Muhammad Sultan and Muhammad Azam, accompanied him to the war. Some forts were also repaired and a wall of defence built round the suburb of Karan-pura, as the absence of the main army in Northern India might tempt spoilers. The officers were ordered to engage houses at Aurangabad and Burhanpur and leave their families there. Money was given to them in aid of these necessary arrangements.

On hearing of Murad Bakhsh’s coronation and Mir Jumla’s arrest, Shah Jahan openly marched northwards to contest the throne.

He sent letters of reprimand to his two sons, ordering them to return to the path of obedience and duty. But they pretended to see only Dara’s hand in these Imperial letters, and insisted on going to the capital to pay their respects to the Emperor in person. At last, his preparations being well advanced, Aurangzib considered further delay useless, especially as Jaswant Singh and Qasim Khan on reaching Malwa were sure to strengthen Dara’s interest there and organise the local zamindars to bar the road from the

* Adab 201a, 168b, 92a, 123a; A. N. 43—46; Dilkasha, 18—21.
South. So, after giving to Murad the impatiently expected notice to start, he sent his eldest son with the Van towards Burhanpur (25th January, 1658) and himself left Aurangabad with the rest of his army eleven days afterwards (5th Feb.). He now began to exercise royal prerogatives, bestowing titles, posts, and promotions of mansab (rank). Muazzam was created Viceroy of the Deccan and Wazir Khan that of Khandesh.*

Burhanpur was reached on 18th February, and here the organisation of the army and the preparations for the march were completed. A month's halt was made in this town. Aurangzib had written a letter to Shah Jahan inquiring about his health and hoping that the Emperor would soon completely recover, look after the administration himself, and put an end to Dara's usurpation of the supreme authority. But day by day only alarming news of the Court reached him. His agent Isa Beg, too, arrived from Agra and fully unfolded the state of affairs there, saying how after his illness Shah Jahan doted on Dara to an extreme and that Prince had made himself Emperor in all but the name. Isa Beg was the bearer of secret messages from

many nobles, professing devotion to Aurangzib and asking him to push on to the capital, without fearing the largeness of the Imperial army, as it was at heart hostile to Dara.

Encouraged by these promises of support and unwilling to let Jaswant Singh have more time to consolidate his power in Malwa or close the northern road effectually, Aurangzib set out from Burhanpur on 20th March. From Mandwah he sent his eldest son back to arrest and imprison Shah Nawaz Khan, who was unwilling to accompany Aurangzib in his open rebellion, and had lingered behind at Burhanpur under false pretexts. This high officer, though he was the father-in-law of Aurangzib and descended from the royal blood of Persia, had to sacrifice liberty to loyalty, (26th March). By Aurangzib’s order, he was kept a prisoner in the fort of Burhanpur for seven months.*

At Mandwah there is a parting of the roads to Hindustan. One path running north-eastwards crosses the Narmada at Handia. But Aurangzib took the other route, turned to the

north-west, and in seven marches reached Akbarpur on the bank of the Narmada, the stream that has divided Southern India from Northern since time immemorial. Here he forded the river without the least opposition (3rd April) and then marched due north towards Ujjain, through the pass overlooked by the hill-fort of Mandu.

On 13th April he reached the environs of Dipalpur and learnt that Murad had arrived some miles west of him. A messenger was sent to invite the younger Prince to join him without delay. Next day, both the armies began their march, and on the way, near the lake of Dipalpur, the brothers met together; their armies were united; and with redoubled strength and confidence they pushed on towards Ujjain to encounter Jaswant, who was only one day's march in front. In the evening Aurangzib encamped at the village of Dharmat, on the western bank of the Gambhira (an affluent of the Chambal), and decided to fight the enemy next day.*

* Akbarpur, 22°9 N. 75°32 E. on the Narmada, 13 miles west of Mandlesar (Ind. At. Sh. 37 N. E.) The hill-fort of Mandu is 14 miles north of Akbarpur. Dipalpur, 22°50 N. 75°36 E. (Sh. 36 S. E.) Dharmat, 23 N. 75°43 E. is 12 miles north of Dipalpur, 2 miles S. W. of the Fatehabad Railway Station, and 14 miles S. S. W. of Ujjain. (Sh. 36 N. E.) A. N. 53—56. Aqil Khan, 26. Isar·das, 17.
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